To: Honorable Mayor and Members of the City Council
From: Dee Williams-Ridley, City Manager
Submitted by: Jennifer Louis, Chief of Police
Subject: Surveillance Ordinance items related to Fixed Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs)

RECOMMENDATION
Adopt a Resolution accepting the proposed policies and acquisition report for the use of fixed automated license plate readers (ALPRs).

FISCAL IMPACTS OF RECOMMENDATION
BPD expects the individual camera costs to range from $2500-$5000 each, with the installation to vary. BPD believes that for the proposed 52-camera deployment the cost to purchase and install to not exceed an initial cost of $250,000. The yearly subscription cost may fluctuate but is expected to range from $125,000 to $175,000 a year.

INTRODUCTION
The City of Berkeley enacted the Surveillance Ordinance in 2018 to establish a thoughtful process regarding the procurement and use of Surveillance Technology that carefully balances the City’s interest in protecting public safety with its interest in protecting the privacy and civil rights of its community members. To ensure that our general policies maintained consistent format with other department policies the Department developed parallel ‘use’ policies where appropriate so that the ‘Surveillance Use Policy’ could directly follow all the requirements explicitly set forth in BMC 2.99.020(4). Both policies are equally important, and all members are required to abide by the legal parameter of both policies. Thereby in nearly every piece of equipment that the Department has that is reportable under BMC 2.99, there are generally two nearly identical policies, a Use Policy, and a Surveillance Use Policy. Recognizing the importance of the Surveillance Use Policies, the Department has a chapter in our Departmental Policies dedicated to the Surveillance Use Policies.
CURRENT SITUATION AND ITS EFFECTS
There is existing automated license plate reader (ALPR) technology at use in the City, however, Council approved that technology for a different use and effective purpose than is proposed in this item. This new use of ALPR technology is fixed automated license plate readers (ALPRs). As part of the Surveillance Ordinance process, the department must complete acquisition and use policies which must undergo review by the Police Accountability Board and ultimately receive Council approval. These items were also presented to the Public Safety Policy Committee for review and guidance.

The Department is bringing this item forward in response to the Council’s approved budget referral on ALPRs for community safety improvement on November 30th, 2021. The Department was tasked with the creation of policies and identifying costs associated with such a program.

The Department has identified and provided several examples in the Acquisition Report wherein this technology could have potentially benefited the Department in its efforts of precision-based policing, and potentially aided the community in the mutual efforts to keep the City of Berkeley safe.

The City of Berkeley currently has ALPR technology with the Department’s Parking Enforcement. However, this technology is intentionally focused on the mission as it relates to parking enforcement operations. The proposed fixed ALPR policies are intended to aid investigations, improve community safety and aid the Department in its efforts of precision-based policing.

Crime trends regionally and in the City of Berkeley indicate there has been a steady increase in shootings in the City over the last five years and Part 1 Crimes reached their highest level in ten years in 2022. The Department believes that fixed ALPRs support our mission to safeguard our diverse community through proactive law enforcement and problem-solving, treating all people with dignity and respect. This law enforcement tool enhances policing practices and creates greater safeguards toward fair and impartial policing and safer outcomes during law enforcement interactions.

The Fixed Automated License Plate Reader Policies are covered by three policies:
1. Policy 422 – The policy that will establish guidelines for the Police Department on the use of Fixed Automated License Plate Readers
2. Policy 1305 - The Surveillance Use Policy related to Fixed Automated License Plate Readers

These policies are attached to this report.
On May 12th, 2023, the above policies are currently undergoing review by the City Attorney’s Office. Pursuant to the Surveillance Ordinance, BMC Section 2.99.030.2, upon receipt of acquisition and use policies from the Police Department, the Police Accountability Board (PAB) has a 30-day deadline “to recommend approval of the policy, object to the proposal, recommend modifications, or take no action.” BPD shared the policies with DPA on May 11th, 2023.

The Police Accountability Board held a Special Meeting on June 16th, 2023 wherein they objected to the proposed policies and outlined concerns. These concerns and correspondence are attached to this item.

The Public Safety Policy Committee held a Special Meeting on June 20th, 2023. Both the Police Department and Police Accountability Board/ODPA presented the proposed policies. In conclusion, the Public Safety Policy Committee made a qualified positive recommendation to the City Council with the understanding that the Berkeley Police Department (BPD) and the Police Accountability Board (PAB) will be submitting supplemental materials for consideration; requesting that BPD provide a line-by-line response to the amendments and revisions proposed by the PAB clarifying why they are being accepted or rejected. It was also requested that the Department provide an Informational Item to Council upon the final recommendation of placement of the ALPR cameras after consulting with the vendor.

The Department is bringing before the Council a revised red-line version of the policies that address concerns identified by PAB. These updates are explained in greater detail (“line by line”) in the attached memorandum.

ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY AND CLIMATE IMPACTS
There are no identifiable environmental effects, climate impacts, or sustainability opportunities associated with the subject of this report.

CONTACT PERSON
Captain Mike Durbin, Police, Professional Standards Division (510) 981-5760

ATTACHMENTS:
1. Resolution
2. Police Accountability Board’s June 16th, 2023 Objection to the BPD Acquisition and Proposed Policies.
3. BPD Policy 422
4. BPD Policy 1305
5. BPD Acquisition Report
6. BPD response to Police Accountability Board
RESOLUTION NO. ##,###-N.S.

SURVEILLANCE ORDINANCE ITEMS: FIXED AUTOMATED LICENSE PLATE READERS (ALPRS)

WHEREAS, the Berkeley City Council adopted Ordinance NO. 7,592-N.S., the Surveillance Technology Use and Community Safety Ordinance on March 13, 2018; and

WHEREAS, BMC section 2.99.020 (4) mandates a Surveillance Use Policy for use of Surveillance Technology; and

WHEREAS, Fixed Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs) are considered Surveillance Technology per BMC section 2.99.020 (1); and

WHEREAS, per BMC section 2.99.030 (1)(b), requires the City Manager to obtain City Council approval for the acquisition of new Surveillance Technology, Fixed Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs), by placing an item on the Action Calendar.

NOW THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED by the Council of the City of Berkeley that it approves the acquisition and Use Policies for the Fixed Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs).
June 16, 2023

VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL

Chief Jennifer Louis
Berkeley Police Department
2100 Martin Luther King Jr. Way
Berkeley, CA 94704

Re: Objection to the Berkeley Police Department Surveillance Acquisition Report – Fixed Automated License Plate Readers (ALPR) and Proposed Policies 422 and 1305

Dear Chief Jennifer Louis,

I am writing to you as the Chair of the Police Accountability Board (PAB) regarding the recent proposal for the acquisition of fixed automated license plate readers (ALPRs) and the corresponding proposed policies (422 and 1305). Pursuant to our authority under BMC 2.99.030, the PAB has conducted a thorough review of the Berkeley Police Department Surveillance Acquisition Report – Fixed Automated License Plate Readers and the proposed policies (422 and 1305). On June 16, 2023, at a Special Meeting, the Board voted to object to the proposal of the acquisition and the policies as written.

We acknowledge the importance of maintaining public safety and recognize the Berkeley Police Department's dedication to serving and protecting our community. Our aim is to balance public safety and the protection of civil liberties and privacy without compromising one for the other. By addressing and clarifying the concerns we raise in this letter, we can work together to create a safe and secure environment for all members of the Berkeley community while upholding their rights and privacy.

Our decision to object to the proposal was based on careful consideration of various factors. We considered the comments and observations from individual Board members, an independent report authored by the Office of the Director of Police Accountability (ODPA) expressing concerns about the technology and lack of clarity in the drafted policies, input from community members
who participated in the public forum of the Board, and insights from subject matter experts who cautioned us about approving the acquisition and corresponding policies without a careful analysis of the community implications.

In the analysis, the PAB identified four specific areas where the acquisition report and proposed policies lack clarity and may run contrary to the values of our community and the work underway to reimagine public safety in the City of Berkeley:

1) **Civil Liberties Protections**\(^1\): The proposed acquisition report and policies need to provide stronger safeguards and assurances for protecting civil liberties and privacy rights. It is essential to ensure that the acquisition and use of ALPRs do not infringe upon the rights of individuals in our community. For example:

   a. One of our Board members expressed concerns that the acquisition report or the policies don’t provide safeguards for this surveillance technology or its data being used in a way that could run afoul of reproductive rights by recording movements or location patterns of individuals seeking medical attention or health services for reproductive rights.

   b. We are concerned that the Department indicates “Reasonable suspicion or probable cause is not required before using an ALPR”, but provides no clear examples of a scenario where the technology may be required to be used without reaching these important legal thresholds.

   c. There appears to be unclear language about retention periods. In one section the Department indicates, “The ALPR vendor will purge their data at the end of the 30 days of storage.” Then, the Department includes seemingly contradictory language in its policy: “However, this will not preclude Berkeley Police Department from maintaining any relevant vehicle data obtained from the system after that period pursuant to the established City of Berkeley retention schedule mentioned above or outlined elsewhere.” (see Section 1305.4 of the proposed policy)

\(^1\) As indicated by BPD Sergeant LeDoux at the June 16, 2023 Special Meeting of the Board, the Department is considering acquiring cameras from a specific vendor. Watchdogs like the ACLU have raised civil liberties concerns about the potential vendor. For your consideration please consider this article from the ACLU regarding Flock’s surveillance systems:

2) **Lack of Empirical Support or Data justifying the need or its intended use:** We have noted a lack of empirical evidence or data demonstrating the effectiveness of the technology in achieving its intended goals here in the City of Berkeley. While the PAB is aware the BPD has reported an increase in crime in specific categories over the years, comparable jurisdictions with or without this technology have not been analyzed to determine potential effectiveness for those crime categories. Before moving forward with the acquisition, it is crucial to have solid evidence that ALPRs will significantly contribute to solving criminal investigations and enhancing public safety beyond the highlighted cases the Department cites in the Acquisition Report.

   a. The ODPA’s report cited the IACP (2022) survey which indicated, “Although research is sparse, there is some evidence that suggests LPR use is effective at preventing crime.” However, the Acquisition Report fails to adequately provide a data-based justification for why the City of Berkeley needs to adopt this technology.

   b. As noted in the ODPA report, as currently written, the *Purpose* section of the BPD’s Acquisition Report does not explicitly mention a data-based justification for the use of ALPRs (beyond the highlighted cases of interest). To strengthen the justification for the acquisition, the BPD needs to provide statistical analyses (or other data analyses) demonstrating the effectiveness of ALPRs in reducing the specific crime problems the City would like to resolve.

3) **Concerns about True Financial Costs:** The PAB has concerns about the true costs associated with the technology, including potential hidden costs, maintenance expenses, and long-term financial commitments. It is essential to have a comprehensive understanding of the financial implications and ensure that the benefits outweigh the costs.

4) **Lack of Completeness of the Acquisition Report and Proposed Policies:** The proposed policies require further clarity, elaboration, and editing. Particularly, the Department should clearly outline the intended uses of the data, retention periods, access controls, and measures to protect against potential misuse or unauthorized access (to include more information about minimum training requirements for the users of the technology). For example:

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a. In the proposed policies, the Department uses language to emphasize the importance of data privacy, protection of civil liberties, and accountability but has a weak approach to misuse in Section 422.5 of the proposed policy, “Anyone who engages in an impermissible use of the ALPR system or associated scan files or hot lists may be subject to administrative sanctions, up to and including termination, pursuant to and consistent with the relevant collective bargaining agreements and departmental policies.” (emphasis added). Adherence to the policy needs to be non-negotiable, therefore the Department needs to modify the language to indicate that impermissible uses SHALL be subject to administrative sanctions.

b. Section 422.10 of the proposed policy mentions the requirement for training but does not specify what that will look like. As noted in the ODPA report, the BPD should outline the minimum training requirements provided to officers on the proper use of ALPRs and adherence to privacy and civil rights standards.

c. Without clear articulation of the minimum training requirements, the Board has concerns regarding Sections 422.5 and 1305.3 of the proposed policies which encapsulate conditions for use, standards to be observed for various circumstances (stop of car vs. stop of person for example), and required verification before certain activities can be taken.

We sincerely appreciate your attentiveness to this matter. We eagerly anticipate continued dialogue and collaboration on this significant issue. We firmly believe that addressing complex and intricate problems requires consideration of multiple, and at times conflicting, perspectives, which may yield various potential solutions.

Sincerely,

John “Chip” Moore, Chair
Police Accountability Board

cc: Via Email Only
Terry Taplin, City Councilor (Chair of Public Safety Committee)
Police Accountability Board
Dee Williams-Ridley, City Manager
Mark Numainville, City Clerk
Farimah Brown, Berkeley City Attorney

Attachments:
- JUNE 16, 2023 - POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY BOARD SPECIAL MEETING PACKET
- JUNE 16, 2023 - POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY BOARD SPECIAL MEETING SUPPLEMENTAL PACKET
**POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY BOARD**
**SPECIAL MEETING PACKET**

**Friday, June 16, 2023**
**10:00 A.M.**

Board Members:

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<th>Role</th>
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<tr>
<td>JOHN MOORE III. (CHAIR)</td>
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**MEETING LOCATION**
Multipurpose Room
1947 Center Street,
Berkeley, CA 94704

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Health and Safety Protocols for In-Person Meetings of Berkeley Boards and Commissions
February 2023

The policy below applies to in-person meetings of Berkeley Boards and Commissioners held in accordance with the Government Code (Brown Act) after the end of the State-declared emergency on February 28, 2023.

Issued By: City Manager’s Office
Date: February 14, 2023

I. Vaccination Status
All attendees are encouraged to be fully up to date on their vaccinations, including any boosters for which they are eligible.

II. Health Status Precautions
For members of the public who are feeling sick, including but not limited to cough, shortness of breath or difficulty breathing, fever or chills, muscle or body aches, vomiting or diarrhea, or new loss of taste or smell, it is recommended that they do not attend the meeting in-person as a public health precaution. In these cases, the public may submit comments in writing in lieu of attending in-person.

If an in-person attendee has been in close contact, as defined below, with a person who has tested positive for COVID-19 in the past five days, they are advised to wear a well-fitting mask (N95s, KN95s, KF94s are best), test for COVID-19 3-5 days from last exposure, and consider submitting comments in writing in lieu of attending in-person.

Close contact is defined as someone sharing the same indoor airspace, e.g., home, clinic waiting room, airplane, etc., for a cumulative total of 15 minutes or more over a 24-hour period within 2 days before symptoms of the infected person appear (or before a positive test for asymptomatic individuals); or having contact with COVID-19 droplets (e.g., being coughed on while not wearing recommended personal protective equipment).

A voluntary sign-in sheet will be available at the meeting entry for in-person attendees. This will assist with contact tracing in case of COVID-19 contact resulting from the meeting.

Members of City Commissions are encouraged to take a rapid COVID-19 test on the day of the meeting.
Health and Safety Protocols for In-Person Meetings of Berkeley Boards and Commissions
February 2023

III. Face Coverings/Mask
Face coverings or masks that cover both the nose and mouth are encouraged for all commissioners, staff, and attendees at an in-person City Commission meeting. Face coverings will be provided by the City and available for attendees to use at the meeting. Members of Commissions, city staff, and the public are encouraged to wear a mask at all times, except when speaking publicly from the dais or at the public comment podium, although masking is encouraged even when speaking.

IV. Physical Distancing
Currently, there are no physical distancing requirements in place by the State of California or the Local Health Officer for an indoor event similar to a Commission meeting.

Audience seating capacity will be at regular allowable levels per the Fire Code. Capacity limits will be posted at the meeting location. However, all attendees are requested to be respectful of the personal space of other attendees. An area of the public seating area will be designated as “distanced seating” to accommodate persons that need to distance for personal health reasons.

Distancing will be implemented for the dais as space allows.

V. Protocols for Teleconference Participation by Commissioners
Upon the repeal of the state-declared emergency, all standard Brown Act requirements will be in effect for Commissioners participating remotely due to an approved ADA accommodation. For Commissioners participating remotely, the agenda must be posted at the remote location, the remote location must be accessible to the public, and the public must be able to participate and give public comment from the remote location.

- A Commissioner at a remote location will follow the same health and safety protocols as in-person meetings.
- A Commissioner at a remote location may impose reasonable capacity limits at their location.

VI. Hand Washing/Sanitizing
Hand sanitizing stations are available at the meeting locations. The bathrooms have soap and water for handwashing.

VII. Air Flow/Circulation/Sanitizing
Air filtration devices are used at all meeting locations. Window ventilation may be used if weather conditions allow.
POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY BOARD
SPECIAL MEETING AGENDA

Friday, June 16, 2023
10:00 A.M.

Board Members:
JOHN MOORE III. (CHAIR)  REGINA HARRIS (VICE-CHAIR)
KITTY CALAVITA  JULIE LEFTWICH
LEAH WILSON

MEETING LOCATION
Multipurpose Room
1947 Center Street,
Berkeley, CA 94704

PUBLIC NOTICE

The PAB has resumed in-person meetings and encourages community members to attend in person. Community members attending in person should observe the “Health and Safety Protocols for In-person Meetings of Berkeley Boards and Commissions” as outlined by the City of Berkeley.

***The PAB acknowledges that physical attendance may not be feasible for all community members. To this end, the Office of the Director of Police Accountability (ODPA) has been exploring the option of allowing for remote participation at the PAB meetings. Please note that the ODPA and PAB are in the early stages of implementing this hybrid meeting format so there is a possibility for technical glitches and errors. Your patience and understanding are greatly appreciated. ***

To access the meeting remotely: join from a PC, Mac, iPad, iPhone, or Android device using this URL: https://us02web.zoom.us/j/82136328053. If you do not wish for your name to appear on the screen, use the drop-down menu and click on “rename” to rename yourself to be anonymous. To request to speak, use the “raise hand” icon on the screen. To join by phone: Dial 1 669 900 6833 and enter Meeting ID 821 3632 8053. If you wish to comment during the public comment portion of the agenda, press *9 and wait to be recognized.
LAND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The City of Berkeley recognizes that the community we live in was built on the territory of xučyun (Huchiun (Hooch-yoon)), the ancestral and unceded land of the Chochenyo (Chochen-yo)-speaking Ohlone (Oh-low-nee) people, the ancestors and descendants of the sovereign Verona Band of Alameda County. This land was and continues to be of great importance to all of the Ohlone Tribes and descendants of the Verona Band. As we begin our meeting tonight, we acknowledge and honor the original inhabitants of Berkeley, the documented 5,000-year history of a vibrant community at the West Berkeley Shellmound, and the Ohlone people who continue to reside in the East Bay. We recognize that Berkeley’s residents have and continue to benefit from the use and occupation of this unceded stolen land since the City of Berkeley’s incorporation in 1878. As stewards of the laws regulating the City of Berkeley, it is not only vital that we recognize the history of this land, but also recognize that the Ohlone people are present members of Berkeley and other East Bay communities today.

AGENDA

1. CALL TO ORDER & ROLL CALL (2 MINUTES)

2. APPROVAL OF AGENDA (2 MINUTES)

3. PUBLIC COMMENT (15 MINUTES)
   (Public comment at special meetings is limited to the items on the agenda. Speakers are generally allotted up to three minutes, but may be allotted less time if there are many speakers.)

4. POLICY REVIEW OF BERKELEY POLICE DEPARTMENT’S PROPOSED POLICIES: POLICY 422 “FIXED AUTOMATED LICENSE PLATE READERS (ALPRs)” AND POLICY 1305 “SURVEILLANCE USE POLICY – FIXED ALPRs” (90 MINUTES)
   (The objective of this agenda item is to conduct a comprehensive policy review of the Berkeley Police Department’s proposed policies regarding the use of ALPRs. The PAB may vote to recommend approval of the policies, object to the proposal, recommend modifications, or take no action.)

5. PUBLIC COMMENT (10 MINUTES)
   (Public comment at special meetings is limited to the items on the agenda. Speakers are generally allotted up to three minutes, but may be allotted less time if there are many speakers.)

6. ADJOURNMENT (1 MINUTE)
Communications Disclaimer

Communications to the Police Accountability Board, like all communications to Berkeley boards, commissions, or committees, are public records and will become part of the City’s electronic records, which are accessible through the City’s website. Please note: e-mail addresses, names, addresses, and other contact information are not required, but if included in any communication to a City board, commission, or committee, will become part of the public record. If you do not want your e-mail address or any other contact information to be made public, you may deliver communications via U.S. Postal Service or in person to the Board Secretary. If you do not want your contact information included in the public record, do not include that information in your communication. Please contact the Board Secretary for further information.

Communication Access Information (A.R. 1.12)

To request a disability-related accommodation(s) to participate in the meeting, including auxiliary aids or services, please contact the Disability Services specialist at 981-6418 (V) or 981-6347 (TDD) at least three business days before the meeting date.

SB 343 Disclaimer

Any writings or documents provided to a majority of the Board regarding any item on this agenda will be made available for public inspection at the Office of the Director of Police Accountability, located at 1947 Center Street, 5th Floor, Berkeley, CA.

Contact the Director of Police Accountability (Board Secretary) at:

1947 Center Street, 5th Floor, Berkeley, CA 94704
Website: www.cityofberkeley.info/dpa/   Email: dpa@cityofberkeley.info
November 30, 2021 Budget Referral
Re Automatic License Plate Readers
for Community Safety Improvements
as Submitted by Councilmember
Taplin, Vice Mayor Droste (Former),
And Councilmember Wengraf.
To: Honorable Mayor and Members of the City Council

From: Councilmember Taplin, Vice Mayor Droste (co-sponsor), Councilmember Wengraf (co-sponsor)

Subject: Budget referral: Automated license plate readers for community safety improvement

RECOMMENDATION
That the Berkeley City Council take the following actions to enable and deploy tactical technologies in strategic public spaces and the public ROW for the improvement of community safety and determent, intervention, prevention of illegal dumping and/or investigation of violent crime and traffic violations:

● Authorize the City Manager to install Automatic License Plate Readers (ALPRs) at strategic locations including public facilities, entrances to the city and the public right-of-way in areas impacted by violent crime, traffic violations including infractions pertaining to bicycle and pedestrian safety, illegal dumping, Schedule II drug offenses, and other criminal activity; and refer to the FY 23-24 budget process cost of ALPRs.

● Refer to the City Manager the development of a policy pursuant and subject to City of Berkeley Surveillance Ordinance and Sanctuary City Contracting Ordinance enabling the use of ALPRs in fixed locations, mobile trailers, and vehicles by the Berkeley Police Department; consider a data retention period of no greater than one year, no less than sixty days to account for reporting lag, and study the feasibility of shorter data retention periods for non-hit scans with final discretion resting with the City Manager; consider comparable and applicable standards in the ALPRs policies of local governments including: the City of Alameda, The city of Emeryville, The City of Hayward, The City of Oakland, The City of Piedmont, The City of Richmond, The City of San Leandro, and The City of Vallejo; and consider provisions to safeguard efficacy against plate counterfitting, plate switching, and other methods of detection evasions.

POLICY COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATION
On November 1, 2021, the Public safety Policy Committee took the following action: M/S/C (Kesarwani/Bartlett) to refer the item to Council with a qualified positive recommendation of the item to reflect the Policy Committee’s desire for consideration of the costs and benefits of this proposed expenditure against other public safety investments in the two-year FY 2022-23 &
2023-24 budget and the need to first develop a policy related to addressing data retention and other issues in accordance with the City of Berkeley Surveillance Ordinance and Sanctuary City Contracting Ordinance.

CURRENT SITUATION AND ITS EFFECTS

According to the Berkeley Police Department’s 2019/2020 Crime Report, Berkeley has seen marked increases in aggravated assault, homicides, auto theft and larceny over the past two years. While the overall crime rate remained relatively flat, specific categories of property crimes increased sharply—especially vehicle thefts, which increased by 66% in 2020. Homicides decreased to zero in 2021, but reports of gunfire and auto theft increased.

Currently, the police department’s Parking Enforcement Bureau uses Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs) for time zone parking and scofflaw enforcement, replacing the practice of physically “chalking” car tires, but ALPR technology has not been implemented in the city for other law enforcement purposes. According to the City Manager’s 2020 Surveillance Technology Report, there were an average of 12,059 successful license plate “reads” per day in the month of September, 2020. From October 2019 to October 2020, there were 44,068 “hits” detecting a positive violation, roughly 25% (14,945) of which resulted in enforcement by citation issuance.

Pursuant to Berkeley Municipal Code Chapter 2.99 Section 2.99.070, the City Manager’s office is required to report on surveillance technology on an annual basis.

BACKGROUND

According to a 2018 study by the Center for Policing Equity, Black people comprise only 8% of Berkeley’s population, but a disproportionate 46% of people subject to police uses of force. In light of this evidence, and in the wake of the national outcry over the death of George Floyd, the City Council adopted a resolution on July 14, 2020 directing the City Manager in part to “identify elements of police work that could be achieved through alternative programs, policies, systems, and community investments.”

Some research has found that ALPRs contribute to marginal improvements in public safety outcomes with respect to vehicle thefts and traffic safety. The use of LPR technology has

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2 https://www.cityofberkeley.info/Clerk/City_Council/2020/11_Nov/Documents/2020-11-10_Item_19_Resolution_Accepting_the_Surveillance.aspx
increased significantly in law enforcement agencies across the US in the past decade, but outcomes have been inconsistently tracked, which limits available research. One qualitative case study found that criminal investigators adapted LPR technology to a broader range of investigative work, such as rapid responses and corroborating suspect alibis.

An analysis of a randomized control trial in the City of Vallejo found that ALPRs attached to police vehicles enabled a 140% increase in detection of stolen vehicles, while arrests were more efficient with stationary ALPRs in fixed locations. A study on LPR technology in Mesa, AZ found that LPRs resulted in an eightfold increase in the number of plates scanned, more positive scans, arrests and recovery of stolen vehicles, and a reduction in calls for drug offenses. However, the study did not find a statistically significant reduction in vehicle thefts in hot spots compared to manual checks, possibly because the presence of law enforcement officers performing manual checks had a more preventative effect. Another study of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department found that “LPR use may have contributed to modest improvements in case closures for auto theft and robbery”—the former in the long term, and the latter both short- and long term.

According to recent analysis by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, one law enforcement agency found that drivers with suspended, revoked, or restricted licenses were 2.2 times more likely to be involved in serious or fatal crashes than other drivers, and that identifying these drivers with ALPRs “could affect traffic safety positively by targeting violator vehicles that are more prone to crash risk.” A quasi-experimental survey of data from Buffalo, NY found a reduction in violent crime and traffic accidents associated with roadblocks using LPRs.

RATIONALE FOR RECOMMENDATION
Reimagining public safety necessitates significant improvements in public safety outcomes, including practical solutions to traffic safety and property crime. California law currently

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preempts municipalities from transferring traffic enforcement to civilian duties or automated speed cameras.

While auto thefts in Berkeley increased by 64% from 2019 to 2020, and increased 54% year-over-year in the first half of 2021\(^\text{13}\), a 2021 City Auditor analysis\(^\text{14}\) of the Berkeley Police Department found that Officer-Initiated Stops disproportionately target Black and Latino drivers relative to their share of the city’s population.

![Bar chart showing percent of Berkeley Population (2019) vs. Percent of Officer-Initiated Stops (2015-2019)](image)

Note: For the purposes of this figure for Berkeley populations, the U.S. Census categories of American Indian and Alaska Native alone, Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander alone, and Two or More Races are summed for Other; White is White alone, not Hispanic or Latino.

Source: Auditor’s analysis of Berkeley Police Department Computer Aided Dispatch data and 2019 US Census data

ALPRs therefore present an opportunity to reduce property crimes and improve traffic safety while also reducing civilian encounters with police officers conducting ad hoc traffic enforcement, which the 2021 audit found to have a significant racial bias against Black and Latino drivers. ALPRs could make enforcement more fair, impartial, and effective. In 2015, the Berkeley Police Department used ALPR technology on a mobile trailer to investigate five attempted kidnappings by Willard Middle School.\(^\text{15}\)

However, ALPR data storage gives rise to several privacy concerns. In *Carpenter v. United States*, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that accessing location data tracking an individual’s

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movements from their cell phone constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment and requires a search warrant.\textsuperscript{16} While ALPR scans are subject to reasonableness standards for searches under Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, state courts have found that ALPR alerts are sufficient to establish a reasonable suspicion, though there are situations that require further intervention to establish reasonableness or avoid error.\textsuperscript{17}

In \textit{Neal v. Fairfax County Police Department}, the Virginia Supreme Court ruled that GPS data and images associated with license plate numbers were private personal information (PPI), but license plate numbers themselves stored in ALPR databases were not.\textsuperscript{18} The California Supreme Court has also underscored such a distinction between “bulk data collection” of license plate numbers that did not “produce records of investigations” for particular crimes.\textsuperscript{19} By contrast, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Sotomayor argued in \textit{United States v. Jones} that government agencies collecting “private aspects of identity” could be “susceptible to abuse.”\textsuperscript{20} This calls into question the so-called third party doctrine of the Fourth Amendment—the longstanding precedent that individuals may be reasonably considered to waive their right to privacy and assume any information provided to third parties may eventually be accessed by the government—given the vast array of information government agencies can now access through surveillance technology. To carefully balance privacy and policing efficacy under this new paradigm, Newell (2013) recommends strictly limiting data retention for non-“hit” scans, and maintaining anonymized ALPR data subject to public disclosure laws.\textsuperscript{21}

California Vehicle Code Section 2413(b) restricts the California Highway Patrol (CHP)’s retention LPR data for 60 days unless it is being used as evidence in a felony investigation. Subsection (c) restricts the distribution of this data strictly to law enforcement agencies or officers and “only for purposes of locating vehicles or persons when either are reasonably suspected of being involved in the commission of a public offense.”

In 2015, Senate Bill 34 imposed additional security and privacy requirements on the use of ALPR data.\textsuperscript{22} Unfortunately, a State Auditor report in 2020 surveying four local law enforcement agencies in California found that ALPR policies were out of compliance with SB34, retained images for far longer than needed or allowed, and had no processes in place to safeguard local compliance. For example, the State Auditor “did not find evidence that the agencies had always

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{18} \textit{Neal v. Fairfax County Police Dept.}, 812 S.E.2d 444, 295 Va. 334 (2018).
\bibitem{20} \textit{United States v. Jones}, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring);
\bibitem{22} \url{https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201520160SB34}
\end{thebibliography}
determined whether an entity receiving shared images had a right and a need to access the images or even that the entity was a public agency.”

In 2018, a lawsuit by the American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California revealed that Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) had purchased access to private databases containing ALPR data with 5 billion individual data points for civil immigration enforcement, and had obtained ALPR data from over 80 local law enforcement agencies. However, in 2017, Senate Bill 54 greatly restricted the ability of California law enforcement agencies to share information with ICE.

Berkeley Parking Enforcement uses PCS Mobile ALPR units using Genentech ALPR technology regulated by BPD Administrative Order #001-2016, which limits storage of reads to 30 days and hits to 365 days. Images of reads are not stored on the server, and data may only be used for legitimate law enforcement purposes. Police Departments in the cities of Vallejo and Piedmont utilize the Flock Safety Operating System, which comes with a transparency portal listing permitted and prohibited uses, data storage, access provided to outside agencies, numbers of hits and scans, and other relevant metadata.

ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED
1. Gun buyback programs have not demonstrated significant efficacy except in limited circumstances within more holistic community-based violence prevention programs.

2. With the stalling of Assembly Bill 550 in this year’s legislative session, automated speeding cameras are not currently permitted in the state of California.

3. On October 27, 2020, the City Council referred to the Community Engagement Process for Reimagining Public Safety the creation of a Group Violence Intervention Program (GVI), or “Operation Ceasefire,” that will assemble a Berkeley-centered interjurisdictional working group of community members, law enforcement personnel, and supportive services providers to address gun violence. Current staffing capacity in the City Manager’s office is insufficient to develop such a program before the process is complete.

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25 https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180SB54

26 https://transparency.flocksafety.com/vallejo-ca-pd

27 https://transparency.flocksafety.com/vallejo-ca-pd


29 https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=202120220AB550
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS
None.

FISCAL IMPACTS
In 2017, an amendment to Contract No. 9977\textsuperscript{30} from the City Manager’s Office itemized a unit cost of $78,363 for each ALPR system. Costs for this referral may be different because this contract was only for mobile ALPRs used for parking enforcement, not in fixed locations or mobile trailers.

CONTACT
Councilmember Terry Taplin, District 2, (510) 981-7120, ttaplin@cityofberkeley.info

ATTACHMENTS
1. City of Vallejo ALPR Policy,
2. City of Alameda,
3. City of Emeryville,
4. City of Hayward,
5. City of Oakland,
6. City of Piedmont,
7. City of Richmond,
8. City of San Leandro.

\textsuperscript{30} \url{https://ci.berkeley.ca.us/Clerk/City_Council/2017/07_Jul/Documents/2017-07-11_Item_13_Contract_No_9977_Amendment.aspx}
Policy

426
Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs)

426.1 PURPOSE AND SCOPE
The purpose of this policy is to provide guidance for the capture, storage, and use of digital data obtained through the use of Automated License Plate Reader (ALPR) technology.

426.2 DEFINITIONS

(a) **Automated License Plate Reader (ALPR):** A device that uses cameras and computer technology to compare digital images to lists of known information of interest.

(b) **ALPR Operator:** Trained Department members who may utilize ALPR system/equipment. ALPR operators may be assigned to any position within the Department, and the ALPR Administrator may order the deployment of the ALPR systems for use in various efforts.

(c) **ALPR Administrator:** The Investigations Bureau Captain or the Chief’s designee, serves as the ALPR Administrator for the Department.

(d) **Hot List:** A list of license plates associated with vehicles of interest compiled from one or more databases including, but not limited to, NCIC, CA DMV, Local BOLO's, etc.

(e) **Vehicles of Interest:** Including, but not limited to vehicles which are reported as stolen; display stolen license plates or tags; vehicles linked to missing and/or wanted persons and vehicles flagged by the Department of Motor Vehicle Administration or law enforcement agencies.

(f) **Detection:** Data obtained by an ALPR of an image (such as a license plate) within public view that was read by the device, including potential images (such as the plate and description of vehicle on which it was displayed), and information regarding the location of the ALPR system at the time of the ALPR’s read.

(g) **Hit:** Alert from the ALPR system that a scanned license plate number may be in the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) or other law enforcement database for a specific reason including, but not limited to, being related to a stolen car, wanted person, missing person, domestic violation protective order or terrorist-related activity.

426.3 ADMINISTRATION
The ALPR technology, also known as License Plate Recognition (LPR), allows for the automated detection of license plates along with the vehicle make, model, color and unique identifiers through the Vallejo Police Department’s ALPR’s system and the vendor’s vehicle identification technology. The technology is used by the Vallejo Police Department to convert data associated with vehicle license plates and vehicle descriptions for official law enforcement purposes, including identifying stolen or wanted vehicles, stolen license plates and missing persons. It may also be used to gather information related to active warrants, homeland security, electronic surveillance, suspect interdiction and stolen property recovery.
All installation and maintenance of ALPR equipment, as well as ALPR data retention and access, shall be managed by the Department Information Technology Manager. The Department Information Technology Manager will assign members under his/her command to administer the day-to-day operation of the ALPR equipment and data.

426.3.1 ALPR ADMINISTRATOR
The Investigations Bureau Captain shall be responsible for compliance with the requirements of Civil Code § 1798.90.5 et seq. This includes, but is not limited to (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53):

(a) Only properly trained sworn officers, crime analysts, and police assistants are allowed access to the ALPR system or to collect ALPR information.

(b) Ensuring that training requirements are completed for authorized users.

(c) ALPR system monitoring to ensure the security of the information and compliance with applicable privacy laws.

(d) Ensuring that procedures are followed for system operators and to maintain records of access in compliance with Civil Code § 1798.90.52.

(e) The title and name of the current designee in overseeing the ALPR operation is maintained. Continually working with the Custodian of Records on the retention and destruction of ALPR data.

(f) Ensuring this policy and related procedures are conspicuously posted on the department's website.

426.4 OPERATIONS
Use of an ALPR is restricted to the purposes outlined below. Department members shall not use, or allow others to use the equipment or database records for any unauthorized purpose (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53).

(a) An ALPR shall only be used for official law enforcement business.

(b) An ALPR may be used in conjunction with any routine patrol operation or criminal investigation; reasonable suspicion or probable cause is not required before using an ALPR.

(c) Partial license plates and unique vehicle descriptions reported during major crimes should be entered into the ALPR system in an attempt to identify suspect vehicles.

(d) No member of this department shall operate ALPR equipment or access ALPR data without first completing department-approved training.

(e) If practicable, the officer should verify an ALPR response through the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETs) before taking enforcement action that is based solely on an ALPR alert. Once an alert is received, the operator should confirm
that the observed license plate from the system matches the license plate of the observed vehicle. Before any law enforcement action is taken because of an ALPR alert, the alert will be verified through a CLETS inquiry via MDC or through Dispatch. Members will not take any police action that restricts the freedom of any individual based solely on an ALPR alert unless it has been validated. Because the ALPR alert may relate to a vehicle and may not relate to the person operating the vehicle, officers are reminded that they need to have reasonable suspicion and/or probable cause to make an enforcement stop of any vehicle. (For example, if a vehicle is entered into the system because of its association with a wanted individual, Officers should attempt to visually match the driver to the description of the wanted subject prior to making the stop or should have another legal basis for making the stop.)

(f) Hot Lists. Designation of hot lists to be utilized by the ALPR system shall be made by the ALPR Administrator or his/her designee. Hot lists shall be obtained or compiled from sources as may be consistent with the purposes of the ALPR system set forth in this Policy. Hot lists utilized by the Department’s LPR system may be updated by agency sources more frequently than the Department may be uploading them and thus the Department’s LPR system will not have access to real time data. Occasionally, there may be errors in the LPR system’s read of a license plate. Therefore, an alert alone shall not be a basis for police action (other than following the vehicle of interest). Prior to initiation of a stop of a vehicle or other intervention based on an alert, Department members shall undertake the following:

(1) Verification of status on a Hot List. An officer must receive confirmation, from a Vallejo Police Department Communications Dispatcher or other department computer device, that the license plate is still stolen, wanted, or otherwise of interest before proceeding (absent exigent circumstances).

(2) Visual verification of license plate number. Officers shall visually verify that the license plate of interest matches identically with the image of the license plate number captured (read) by the LPR, including both the alphanumeric characters of the license plate, state of issue, and vehicle descriptors before proceeding. Department members alerted to the fact that an observed motor vehicle's license plate is entered as a Hot Plate (hit) in a specific BOLO (be on the lookout) list are required to make a reasonable effort to confirm that a wanted person is actually in the vehicle and/or that a reasonable basis exists before a Department member would have a lawful basis to stop the vehicle.

(3) Department members will clear all stops from hot list alerts by indicating the positive ALPR Hit, i.e., with an arrest or other enforcement action. If it is not obvious in the text of the call as to the correlation of the ALPR Hit and the arrest, then the Department member shall update with the Communications Dispatcher and original person and/or a crime analyst inputting the vehicle in the hot list (hit).

(4) General Hot Lists (SVS, SFR, and SLR) will be automatically downloaded into the ALPR system a minimum of once a day with the most current data overwriting the old data.

(5) All entries and updates of specific Hot Lists within the ALPR system will be documented by the requesting Department member within the appropriate general offense report. As such, specific Hot Lists shall be approved by the ALPR
Administrator (or his/her designee) before initial entry within the ALPR system. The updating of such a list within the ALPR system shall thereafter be accomplished pursuant to the approval of the Department member's immediate supervisor. The hits from these data sources should be viewed as informational; created solely to bring the officers attention to specific vehicles that have been associated with criminal activity.

All Hot Plates and suspect information entered into the ALPR system will contain the following information as a minimum:

- Entering Department member's name
- Related case number.
- Short synopsis describing the nature of the originating call

(g) Training. No member of this Department shall operate ALPR equipment or access ALPR data without first completing Department-approved training.

(h) Login/Log-Out Procedure. To ensure proper operation and facilitate oversight of the ALPR system, all users will be required to have individual credentials for access and use of the systems and/or data, which has the ability to be fully audited.

Permitted/Impermissible Uses. The ALPR system, and all data collected, is the property of the Vallejo Police Department. Department personnel may only access and use the ALPR system for official and legitimate law enforcement purposes consistent with this Policy. The following uses of the ALPR system are specifically prohibited:

1. Invasion of Privacy: Except when done pursuant to a court order such as a search warrant, is a violation of this Policy to utilize the ALPR to record license plates except those of vehicles that are exposed to public view (e.g., vehicles on a public road or street, or that are on private property but whose license plate(s) are visible from a public road, street, or a place to which members of the public have access, such as the parking lot of a shop or other business establishment).

2. Harassment or Intimidation: It is a violation of this Policy to use the ALPR system to harass and/or intimidate any individual or group.

3. Use Based on a Protected Characteristic. It is a violation of this policy to use the LPR system or associated scan files or hot lists solely because of a person's, or group's race, gender, religion, political affiliation, nationality, ethnicity, sexual orientation, disability, or other classification protected by law.

4. Personal Use: It is a violation of this Policy to use the ALPR system or associated scan files or hot lists for any personal purpose.

5. First Amendment Rights. It is a violation of this policy to use the LPR system or associated scan files or hot lists for the purpose or known effect of infringing upon First Amendment rights.
Anyone who engages in an impermissible use of the ALPR system or associated scan files or hot lists may be subject to:

- criminal prosecution,
- civil liability, and/or
- administrative sanctions, up to and including termination, pursuant to and consistent with the relevant collective bargaining agreements and Department policies.

426.4 DATA COLLECTION AND RETENTION

The Investigations Bureau Captain is responsible for ensuring systems and processes are in place for the proper collection and retention of ALPR data. Data will be transferred from vehicles to the designated storage in accordance with department procedures.

All ALPR data downloaded to the server should be stored for no longer than one year, and in accordance with the established records retention schedule. Thereafter, ALPR data should be purged unless it has become, or it is reasonable to believe it will become, evidence in a criminal or civil action or is subject to a discovery request or other lawful action to produce records. In those circumstances the applicable data should be downloaded from the server onto portable media and booked into evidence.

ALPR vendor, Flock Safety will store the data (data hosting) and ensure proper maintenance and security of data stored in their data towers. Flock Safety will purge their data at the end of the 30 days of storage. However, this will not preclude VPD from maintaining any relevant vehicle data obtained from the system after that period pursuant to the established City of Vallejo retention schedule mentioned above or outlined elsewhere.

Restrictions on use of ALPR Data: Information gathered or collected, and records retained by Flock Safety cameras or any other VPD ALPR system will not be sold, accessed, or used for any purpose other than legitimate law enforcement or public safety purposes.

426.5 ACCOUNTABILITY and SAFEGUARDS

All data will be closely safeguarded and protected by both procedural and technological means. The Vallejo Police Department will observe the following safeguards regarding access to and use of stored data (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53):

(a) All non-law enforcement requests for access to stored ALPR data shall be processed in accordance with applicable law.

(b) All ALPR data downloaded to the mobile workstation shall be accessible only through a login/password-protected system capable of documenting all access of information by name, date, and time.

(c) Persons approved to access ALPR data under these guidelines are permitted to access the data for legitimate law enforcement purposes only, such as when the data relate to a specific criminal investigation or department-related civil or administrative action.
(d) Such ALPR data may be released to other authorized and verified law enforcement officials and agencies for legitimate law enforcement purposes.

(e) Every ALPR Detection Browsing Inquiry must be documented by either the associated Vallejo Police case number or incident number, and/or a reason for the inquiry.

For security or data breaches, see the Records Release and Maintenance Policy.

**426.6 POLICY**

The policy of the Vallejo Police Department is to utilize ALPR technology to capture and store digital license plate data and images while recognizing the established privacy rights of the public.

All data and images gathered by the ALPR are for the official use of this department. Because such data may contain confidential information, it is not open to public review.

The Vallejo Police Department does not permit the sharing of ALPR data gathered by the City or its contractors/subcontractors for purpose of federal immigration enforcement, pursuant to the California Values Act (Government Code § 7282.5; Government Code § 7284.2 et seq) – these federal immigration agencies include Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Patrol (CPB).

**462.7 ALPR DATA DETECTION BROWSING AUDITS**

It is the responsibility of the Professional Standards Division (PSD) Lieutenant or the Chief’s designee to ensure that an audit is conducted of ALPR detection browsing inquiries at least once during each calendar year. The Department will audit a sampling of the ALPR system utilization from the prior 12-month period to verify proper use in accordance with the above-authorized uses. The audit shall randomly select at least 10 detection browsing inquiries conducted by department employees during the preceding six-month period and determine if each inquiry meets the requirements established in policy section 462.5(e).

The audit shall be documented in the form of an internal department memorandum to the Chief of Police. The memorandum shall include any data errors found so that such errors can be corrected. After review by the Chief of Police, the memorandum and any associated documentation shall be filed and retained by PSD.

**426.8 RELEASING ALPR DATA**

The ALPR data may be shared only with other law enforcement or prosecutorial agencies for official law enforcement purposes or as otherwise permitted by law.

(a) The agency makes a written request for the ALPR data that includes:

(1) The name of the agency.
(2) The name of the person requesting.
(3) The intended purpose of obtaining the information.
(b) The request is reviewed by the Chief of Police or the authorized designee and approved before the request is fulfilled.

(c) The Chief of Police or the authorized designee will consider the California Values Act (Government Code § 7282.5; Government Code § 7284.2 et seq), before approving the release of ALPR data. The Vallejo Police Department does not permit the sharing of ALPR data gathered by the City or its contractors/subcontractors for purpose of federal immigration enforcement, these federal immigration agencies include Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Patrol (CBP).

(d) The approved request is retained on file. Requests for ALPR data by non-law enforcement or non-prosecutorial agencies will be processed as provided in the Records Maintenance and Release Policy (Civil Code § 1798.90.55).

426.9 TRAINING
The Training Sergeant should ensure that members receive department-approved training for those authorized to use or access the ALPR system (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53).
Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs)

462.1 PURPOSE AND SCOPE
The purpose of this policy is to establish guidelines for officers utilizing the Automated License Plate Reader (ALPR) system. This policy will further establish guidelines for the deployment and actions permissible when using the system. The policy shall remain in effect until it is superseded, amended, or withdrawn.

(a) An ALPR system is a computer-based system that utilizes special cameras to capture license plate information. The ALPR system captures an infrared image of a license plate and converts it to a text file using Optical Character Recognition ("OCR") technology. The text is compared to various hot lists generated by local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies, including the National Crime Information Center ("NCIC"), and generates an alert when there is a hit. The ALPR system identifies license plates and will not identify the person operating the motor vehicle. The Department may, as a separate step and for legitimate law enforcement purposes per the Federal Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, and as set forth in this Policy, undertake to identify the owner of a vehicle in the event the ALPR system generates an alert, such as by running the license plate number through the State of California Department of Motor Vehicle (DMV) database.

(b) It shall be the policy of this Agency that all Department members abide by the policy and its procedures set forth when using the ALPR system, thereby increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of its public safety efforts in a manner that safeguards the privacy concerns of law abiding citizens.

(c) The ALPR system shall be restricted to legitimate law enforcement uses for the purpose of furthering legitimate law enforcement goals and enhancing public safety. Such uses and goals include, but are not limited to, providing information to officers that will assist in on-going criminal investigations, crime prevention, crime detection, the apprehension of wanted persons, ensuring the safety of vulnerable individuals through the recovery of missing and endangered persons, and improving the quality of life in our community through the identification and removal of stolen or unregistered motor vehicles.

(d) The Department shall utilize hot lists which further the above specified goals of the ALPR system, where there is a legitimate and specific law enforcement reason for identifying a vehicle associated with an outstanding arrest warrant, vehicles related to missing persons investigations, vehicles associated with AMBER Alerts, stolen vehicles, vehicles that are reasonably believed to be involved in the commission of a crime, vehicles which are registered to or are reasonably believed to be operated by persons who do not have a valid operator’s license or who are on the...
revoked or suspended list, vehicles with expired registrations, vehicles registered to persons who are subject to a restraining order issued by a court or by the Parole Board, or who are subject to any other duly issued order restricting their movements, vehicles registered to persons wanted by a law enforcement agency who are of interest in a specific investigation, or vehicles registered to persons who are on any watch list issued by a State or Federal agency responsible for homeland security when information has been received concerning a specific individual.

462.2 DEFINITIONS

ALPR – Automated License Plate Recognition System, or Automated License Plate Reader

ALPR System – The system in its entirety, including all ALPR cameras, software, and collected data

Alert – An audible and/or visual signal activated upon the read of a license plate by the ALPR system that has NOT BEEN VISUALLY VERIFIED by the officer against the photo in the ALPR system.

Tentative Hit – An alert by the ALPR system that HAS BEEN VISUALLY VERIFIED by the officer against the ALPR hotlist and photo but HAS NOT BEEN VALIDATED by the officer or dispatch as a live query transaction OR CONFIRMED AS VALID with the original entering agency.

Live Query Transaction – A hit by the ALPR system that HAS BEEN VALIDATED as active but HAS NOT BEEN CONFIRMED as valid by the entering agency.

Confirmation (Confirmed Hit) – A hit by the ALPR system that HAS BEEN CONFIRMED as valid and active by the original entering agency through secondary check.

Hotlist – Data files extracted from law enforcement databases which contain listings of stolen license plates, stolen vehicles, wanted persons, and other vehicles/persons actively being sought by a law enforcement agency such as Amber/Silver Alert vehicles/persons. These data extracts are generally facilitated numerous times per day in an effort to provide current data.

462.3 PROCEDURES

(a) Management

The Alameda Police Department, by and through the Chief of Police, is solely responsible for the day-to-day operation and management of the ALPR system and for all tasks ancillary to its operation and management. The Chief of Police shall assign Department personnel to operate and manage the ALPR system on a day-to-day basis.

The Chief of Police, through his or her designee, shall ensure that the ALPR system is operated in conformity with this Policy and other Department policies, procedures, rules and regulations. The Chief shall enforce this Policy and shall act as the Department Head for all disciplinary and enforcement actions for any violations by Department personnel.

(b) Operations
Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs)

1. **Installation and Functioning.** ALPR cameras may be mounted on a marked cruiser or unmarked vehicle. ALPR equipment will passively read the license plates of moving or parked motor vehicles using ALPR optical character recognition technology and compare them against various hot lists uploaded or created by the Alameda Police Department. Scanned data files collected by the system will, on an ongoing basis, be automatically uploaded from the ALPR camera to the Department's ALPR database.

2. **Hot Lists.** Designation of hot lists to be utilized by the ALPR system shall be made by the Chief or his/her designee. Hot lists shall be obtained or compiled from sources as may be consistent with the purposes of the ALPR system set forth in this Policy. These sources may include:
   - NCIC Stolen Vehicle files, as available;
   - NCIC Stolen plates and Stolen Canadian plates, as available;
   - NCIC Wanted persons, as available;
   - NCIC Missing or Endangered person files, as available;
   - NCIC Supervised Release (Federal Probationers), as available;
   - NCIC Nationwide Domestic Violence Protection Orders, as available;
   - NCIC Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File, as available;
   - NCIC Sexual Offender;
   - DMV Records of Suspended/Revoked Registrations.

3. **Training.** No member of this Department shall operate ALPR equipment or access ALPR data without first completing Department-approved training.

4. **Login/Log-Out Procedure.** To ensure proper operation and facilitate oversight of the ALPR system, all users will be required to have individual credentials for access and use of the systems and/or data. A routine check to ensure the equipment is working properly should be done at the beginning of each shift by the user logging into the system.

5. **Auditing and Oversight.** To ensure proper oversight into the use of the system and adherence to this policy, all activities (plate detections, queries, reports, etc.) are automatically recorded by the system for auditing purposes. System audits shall be conducted by the Inspectional Services Section supervisor at least every six months during the first two years subsequent to implementation and no less than annually thereafter. The audit report shall include an explanation regarding any data retained longer than six months (e.g. data retained as evidence in a criminal case).

6. **Permitted/Impermissible Uses.** The ALPR system, and all data collected, is the property of the Alameda Police Department. Department personnel may only access and use the ALPR system for official and legitimate law enforcement purposes consistent with this Policy. The following uses of the ALPR system are specifically prohibited:
Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs)

a. Invasion of Privacy: Except when done pursuant to a court order such as a search warrant, it is a violation of this Policy to utilize the ALPR to record license plates except those of vehicles that are exposed to public view (e.g., vehicles on a public road or street, or that are on private property but whose license plate(s) are visible from a public road, street, or a place to which members of the public have access, such as the parking lot of a shop or other business establishment).

b. Harassment or Intimidation: It is a violation of this Policy to use the ALPR system to harass and/or intimidate any individual or group.

c. Personal Use: It is a violation of this Policy to use the ALPR system or associated scan files or hot lists for any personal purpose.

Anyone who engages in an impermissible use of the ALPR system or associated scan files or hot lists may be subject to:

· criminal prosecution,
· civil liability, and/or
· administrative sanctions, up to and including termination, pursuant to and consistent with the relevant collective bargaining agreements and Department policies.

7. Required Steps Preliminary to Police Action. Hot lists utilized by the Department's ALPR system may be updated by agency sources more frequently than the Department may be uploading them, and the Department's ALPR system will not have access to real time data. Further, there may be errors in the ALPR's read of a license plate. Therefore, an alert alone shall not be a basis for police action (other than following the vehicle of interest). Prior to initiation of a stop of a vehicle or other intervention based on an alert, an officer shall undertake the following:

a. Verification of current status on hot list. An officer must receive confirmation, from someone or some system within the Department that the license plate is still stolen, wanted, or otherwise of interest before proceeding.

b. Visual verification of license plate number. Officers shall visually verify that the license plate on the vehicle of interest matches identically with the image of the license plate number captured (read) by the ALPR, including both the alphanumeric characters of the license plate and the state of issue, before proceeding with a traffic stop.

8. Use in Connection With Serious Crimes/Incidents. Use of the ALPR should be considered to conduct license plate canvasses in the immediate wake of any homicide, shooting, robbery, kidnapping, sexual assault or AMBER ALERT, or other major crime or incident.

(c) Database Access and Privacy Concerns

1. The ALPR system database and software resides in a data center featuring full redundancy and access controls. The data remains property of the Alameda Police Department, and is managed according to this Policy.

2. The ALPR system is governed by the Permitted/Impermissible Uses as outlined in this Policy.
Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs)

3. The ALPR data contains no Personally Identifiable Information (PII) that may be used to connect license plate detection to an individual. It is only with permissible purpose that an investigator may make this connection (using other systems) and this access is already governed by the Federal Driver's Privacy Protection Act (DPPA).

4. All investigative queries into collected ALPR data are logged by user and available for auditing and review by the Department as outlined in this Policy.

(d) Data Retention

All data and images gathered by an ALPR are for the official use of the Alameda Police Department and because such data may contain confidential CLETS information, it is not open to public review. ALPR information gathered and retained by this Department may be used and shared with prosecutors or others only as permitted by law. All ALPR data downloaded to the server will be stored for a period of six months, and thereafter shall be purged unless it has become, or it is reasonable to believe it will become, evidence in a criminal or civil action or is subject to a lawful action to produce records. In those circumstances, the applicable data should be downloaded from the server onto portable media and booked into evidence.
Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs)

429.1 PURPOSE AND SCOPE
The purpose of this policy is to provide guidance for the capture, storage and use of digital data obtained through the use of Automated License Plate Reader (ALPR) technology.

429.2 ADMINISTRATION
The ALPR technology, also known as License Plate Recognition (LPR), allows for the automated detection of license plates. It is used by the Emeryville Police Department to convert data associated with vehicle license plates for official law enforcement purposes, including identifying stolen or wanted vehicles, stolen license plates and missing persons. It may also be used to gather information related to active warrants, homeland security, electronic surveillance, suspect interdiction and stolen property recovery.

All installation and maintenance of ALPR equipment, as well as ALPR data retention and access, shall be managed by the Professional Services and Standards Division Captain. The Professional Services and Standards Division Captain will assign members under his/her command to administer the day-to-day operation of the ALPR equipment and data.

429.2.1 ALPR ADMINISTRATOR
The Professional Services and Standards Captain shall be responsible for developing guidelines and procedures to comply with the requirements of Civil Code § 1798.90.5 et seq. This includes, but is not limited to Civil Code §1798.90.51; Civil Code §1798.90.53:

(a) A description of the job title or other designation of the members and independent contractors who are authorized to use or access the ALPR system or to collect ALPR information.

(b) Training requirements for authorized users.

(c) A description of how ALPR system will be monitored to ensure the security of the information and compliance with applicable privacy laws.

(d) Procedures for system operators to maintain records of access in compliance with Civil Code § 1798.90.52.

(e) The title and name of the current designee in overseeing the ALPR operation.

(f) Working with the Custodian of Records on the retention and destruction of ALPR data.

(g) Ensuring this policy and related procedures are conspicuously posted on the departments website.

429.3 OPERATIONS
Use of an ALPR is restricted to the purposes outlined below. Department members shall not use, or allow others to use the equipment or database records for any unauthorized purpose (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53).

(a) An ALPR shall only be used for official law enforcement business.
Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs)

(b) An ALPR may be used in conjunction with any routine patrol operation or criminal investigation. Reasonable suspicion or probable cause is not required before using an ALPR.

(c) While an ALPR may be used to canvass license plates around any crime scene, particular consideration should be given to using ALPR-equipped cars to canvass areas around homicides, shootings and other major incidents. Partial license plates reported during major crimes should be entered into the ALPR system in an attempt to identify suspect vehicles.

(d) No member of this department shall operate ALPR equipment or access ALPR data without first completing department-approved training.

(e) No ALPR operator may access department, state or federal data unless otherwise authorized to do so.

(f) If practicable, the officer should verify an ALPR response through the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS) before taking enforcement action that is based solely on an ALPR alert.

429.4 DATA COLLECTION AND RETENTION
The Professional Services and Standards Division Captain is responsible for ensuring systems and processes are in place for the proper collection and retention of ALPR data. Data will be transferred from vehicles to the designated storage in accordance with department procedures.

All ALPR data downloaded to the server should be stored for a minimum of one year (Government Code § 34090.6) and in accordance with the established records retention schedule. Thereafter, ALPR data should be purged unless it has become, or it is reasonable to believe it will become, evidence in a criminal or civil action or is subject to a discovery request or other lawful action to produce records. In those circumstances the applicable data should be downloaded from the server onto portable media and booked into evidence.

429.5 ACCOUNTABILITY
All data will be closely safeguarded and protected by both procedural and technological means. The Emeryville Police Department will observe the following safeguards regarding access to and use of stored data (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53):

(a) All ALPR data downloaded to the mobile workstation and in storage shall be accessible only through a login/password-protected system capable of documenting all access of information by name, date and time (Civil Code § 1798.90.52).

(b) Members approved to access ALPR data under these guidelines are permitted to access the data for legitimate law enforcement purposes only, such as when the data relate to a specific criminal investigation or department-related civil or administrative action.
Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs)

(c) ALPR system audits should be conducted on a regular basis.

For security or data breaches, see the Records Release and Maintenance Policy.

429.6 POLICY
The policy of the Emeryville Police Department is to utilize ALPR technology to capture and store
digital license plate data and images while recognizing the established privacy rights of the public.

All data and images gathered by the ALPR are for the official use of this department. Because
such data may contain confidential information, it is not open to public review.

429.7 RELEASING ALPR DATA
The ALPR data may be shared only with other law enforcement or prosecutorial agencies
for official law enforcement purposes or as otherwise permitted by law, using the following
procedures:

(a) The agency makes a written request for the ALPR data that includes:
   1. The name of the agency.
   2. The name of the person requesting.
   3. The intended purpose of obtaining the information.

(b) The request is reviewed by the Professional Services and Standards Division Captain
    or the authorized designee and approved before the request is fulfilled.

(c) The approved request is retained on file.

Requests for ALPR data by non-law enforcement or non-prosecutorial agencies will be processed
as provided in the Records Maintenance and Release Policy (Civil Code § 1798.90.55).

429.8 TRAINING
The Professional Services Officer should ensure that members receive department-approved
training for those authorized to use or access the ALPR system (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil
Code § 1798.90.53).
Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs)

429.1 PURPOSE AND SCOPE
Automated License Plate Reader (ALPR) technology, also known as License Plate Recognition, provides automated detection of license plates. ALPRs are used by the Hayward Police Department to convert data associated with vehicle license plates for official law enforcement purposes, including identifying stolen or wanted vehicles, stolen license plates and missing persons. ALPRs may also be used to gather information related to active warrants, homeland security, electronic surveillance, suspect interdiction and stolen property recovery.

429.1.1 ACCREDITATION STANDARDS
This section pertains to the following CALEA Standards: 41.3.9

429.2 ADMINISTRATION OF ALPR DATA
All installation and maintenance of ALPR equipment, as well as ALPR data retention and access shall be managed by the Support Services Division Commander. The Support Services Division Commander will assign personnel under his/her command to administer the day-to-day operation of the ALPR equipment and data.

429.3 ALPR OPERATION
Use of an ALPR is restricted to the purposes outlined below. Department personnel shall not use, or allow others to use the equipment or database records for any unauthorized purpose.

(a) An ALPR shall only be used for official and legitimate law enforcement business.

(b) An ALPR may be used in conjunction with any routine patrol operation or criminal investigation. Reasonable suspicion or probable cause is not required before using an ALPR.

Examples of authorized purposes include but are not limited to:
1. Locating stolen, wanted and subject of investigation vehicles;
2. Locating and apprehending individuals subject to arrest warrants or otherwise lawfully sought by law enforcement;
3. Locating witnesses and victims of violent crime;
4. Locating missing children and elderly individuals, including responding to Amber and Silver Alerts;
5. Supporting local, state, federal, and tribal public safety departments in the identification of vehicles associated with targets of criminal investigations, including investigations of serial crimes;
6. Protecting participants at special events; and
7. Protecting critical infrastructure sites.
Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs)

(c) While an ALPR may be used to canvass license plates around any crime scene, particular consideration should be given to using ALPR-equipped cars to canvass areas around homicides, shootings and other major incidents. Partial license plates reported during major crimes should be entered into the ALPR system in an attempt to identify suspect vehicles.

(d) No ALPR operator may access California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS) data unless otherwise authorized to do so.

(e) If practicable, the officer should verify an ALPR response through CLETS before taking enforcement action that is based solely on an ALPR alert.

429.4 ALPR AUTHORIZED USERS AND TRAINING

(a) No member of this department shall operate ALPR equipment or access ALPR data without first completing department-approved training.

(b) The following classifications are authorized to be trained in the use of the ALPR system:
   1. Duly sworn peace officers
   2. Professional staff whose duties require or call for the use of the system or data; examples: Community Service Officers (assigned to investigative positions) or Crime Analysts

(c) Training in the use of the system shall consist of:
   1. Privacy and civil liberties protections;
   2. Legal authorities, developments and issues involving the use of ALPR Data and technology;
   3. Current HPD Policy regarding appropriate use of ALPR Systems;
   4. Technical, physical, administrative and procedural measures to protect the security of ALPR Data against unauthorized access or use; and
   5. Practical exercises in the use of the ALPR system.

429.5 ALPR DATA COLLECTION, RETENTION AND DISSEMINATION

Information collected by ALPR is categorized as one of two types.

(a) DETECTIONS: Detections are the records including images and data (date, time and location) gathered by ALPR field units.

(b) HITS: Are the notices from the system alerting the operator of a match between the license plate captured and a listing on one of the hot lists.
Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs)

(c) RETENTION OF DATA: All data and images gathered by an ALPR are for the official use of the Hayward Police Department and because such data may contain confidential CLETS information, it is not open to public review. ALPR information gathered and retained by this department may be used and shared with prosecutors or others only as permitted by law.

The Support Services supervisor is responsible to ensure proper collection and retention of ALPR data, and for transferring ALPR data stored in department vehicles to the department server on a regular basis, not to exceed 30 days between transfers.

All ALPR data downloaded to the server should be stored for a minimum of one year (Government Code § 34090.6), and thereafter may be purged unless it has become, or it is reasonable to believe it will become, evidence in a criminal or civil action or is subject to a lawful action to produce records. In those circumstances the applicable data should be downloaded from the server onto portable media and booked into evidence.

All ALPR HIT records are maintained indefinitely.

(d) DISSEMINATION: The Hayward Police Department may disseminate ALPR data to any government entity with an authorized law enforcement or public safety purpose for access to such data. The Hayward Police Department assumes no responsibility or liability for the acts or omissions of other agencies in making use of the ALPR data properly disseminated. Though the Hayward Police Department will make every reasonable effort to ensure the quality of shared ALPR Data and hotlists, it cannot make absolute guarantees of the accuracy of information provided.

429.6 ACCOUNTABILITY AND SAFEGUARDS
All saved data will be closely safeguarded and protected by both procedural and technological means. The Hayward Police Department will observe the following safeguards regarding access to and use of stored data:

(a) All non-law enforcement requests for access to stored ALPR data shall be referred to the Records Administrator and processed in accordance with applicable law.

(b) All ALPR data downloaded to the mobile workstation and server shall be accessible only through a login/password-protected system capable of documenting all access of information by name, date and time.
Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs)

(c) Persons approved to access ALPR data under these guidelines are permitted to access the data for legitimate law enforcement purposes only, such as when the data relate to a specific criminal investigation or department-related civil or administrative action.

(d) Such ALPR data may be released to other authorized and verified law enforcement officials and agencies at any time for legitimate law enforcement purposes.

(e) ALPR system audits should be conducted on a regular basis.

429.7 REVISIONS
Enacted: March 31, 2015
Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs)

430.1 PURPOSE AND SCOPE
The purpose of this policy is to provide guidance for the capture, storage and use of digital data obtained through the use of Automated License Plate Reader (ALPR) technology.

430.2 POLICY
The policy of the Oakland Police Department is to utilize ALPR technology to capture and store digital license plate data and images while recognizing the established privacy rights of the public.

All data and images gathered by the ALPR are for the official use of this department. Because such data may contain confidential information, it is not open to public review.

430.3 ADMINISTRATION
The ALPR technology, also known as License Plate Recognition (LPR), allows for the automated detection of license plates. It is used by the Oakland Police Department to convert data associated with vehicle license plates for official law enforcement purposes, including identifying stolen or wanted vehicles, stolen license plates and missing persons. It may also be used to gather information related to active warrants, suspect interdiction and stolen property recovery.

All installation and maintenance of ALPR equipment, as well as ALPR data retention and access, shall be managed by the Bureau of Services Deputy Chief. The Deputy Chief will assign members under his/her command to administer the day-to-day operation of the ALPR equipment and data.

430.3.1 ALPR ADMINISTRATOR
The Bureau of Services Deputy Chief shall be the administrator of ALPR program, and shall be responsible for developing guidelines and procedures to comply with the requirements of Civil Code § 1798.90.5 et seq. This includes, but is not limited to Civil Code §§ 1798.90.51 through 1798.90.53:

(a) A description of the job title or other designation of the members and independent contractors who are authorized to use or access the ALPR system or to collect ALPR information.

(b) Training requirements for authorized users.

(c) A description of how the ALPR system will be monitored to ensure the security of the information and compliance with applicable privacy laws.

(d) Procedures for system operators to maintain records of access in compliance with Civil Code § 1798.90.52.

(e) The title of the current designee overseeing the ALPR operation.

(f) Working with the Custodian of Records on the retention and destruction of ALPR data.
Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs)

(g) Ensuring this policy and related procedures are conspicuously posted on the department’s website.

430.4 ALPR USERS
Personnel authorized to use ALPR equipment or access information collected through the use of such equipment shall be specifically trained in such technology and authorized by the Chief of Police or designee. Such personnel shall be limited to designated sergeants, officers, police service technicians, and parking enforcement personnel unless otherwise authorized.

430.5 PURPOSES FOR ACCESSING AND USING ALPR INFORMATION
Use of an ALPR is restricted to the purposes outlined below. The title of the official custodian of the ALPR system, responsible for implementing this section, is the ALPR Coordinator. Department members shall not use, or allow others to use the equipment or database records for any unauthorized purpose (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53).

(a) No member of this department shall operate ALPR equipment or access ALPR data without first completing department-approved training.

(b) No ALPR operator may access department, state or federal data unless otherwise authorized to do so.

(c) While an ALPR may be used to canvass license plates around any crime scene, particular consideration should be given to using ALPR-equipped cars to canvass areas around homicides, shootings and other major incidents. Partial license plates reported during major crimes should be entered into the ALPR system in an attempt to identify suspect vehicles.

(d) An ALPR shall only be used for official law enforcement business.

(e) An ALPR may be used in conjunction with any routine patrol operation or criminal investigation. Reasonable suspicion or probable cause is not required before using an ALPR.

(f) If practicable, the officer should verify an ALPR response through the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS) before taking enforcement action that is based solely on an ALPR alert.

430.6 DATA COLLECTION AND RETENTION
The Bureau of Services Deputy Chief is responsible for ensuring systems and processes are in place for the proper collection, accuracy and retention of ALPR data. Data will be transferred from vehicles to the designated storage in accordance with department procedures.

All ALPR data downloaded to the server shall be stored for six months. Thereafter, ALPR data shall be purged unless it has become, or it is reasonable to believe it will become, evidence in a criminal or civil action or is subject to a discovery request or other lawful action to produce records. In those circumstances the applicable data shall be downloaded from the server onto portable media and booked into evidence.
430.7 SYSTEM MONITORING AND SECURITY

All data will be closely safeguarded and protected by both procedural and technological means. The Oakland Police Department will observe the following safeguards regarding access to and use of stored data (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53):

(a) All ALPR data downloaded to the mobile workstation and in storage shall be accessible only through a login/password-protected system capable of documenting all access of information by username, license number or other data elements used in the search, name, date, time and purpose (Civil Code § 1798.90.52).

(b) Members approved to access ALPR data under these guidelines are permitted to access the data for legitimate law enforcement purposes only, such as when the data relate to a specific criminal investigation or department-related civil or administrative action.

(c) ALPR system audits shall be conducted on a regular basis by the Bureau of Services. The purpose of these audits is to ensure the accuracy of ALPR Information and correct data errors.

For security or data breaches, see the Records Release and Maintenance Policy.

430.8 RELEASING OR SHARING ALPR DATA

The ALPR data may be shared only with other law enforcement or prosecutorial agencies for official law enforcement purposes or as otherwise permitted by law, using the following procedures:

(a) The agency makes a written request for the ALPR data that includes:
   1. The name of the agency.
   2. The name of the person requesting.
   3. The intended purpose of obtaining the information.

(b) The request is reviewed by the Bureau of Services Deputy Chief or the authorized designee and approved before the request is fulfilled.

(c) The approved request is retained on file.

Requests for ALPR data by non-law enforcement or non-prosecutorial agencies will be processed as provided in the Records Maintenance and Release Policy (Civil Code § 1798.90.55).

430.9 TRAINING

The Training Section shall ensure that members receive department-approved training for those authorized to use or access the ALPR system and shall maintain a record of all completed trainings. (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53).

Training requirements for employees authorized in ALPR Users Section include completion of training by the ALPR Coordinator or appropriate subject matter experts as designated by the Oakland Police Department. Such training shall include:

- Applicable federal and state law
- Applicable policy
Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs)

- Memoranda of understanding
- Functionality of equipment
- Accessing data
- Safeguarding password information and data
- Sharing of data
- Reporting breaches
- Implementing post-breach procedures

Training updates are required annually.
Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs)

438.1 PURPOSE AND SCOPE
The purpose of this policy is to provide guidance for the capture, storage and use of digital data obtained through the use of Automated License Plate Reader (ALPR) technology.

438.2 ADMINISTRATION
The ALPR technology, also known as License Plate Recognition (LPR), allows for the automated detection of license plates. It is used by the Piedmont Police Department to convert data associated with vehicle license plates for official law enforcement purposes, including identifying stolen or wanted vehicles, stolen license plates and missing persons. It may also be used to gather information related to active warrants, homeland security, electronic surveillance, suspect interdiction and stolen property recovery.

All installation and maintenance of ALPR equipment, as well as ALPR data retention and access, shall be managed by the Administration Operations Commander. The Administration Operations Commander will assign members under his/her command to administer the day-to-day operation of the ALPR equipment and data.

438.2.1 ALPR ADMINISTRATOR
The Administration Operations Commander shall be responsible for developing guidelines and procedures to comply with the requirements of Civil Code § 1798.90.5 et seq. This includes, but is not limited to (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53):

(a) A description of the job title or other designation of the members and independent contractors who are authorized to use or access the ALPR system or to collect ALPR information.

(b) Training requirements for authorized users.

(c) A description of how the ALPR system will be monitored to ensure the security of the information and compliance with applicable privacy laws.

(d) Procedures for system operators to maintain records of access in compliance with Civil Code § 1798.90.52.

(e) The title and name of the current designee in overseeing the ALPR operation.

(f) Working with the Custodian of Records on the retention and destruction of ALPR data.

(g) Ensuring this policy and related procedures are conspicuously posted on the department’s website.

438.3 OPERATIONS
Use of an ALPR is restricted to the purposes outlined below. Department members shall not use, or allow others to use the equipment or database records for any unauthorized purpose (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53).

(a) An ALPR shall only be used for official law enforcement business.
Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs)

(b) An ALPR may be used in conjunction with any routine patrol operation or criminal investigation. Reasonable suspicion or probable cause is not required before using an ALPR.

(c) While an ALPR may be used to canvass license plates around any crime scene, particular consideration should be given to using ALPR-equipped cars to canvass areas around homicides, shootings and other major incidents. Partial license plates reported during major crimes should be entered into the ALPR system in an attempt to identify suspect vehicles.

(d) No member of this department shall operate ALPR equipment or access ALPR data without first completing department-approved training.

(e) No ALPR operator may access department, state or federal data unless otherwise authorized to do so.

(f) If practicable, the officer should verify an ALPR response through the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS) before taking enforcement action that is based solely on an ALPR alert.

438.4 DATA COLLECTION AND RETENTION
The Administration Operations Commander is responsible for ensuring systems and processes are in place for the proper collection and retention of ALPR data. Data will be transferred from vehicles to the designated storage in accordance with department procedures.

All ALPR data downloaded to the server should be stored for a minimum of one year (Government Code § 34090.6) and in accordance with the established records retention schedule. Thereafter, ALPR data should be purged unless it has become, or there is a reason to believe it will become, evidence in a criminal or civil action or is subject to a discovery request or other lawful action to produce records. In those circumstances the applicable data should be downloaded from the server onto portable media and booked into evidence.

438.5 ACCOUNTABILITY
All data will be closely safeguarded and protected by both procedural and technological means. The Piedmont Police Department will observe the following safeguards regarding access to and use of stored data (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53):

(a) All ALPR data downloaded to the mobile workstation and in storage shall be accessible only through a login/password-protected system capable of documenting all access of information by name, date and time (Civil Code § 1798.90.52).

(b) Members approved to access ALPR data under these guidelines are permitted to access the data for legitimate law enforcement purposes only, such as when the data relate to a specific criminal investigation or department-related civil or administrative action.
Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs)

(c) The Support Services Division Commander will be responsible for directing and ensuring that ALPR system audits are conducted on a regular basis.

For security or data breaches, see the Records Release and Maintenance Policy.

438.6 AUTHORIZED DESIGNEE FOR CERTAIN ALPR SERVICES
The Chief of Police may enter into an agreement with another law enforcement agency or authority, through contract or memorandum of understanding, to receive, provide, or share ALPR services that meet the minimum standards of this policy.

438.7 TRAINING
Only persons trained in the use of the ALPR system, including its privacy and civil liberties protections, shall be allowed access to the ALPR data. Training shall consist of:

- Legal authorities, developments, and issues involving the use of ALPR data and technology
- Current policy regarding appropriate use of ALPR systems
- Evolution of ALPR and related technologies, including new capabilities and associated risks
- Technical, physical, administrative, and procedural measures to protect the security of ALPR data against unauthorized access or use
- Practical exercises in the use of the current ALPR system

Training shall be updated as technological, legal, and other changes that affect the use of the ALPR system occur. In no case shall a person utilize the ALPR system if he/she has not completed training in more than a year.

438.8 POLICY
The policy of the Piedmont Police Department is to utilize ALPR technology to capture and store digital license plate data and images while recognizing the established privacy rights of the public.

All data and images gathered by the ALPR are for the official use of this department. Because such data may contain confidential information, it is not open to public review.

438.9 RELEASING ALPR DATA
The ALPR data may be shared only with other law enforcement or prosecutorial agencies for official law enforcement purposes or as otherwise permitted by law.

Any requests for ALPR data by non-law enforcement or non-prosecutorial agencies will be processed as provided in the Records Maintenance and Release Policy (Civil Code § 1798.90.55).

Department personnel who receive requests for ALPR data will accept the request in accordance with our Records Maintenance and Release Policy and forward the request to the Support Services Division Commander.
Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs)

438.10  TRAINING
The Training Sergeant should ensure that members receive department-approved training for those authorized to use or access the ALPR system (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53).
Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs)

462.1 PURPOSE AND SCOPE
Automated License Plate Reader (ALPR) technology, also known as License Plate Recognition, provides automated detection of license plates. ALPRs are used by the Richmond Police Department to convert data associated with vehicle license plates for official law enforcement purposes, including identifying stolen or wanted vehicles, stolen license plates and missing persons. ALPRs may also be used to gather information related to active warrants, homeland security, electronic surveillance, suspect interdiction and stolen property recovery.

462.2 ADMINISTRATION OF ALPR DATA
All installation and maintenance of ALPR equipment, as well as ALPR data retention and access shall be managed by the Administration Division Commander. The Administration Division Commander will assign personnel under his/her command to administer the day-to-day operation of the ALPR equipment and data.

462.3 ALPR OPERATION
Use of an ALPR is restricted to the purposes outlined below. Department personnel shall not use, or allow others to use the equipment or database records for any unauthorized purpose.

(a) An ALPR shall only be used for official and legitimate law enforcement business.

(b) An ALPR may be used in conjunction with any routine patrol operation or criminal investigation. Reasonable suspicion or probable cause is not required before using an ALPR.

(c) While an ALPR may be used to canvass license plates around any crime scene, particular consideration should be given to using ALPR-equipped cars to canvass areas around homicides, shootings and other major incidents. Partial license plates reported during major crimes should be entered into the ALPR system in an attempt to identify suspect vehicles.

(d) No member of this department shall operate ALPR equipment or access ALPR data without first completing department-approved training.

(e) No ALPR operator may access California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS) data unless otherwise authorized to do so.

(f) Absent exigent circumstances, the officer shall verify an ALPR response through CLETS before taking enforcement action that is based solely on an ALPR alert.

462.4 ALPR DATA COLLECTION AND RETENTION
All data and images gathered by an ALPR are for the official use of the Richmond Police Department and because such data may contain confidential CLETS information, it is not open to public review. ALPR information gathered and retained by this department may be used and shared with prosecutors or others only as permitted by law.
Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs)

The Administration supervisor is responsible to ensure proper collection and retention of ALPR data.

All ALPR data downloaded to the server will be stored for ninety (90) days, and thereafter will be purged unless it has become, or it is reasonable to believe it will become, evidence in a criminal or civil action or is subject to a lawful action to produce records. In those circumstances the applicable data should be downloaded from the server onto portable media and booked into evidence.

462.5 ACCOUNTABILITY AND SAFEGUARDS

All saved data will be closely safeguarded and protected by both procedural and technological means. The Richmond Police Department will observe the following safeguards regarding access to and use of stored data:

(a) All non-law enforcement requests for access to stored ALPR data shall be referred to the Records Supervisor and processed in accordance with applicable law.

(b) All ALPR data downloaded to the mobile workstation and server shall be accessible only through a login/password-protected system capable of documenting all access of information by name, date and time.

(c) Persons approved to access ALPR data under these guidelines are permitted to access the data for legitimate law enforcement purposes only, such as when the data relate to a specific criminal investigation or department-related civil or administrative action.

(d) Such ALPR data may be released to other authorized and verified law enforcement officials and agencies at any time for legitimate law enforcement purposes.

(e) ALPR system audits should be conducted on a regular basis.
Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs)

418.1 PURPOSE AND SCOPE
The purpose of this policy is to provide guidance for the capture, storage and use of digital data obtained through the use of Automated License Plate Reader (ALPR) technology.

418.2 POLICY
The policy of the San Leandro Police Department is to utilize ALPR technology to capture and store digital license plate data and images while recognizing the established privacy rights of the public.

All data and images gathered by the ALPR are for the official use of this department. Because such data may contain confidential information, it is not open to public review.

In accordance with a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the San Leandro Police Department and the Northern California Regional Intelligence Center (NCRIC), the Department shall work in cooperation and coordination with NCRIC in providing a standardized approach and method of collecting and sharing ALPR systems’ data.

418.3 ADMINISTRATION
The ALPR technology, also known as License Plate Recognition (LPR), allows for the automated detection of license plates. It is used by the San Leandro Police Department to convert data associated with vehicle license plates for official law enforcement purposes, including identifying stolen or wanted vehicles, stolen license plates and missing persons. It may also be used to gather information related to active warrants, homeland security, electronic surveillance, suspect interdiction and stolen property recovery.

All installation and maintenance of ALPR equipment, as well as ALPR data retention and access, shall be managed by the Bureau of Services Captain, or his/her designee. The Bureau of Services Captain, or his/her designee, will assign members under their command to administer the day-to-day operation of the ALPR equipment and data.

418.3.1 ALPR ADMINISTRATOR
The Bureau of Services Captain, or his/her designee, shall be responsible for developing guidelines and procedures to comply with the requirements of Civil Code § 1798.90.5 et seq. This includes, but is not limited to (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53):

(a) A description of the job title or other designation of the members and independent contractors who are authorized to use or access the ALPR system or to collect ALPR information.

(b) Training requirements for authorized users.

(c) A description of how the ALPR system will be monitored to ensure the security of the information and compliance with applicable privacy laws.
Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs)

(d) Procedures for system operators to maintain records of access in compliance with Civil Code § 1798.90.52.

(e) The title and name of the current designee in overseeing the ALPR operation.

(f) Working with the Custodian of Records on the retention and destruction of ALPR data.

(g) Ensuring this policy and related procedures are conspicuously posted on the department’s website.

418.4 OPERATIONS

Use of an ALPR is restricted to the purposes outlined below. Department members shall not use, or allow others to use the equipment or database records for any unauthorized purpose (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53).

(a) An ALPR shall only be used for official law enforcement business.

(b) An ALPR may be used in conjunction with any routine patrol operation or criminal investigation. Reasonable suspicion or probable cause is not required before using an ALPR.

(c) While an ALPR may be used to canvass license plates around any crime scene, particular consideration should be given to using ALPR-equipped cars to canvass areas around homicides, shootings and other major incidents. Partial license plates reported during major crimes should be entered into the ALPR system in an attempt to identify suspect vehicles.

(d) No member of this department shall operate ALPR equipment or access ALPR data without first completing department-approved training.

(e) No ALPR operator may access department, state or federal data unless otherwise authorized to do so.

(f) If practicable, the officer should verify an ALPR response through the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS) before taking enforcement action that is based solely on an ALPR alert.

418.4.1 AUTHORIZED PURPOSES, COLLECTION, AND USE OF ALPR DATA

Sworn peace officers with a need and right to know may utilize ALPR technology for the following reasons, but are not limited to:

(a) Locate stolen, wanted, and subject of investigation vehicles.

(b) Locate and apprehend individuals subject to arrest warrants or otherwise lawfully sought by law enforcement.

(c) Locate witnesses and victims of violent crime.

(d) Locate missing children and elderly individuals, including responding to Amber and Silver Alerts.
(e) Support local, state, federal and tribal public safety departments in the identification of vehicles associated with targets of criminal investigations, including investigations of serial crimes.

(f) Protect participants at local events.

(g) Protect critical infrastructure sites.

418.5 ALPR DATA COLLECTION AND RETENTION

The City of San Leandro Information Technology division is responsible for ensuring the collection of ALPR data is transferred from department vehicles to the Northern California Regional Intelligence Center (NCRIC) server on an automatic basis, transferring immediately upon utilization of the system.

All data and images gathered by an ALPR are for the official use only, and because such data may contain confidential CLETS information, it is not open to public review. ALPR information gathered and retained by this NCRIC may be used and shared with prosecutors or others only as permitted by law.

All ALPR data downloaded to the NCRIC server shall be stored for one year (Government Code § 34090.6) and thereafter will be purged on the 366th day unless it has become, or it is reasonable to believe it will become evidence in a criminal or civil action or is subject to a lawful action to produce records. In those circumstances the applicable data should be downloaded from the NCRIC server onto portable media and booked into evidence.

418.6 ACCOUNTABILITY

All data will be closely safeguarded and protected by both procedural and technological means by NCRIC. The San Leandro Police Department will observe the following safeguards regarding access to and use of stored data (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53):

(a) All ALPR data downloaded to the mobile workstation and in storage shall be accessible only through a login/password-protected system capable of documenting all access of information by name, date and time (Civil Code § 1798.90.52).

(b) Members approved to access ALPR data under these guidelines are permitted to access the data for legitimate law enforcement purposes only, such as when the data relate to a specific criminal investigation or department-related civil or administrative action.

(c) ALPR system audits should be conducted by the ALPR Administrator on a quarterly basis.

(d) The ALPR Administrator shall report any errors to NCRIC for correction.

418.7 RELEASING ALPR DATA

The ALPR data may be shared only with other law enforcement or prosecutorial agencies for official law enforcement purposes or as otherwise permitted by law, using the following procedures:

(a) The agency makes a written request for the ALPR data that includes:
Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs)

1. The name of the agency.
2. The name of the person requesting.
3. The intended purpose of obtaining the information.

(b) The request is reviewed by the Bureau of Services Captain or the authorized designee and approved before the request is fulfilled.

(c) The approved request is retained on file.

Requests for ALPR data by non-law enforcement or non-prosecutorial agencies will be processed as provided in the Records Maintenance and Release Policy (Civil Code § 1798.90.55).

418.8 TRAINING
The Professional Standards and Training Unit should ensure that members receive department-approved training for those authorized to use or access the ALPR system (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53). This training shall be consistent with the training outlined in the NCRIC ALPR Policy.

418.9 NCRIC ALPR POLICY
NCRIC ALPR Policy
Draft of BPD Policy 422 “Fixed Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs)
Fixed Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs)-

422.1 PURPOSE AND SCOPE
The purpose of this policy is to provide guidance for the capture, storage and use of digital data obtained through the use of Automated License Plate Reader (ALPR) technology. Department Personnel shall adhere to the requirements of Fixed ALPRs in this policy as well as the corresponding Surveillance Use-Fixed ALPRs policy-1305.

422.2 POLICY
The policy of the Berkeley Police Department is to utilize ALPR technology to capture and store digital license plate data and images while recognizing the established privacy rights of the public.

All data and images gathered by the ALPR are for the official use of this department. Because such data may contain confidential information, it is not open to public review.

The Berkeley Police Department does not permit the sharing of ALPR data gathered by the City or its contractors/subcontractors for federal immigration enforcement, pursuant to the California Values Act (Government Code § 7282.5; Government Code § 7284.2 et seq) – these federal immigration agencies include Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Patrol (CBP).

422.3 DEFINITIONS
(a) Automated License Plate Reader (ALPR): A device that uses cameras and computer technology to compare digital images to lists of known information of interest.

(b) ALPR Operator: Trained Department members who may utilize ALPR system/equipment. ALPR operators may be assigned to any position within the Department, and the ALPR Administrator may order the deployment of the ALPR systems for use in various efforts.

(c) ALPR Administrator: The Investigations Bureau Captain or the Chief’s designee, serves as the ALPR Administrator for the Department.

(d) Hot List: A list of license plates associated with vehicles of interest compiled from one or more databases including, but not limited to, NCIC, CA DMV, Local BOLO’s, etc.

(e) Vehicles of Interest: Including, but not limited to vehicles which are reported as stolen, display stolen license plates or tags; vehicles linked to missing and/or wanted persons and vehicles flagged by the Department of Motor Vehicle Administration or law enforcement agencies.
Detection: Data obtained by an ALPR of an image (such as a license plate) within public view that was read by the device, including potential images (such as the plate and description of vehicle on which it was displayed), and information regarding the location of the ALPR system at the time of the ALPR’s read.

Hit Alert from the ALPR system that a scanned license plate number may be in the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) or other law enforcement database for a specific reason including, but not limited to, being related to a stolen car, wanted person, missing person, domestic violation protective order or terrorist-related activity.

422.4 ADMINISTRATION
The ALPR technology, also known as License Plate Recognition (LPR), allows for the automated detection of license plates. It is used by the Berkeley Police Department to convert data associated with vehicle license plates for official law enforcement purposes, including identifying stolen or wanted vehicles, stolen license plates and missing persons. It may also be used to gather information related to active warrants, suspect apprehension and stolen property recovery. Any installation and maintenance of ALPR equipment, as well as ALPR data retention and access, shall be managed by the Investigations Division Captain. The Investigations Division Captain will assign members under his/her command to administer the day-to-day operation of the ALPR equipment and data.

422.4.1 ALPR ADMINISTRATOR
The Investigations Division Captain, or his/her designee, shall be responsible for compliance with the requirements of Civil Code § 1798.90.5 et seq. This includes, but is not limited to (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53):
(a) Only properly trained sworn officers, crime analysts, communication operators, records clerks, parking enforcement officers, and police assistants are allowed access to the ALPR system or to collect ALPR information.
(b) Ensuring that training requirements are completed for authorized users.
(c) ALPR system monitoring to ensure the security of the information and compliance with applicable privacy laws.
(d) Ensuring procedures are followed for system operators to maintain records of access in compliance with Civil Code § 1798.90.52.
(e) The title and name of the current designee in overseeing the ALPR operation.
(f) Working with the Custodian of Records, or vendor on the retention and destruction of ALPR data, ensuring this policy and related procedures are conspicuously posted on the City’s website.

422.5 OPERATIONS
An ALPR shall only be used for official law enforcement business. Use of an ALPR is restricted to the purposes outlined below. Department members shall not use, or allow others to use the equipment or database records for any unauthorized purpose (Civil...
(a) An ALPR shall only be used for official law enforcement business.

(b) An ALPR may be used in conjunction with any routine patrol operation or to support criminal investigations. Reasonable suspicion or probable cause is not required before using an ALPR.

(c) Partial license plates and unique vehicle descriptions reported during crimes may be entered into the ALPR system in an attempt to identify suspect vehicles.

(d) No member of this department shall operate ALPR equipment or access ALPR data without first completing department-approved training.

(e) If practicable, the officer should verify an ALPR response through the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS) before taking enforcement action that is based solely on an ALPR alert. Once an alert is received, the operator should confirm that the observed license plate from the system matches the license plate of the observed vehicle. Before any law enforcement action is taken because of an ALPR alert, the alert will be verified through a CLETS inquiry via MDT or through Dispatch. Members will not take any police action that restricts the freedom of any individual based solely on an ALPR alert unless it has been validated. Because the ALPR alert may relate to a vehicle and may not relate to the person operating the vehicle, officers are reminded that they need to have reasonable suspicion and/or probable cause to make an enforcement stop of any vehicle. (For example, if a vehicle is entered into the system because of its association with a wanted individual, Officers should attempt to visually match the driver to the description of the wanted subject prior to making the stop or should have another legal basis for making the stop.)

(f) Hot Lists. Designation of hot lists to be utilized by the ALPR system shall be made by the ALPR Administrator or his/her designee. Hot lists shall be obtained or compiled from sources as may be consistent with the purposes of the ALPR system set forth in this Policy. Hot lists utilized by the Department's LPR system may be updated by agency sources more frequently than the Department may be uploading them and thus the Department's LPR system will not have access to real time data. Occasionally, there may be errors in the LPR system’s read of a license plate. Therefore, an alert alone shall not be a basis for police action (other than following the vehicle of interest). Prior to initiation of a stop of a vehicle or other intervention based on an alert, Department members shall undertake the following:

1. Verification of status on a Hot List. An officer must receive confirmation, from a Berkeley Police Department Communications Dispatcher or other department computer device, that the license plate is still stolen, wanted, or otherwise of interest before proceeding (absent exigent circumstances).

2. Visual verification of license plate number. Officers shall visually verify that the license plate of interest matches identically with the image of the license plate number captured (read) by the LPR, including both the alphanumeric characters of the license plate.
plate, state of issue, and vehicle descriptors before proceeding. Department members alerted to the fact that an observed motor vehicle's license plate is entered as a Hot Plate (hit) in a specific BOLO (be on the lookout) list are required to make a reasonable effort to confirm that a wanted person is actually in the vehicle and/or that a reasonable basis exists before a Department member would have a lawful basis to stop the vehicle.

(3) Department members will clear all stops from hot list alerts by indicating the positive ALPR Hit, i.e., with an arrest or other enforcement action. If it is not obvious in the text of the call as to the correlation of the ALPR Hit and the arrest, then the Department member shall update with the Communications Dispatcher and original person and/or a crime analyst inputting the vehicle in the hot list (hit).

(4) General Hot Lists (SVS, SFR, and SLR) will be automatically downloaded into the ALPR system a minimum of once a day with the most current data overwriting the old data.

(5) All entries and updates of specific Hot Lists within the ALPR system will be documented by the requesting Department member within the appropriate general offense report. As such, specific Hot Lists shall be approved by the ALPR Administrator.

(6) Administrator (or his/her designee) before initial entry within the ALPR system. The updating of such a list within the ALPR system shall thereafter be accomplished pursuant to the approval of the Department member's immediate supervisor. The hits from these data sources should be viewed as informational; created solely to bring the officers attention to specific vehicles that have been associated with criminal activity. All Hot Plates and suspect information entered into the ALPR system will contain the following information as a minimum:

- Entering Department member's name
- Related case number.
- Short synopsis describing the nature of the originating call

(g) Login/Log-Out Procedure. To ensure proper operation and facilitate oversight of the ALPR system, all users will be required to have individual credentials for access and use of the systems and/or data, which has the ability to be fully audited.

Permitted/Impermissible Uses. The ALPR system, and all data collected, is the property of the Berkeley Police Department. Department personnel may only access and use the ALPR system for official and legitimate law enforcement purposes consistent with this Policy. The following uses of the ALPR system are specifically prohibited:

1. Invasion of Privacy: Except when done pursuant to a court order such as a search warrant, is a violation of this Policy to utilize the ALPR to record license plates except those of vehicles that are exposed to public view (e.g., vehicles on a public road or street, or that are on private property but whose license plate(s) are visible from a public road, street, or a place to which members of the public have access, such as the parking lot of a shop or other business establishment).

2. Harassment or Intimidation: It is a violation of this Policy to use the ALPR system to harass and/or intimidate any individual or group.
3. Use Based on a Protected Characteristic. It is a violation of this policy to use the LPR system or associated scan files or hot lists solely because of a person's, or group's race, gender, religion, political affiliation, nationality, ethnicity, sexual orientation, disability, or other classification protected by law.

4. Personal Use: It is a violation of this Policy to use the ALPR system or associated scan files or hot lists for any personal purpose.

5. First Amendment Rights. It is a violation of this policy to use the LPR system or associated scan files or hot lists for the purpose or known effect of infringing upon First Amendment rights.

(h) Anyone who engages in an impermissible use of the ALPR system or associated scan files or hot lists may be subject to administrative sanctions, up to and including termination, pursuant to and consistent with the relevant collective bargaining agreements and departmental policies. Partial license plates reported during crimes may be entered into the ALPR system in an attempt to identify suspect vehicles.

No ALPR operator may access California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS) data unless otherwise authorized to do so. If practicable, the officer should verify an ALPR response through the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS) before taking enforcement action that is based solely on an ALPR alert.

**422.6 DATA COLLECTION AND RETENTION**

The Investigations Division Captain is responsible for ensuring systems and processes are in place for the proper collection and retention of ALPR data. Data will be transferred from vehicles to the designated storage in accordance with department procedures. The Department should if feasible find a solution to transfer evidentiary hit data into it's digital evidence repository through secure integration.

All ALPR data downloaded to the ALPR server should be stored for no longer than 30 days, and in accordance with the established records retention schedule. Thereafter, ALPR data should be purged unless it has become, or it is reasonable to believe it will become, evidence in a criminal or civil action or is subject to a discovery request or other lawful action to produce records. In those circumstances the applicable data should be downloaded from the server and uploaded into BPD’s digital evidence repository.

ALPR vendor, will store the data (data hosting) and ensure proper maintenance and security of data stored in their data towers. The ALPR vendor will purge their data at the end of the 30 days of storage. However, this will not preclude Berkeley Police Department from maintaining any relevant vehicle data obtained from the system after that period pursuant to the established City of Berkeley retention schedule mentioned above or outlined elsewhere. Relevant vehicle data are scans corresponding to the vehicle of interest on a hot list. The ALPR vendor and Department shall ensure that the necessary data is captured and stored to accurately report the relevant data required in the Annual Surveillance Technology report. Once the City Council approves the Annual Surveillance Technology report all said data may be purged so long as it doesn't violate the Retention guidelines.
Restrictions on use of vendor Data: Information gathered or collected, and records retained by the vendor's cameras or any other Berkeley Police Department ALPR system will not be sold, accessed, or used for any purpose other than legitimate law enforcement or public safety purposes.

422.7 ACCOUNTABILITY
All saved data will be safeguarded and protected by both procedural and technological means. The Berkeley Police Department will observe the following safeguards regarding access to and use of stored data (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53):

(a) Non-law enforcement requests for access to stored ALPR data shall be processed according to the Records Maintenance and Release Policy in accordance with applicable law.

(b) All ALPR data downloaded to any workstation or server shall be accessible only through a login/password-protected system capable of documenting all access of information by name, date and time (Civil Code § 1798.90.52).

(c) Berkeley Police Department members approved to access ALPR data under these guidelines are permitted to access the data for legitimate law enforcement purposes only, such as when the data relate to a specific criminal investigation or department-related civil or administrative action.

(d) Aggregated ALPR data not related to specific criminal investigations shall not be released to any local, state or federal agency or entity without the consent of the Chief of Police or City Manager (i.e. If transportation department requested volume of vehicular traffic associated with specific events, it could conceivably be provided with the count of vehicles, but not the specific license plates with appropriate permissions).

(e) Measures will be taken to ensure the accuracy of ALPR information. Errors discovered in ALPR data collected by ALPR units shall be marked, corrected or deleted in accordance with the type and severity of the error in question.

(f) ALPR system audits will be conducted by the Professional Standards Bureau’s Audit and Inspections Sergeant on a regular basis, at least biennial.

(g) Such ALPR data may be released to other authorized and verified law enforcement officials and agencies for legitimate law enforcement purposes.

(h) Every ALPR Detection Browsing Inquiry must be documented by either the associated Berkeley Police case number or incident number, and/or a reason for the inquiry.

For security or data breaches, see the Records Release and Maintenance Policy.

422.8 ALPR DATA DETECTION BROWNSING AUDITS
It is the responsibility of the Sergeant of Audit and Inspections or the Chief’s designee to ensure that an audit is conducted of ALPR detection browsing inquiries at least biennial. The Department
will audit a sampling of the ALPR system utilization from the prior 24-month period to verify proper use in accordance with the above-authorized uses. The audit shall randomly select at least 10 detection browsing inquiries conducted by department employees during the preceding 24-month period and determine if each inquiry meets the requirements established in policy section 462.6(e).

The audit shall be documented in the form of an internal department memorandum to the Chief of Police. The memorandum shall include any data errors found so that such errors can be corrected. After review by the Chief of Police, the memorandum and any associated documentation shall be filed and retained by the Professional Standards Bureau Captain. This audit should be shared in the Surveillance Ordinance reporting.

### 422.9 RELEASING ALPR DATA

The ALPR data may be shared only with other law enforcement or prosecutorial agencies for official law enforcement purposes or as otherwise permitted by law.

(a) A supervisor at the requesting agency will sign an acknowledgement letter stating that the shared data will only be used for the purposes that are aligned with the Berkeley Police Department’s policy. The Berkeley Police Department does not permit the sharing of ALPR data gathered by the City or its contractors/subcontractors for purpose of federal immigration enforcement, these federal immigration agencies include Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Patrol (CBP). See attached letter.

(b) The signed letter is retained on file. Requests for ALPR data by non-law enforcement or non-prosecutorial agencies will be processed as provided in the Records Maintenance and Release Policy (Civil Code § 1798.90.55).

(c) All signed letters shall be routed to the Audit and Inspection Sergeant for compliance and reporting.

ALPR data is subject to the provisions of the Berkeley Police Department’s Immigration Law Policy, and hence may not be shared with federal immigration enforcement officials.

### 422.10 TRAINING

The Personnel and Training Sergeant shall ensure that members receive department-approved training in order to be authorized to use or access the ALPR system (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53)
Draft of BPD Policy 1305 “Surveillance Use Policy – Fixed ALPRs”
Surveillance Use Policy-Fixed ALPRs

1305.1 PURPOSE

The purpose of this policy is to provide guidance for the capture, storage and use of digital data obtained through the use of Automated License Plate Reader (ALPR) technology. Department Personnel shall adhere to the requirements of the Surveillance Use-Fixed ALPRs in this policy as well as the corresponding Use Policy -422.

The policy of the Berkeley Police Department is to utilize ALPR technology to capture and store digital license plate data and images while recognizing the established privacy rights of the public.

All data and images gathered by the ALPR are for the official use of this department. Because such data may contain confidential information, it is not open to public review.

The Berkeley Police Department does not permit the sharing of ALPR data gathered by the City or its contractors/subcontractors for federal immigration enforcement, pursuant to the California Values Act (Government Code § 7282.5; Government Code § 7284.2 et seq) – these federal immigration agencies include Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Patrol (CBP).

1305.2 DEFINITIONS

(a) Automated License Plate Reader (ALPR): A device that uses cameras and computer technology to compare digital images to lists of known information of interest.

(b) ALPR Operator: Trained Department members who may utilize ALPR system/equipment. ALPR operators may be assigned to any position within the Department, and the ALPR Administrator may order the deployment of the ALPR systems for use in various efforts.

(c) ALPR Administrator: The Investigations Bureau Captain or the Chief's designee, serves as the ALPR Administrator for the Department.

(d) Hot List: A list of license plates associated with vehicles of interest compiled from one or more databases including, but not limited to, NCIC, CA DMV, Local BOLO's, etc.

(e) Vehicles of Interest: Including, but not limited to vehicles which are reported as stolen, display stolen license plates or tags; vehicles linked to missing and/or wanted persons and vehicles flagged by the Department of Motor Vehicle Administration or law enforcement agencies.

(f) Detection: Data obtained by an ALPR of an image (such as a license plate) within public view that was read by the device, including potential images (such as the plate and description of vehicle on which it was displayed), and information regarding the location of the ALPR system at the time of the ALPR's read.
(g) Hit Alert from the ALPR system that a scanned license plate number may be in the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) or other law enforcement database for a specific reason including, but not limited to, being related to a stolen car, wanted person, missing person, domestic violation protective order or terrorist-related activity.

1305.3 AUTHORIZED AND PROHIBITED USES

An ALPR shall only be used for official law enforcement business. Use of an ALPR is restricted to the purposes outlined below. Department members shall not use, or allow others to use the equipment or database records for any unauthorized purpose (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53).

(a) An ALPR shall only be used for official law enforcement business.

(b) An ALPR may be used in conjunction with any routine patrol operation or to support criminal investigations. Reasonable suspicion or probable cause is not required before using an ALPR.

(c) Partial license plates and unique vehicle descriptions reported during crimes may be entered into the ALPR system in an attempt to identify suspect vehicles.

(d) No member of this department shall operate ALPR equipment or access ALPR data without first completing department-approved training.

(e) If practicable, the officer should verify an ALPR response through the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS) before taking enforcement action that is based solely on an ALPR alert. Once an alert is received, the operator should confirm that the observed license plate from the system matches the license plate of the observed vehicle. Before any law enforcement action is taken because of an ALPR alert, the alert will be verified through a CLETS inquiry via MDT or through Dispatch. Members will not take any police action that restricts the freedom of any individual based solely on an ALPR alert unless it has been validated. Because the ALPR alert may relate to a vehicle and may not relate to the person operating the vehicle, officers are reminded that they need to have reasonable suspicion and/or probable cause to make an enforcement stop of any vehicle. (For example, if a vehicle is entered into the system because of its association with a wanted individual, Officers should attempt to visually match the driver to the description of the wanted subject prior to making the stop or should have another legal basis for making the stop.)

(f) Hot Lists. Designation of hot lists to be utilized by the ALPR system shall be made by the ALPR Administrator or his/her designee. Hot lists shall be obtained or compiled from sources as may be consistent with the purposes of the ALPR system set forth in this Policy. Hot lists utilized by the Department's LPR system may be updated by agency sources more frequently than the Department may be uploading them and thus the Department's LPR system will not have access to real time data. Occasionally, there may be errors in the LPR system's read of a license plate. Therefore, an alert alone shall not be a basis for police action (other than following the vehicle of interest). Prior to initiation of a stop of a vehicle or other intervention based on an alert, Department members shall undertake the following:
(1) Verification of status on a Hot List. An officer must receive confirmation, from a Berkeley Police Department Communications Dispatcher or other department computer device, that the license plate is still stolen, wanted, or otherwise of interest before proceeding (absent exigent circumstances).

(2) Visual verification of license plate number. Officers shall visually verify that the license plate of interest matches identically with the image of the license plate number captured (read) by the LPR, including both the alphanumeric characters of the license plate, state of issue, and vehicle descriptors before proceeding. Department members alerted to the fact that an observed motor vehicle's license plate is entered as a Hot Plate (hit) in a specific BOLO (be on the lookout) list are required to make a reasonable effort to confirm that a wanted person is actually in the vehicle and/or that a reasonable basis exists before a Department member would have a lawful basis to stop the vehicle.

(3) Department members will clear all stops from hot list alerts by indicating the positive ALPR Hit, i.e., with an arrest or other enforcement action. If it is not obvious in the text of the call as to the correlation of the ALPR Hit and the arrest, then the Department member shall update with the Communications Dispatcher and original person and/or a crime analyst inputting the vehicle in the hot list (hit).

(4) General Hot Lists (SVS, SFR, and SLR) will be automatically downloaded into the ALPR system a minimum of once a day with the most current data overwriting the old data.

(5) All entries and updates of specific Hot Lists within the ALPR system will be documented by the requesting Department member within the appropriate general offense report. As such, specific Hot Lists shall be approved by the ALPR Administrator.

(6) Administrator (or his/her designee) before initial entry within the ALPR system. The updating of such a list within the ALPR system shall thereafter be accomplished pursuant to the approval of the Department member's immediate supervisor. The hits from these data sources should be viewed as informational; created solely to bring the officers attention to specific vehicles that have been associated with criminal activity.

All Hot Plates and suspect information entered into the ALPR system will contain the following information as a minimum:
- Entering Department member's name
- Related case number.
- Short synopsis describing the nature of the originating call

(g) Login/Log-Out Procedure. To ensure proper operation and facilitate oversight of the ALPR system, all users will be required to have individual credentials for access and use of the systems and/or data, which has the ability to be fully audited.

Permitted/Impermissible Uses. The ALPR system, and all data collected, is the property of the Berkeley Police Department. Department personnel may only access and use the ALPR system for official and legitimate law enforcement purposes consistent with this Policy. The following uses of the ALPR system are specifically prohibited:

1. Invasion of Privacy: Except when done pursuant to a court order such as a search warrant, is a violation of this Policy to utilize the ALPR to record license plates except those of vehicles that are exposed to public view (e.g., vehicles on a public road or street, or that are on private property but whose license plate(s) are visible
from a public road, street, or a place to which members of the public have access, such as the parking lot of a shop or other business establishment).

2. Harassment or Intimidation: It is a violation of this Policy to use the ALPR system to harass and/or intimidate any individual or group.

3. Use Based on a Protected Characteristic. It is a violation of this policy to use the LPR system or associated scan files or hot lists solely because of a person's, or group's race, gender, religion, political affiliation, nationality, ethnicity, sexual orientation, disability, or other classification protected by law.

4. Personal Use: It is a violation of this Policy to use the ALPR system or associated scan files or hot lists for any personal purpose.

5. First Amendment Rights. It is a violation of this policy to use the LPR system or associated scan files or hot lists for the purpose or known effect of infringing upon First Amendment rights.

(h) Anyone who engages in an impermissible use of the ALPR system or associated scan files or hot lists may be subject to administrative sanctions, up to and including termination, pursuant to and consistent with the relevant collective bargaining agreements and departmental policies. Partial license plates reported during crimes may be entered into the ALPR system in an attempt to identify suspect vehicles.

No ALPR operator may access California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS) data unless otherwise authorized to do so. If practicable, the officer should verify an ALPR response through the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS) before taking enforcement action that is based solely on an ALPR alert.

1305.4 DATA COLLECTION

The Investigations Division Captain is responsible for ensuring systems and processes are in place for the proper collection and retention of ALPR data. Data will be transferred from vehicles to the designated storage in accordance with department procedures. The Department should if feasible find a solution to transfer evidentiary hit data into it’s digital evidence repository through secure integration.

All ALPR data downloaded to the ALPR server should be stored for no longer than 30 days, and in accordance with the established records retention schedule. Thereafter, ALPR data should be purged unless it has become, or it is reasonable to believe it will become, evidence in a criminal or civil action or is subject to a discovery request or other lawful action to produce records. In those circumstances the applicable data should be downloaded from the server and uploaded into BPD’s digital evidence repository.

ALPR vendor, will store the data (data hosting) and ensure proper maintenance and security of data stored in their data towers. The ALPR vendor will purge their data at the end of the 30 days of storage. However, this will not preclude Berkeley Police Department from maintaining any relevant vehicle data obtained from the system after that period pursuant to the established City of Berkeley retention schedule mentioned above or outlined elsewhere. Relevant vehicle data are scans corresponding to the vehicle of interest on a hot list. The ALPR vendor and Department shall ensure that the necessary data is captured and stored to accurately report the relevant data required in the Annual Surveillance Technology report. Once the City Council approves the Annual Surveillance Technology report all said data may be purged so long as it doesn’t violate the Retention guidelines.
Restrictions on use of vendor Data: Information gathered or collected, and records retained by
the vendor’s cameras or any other Berkeley Police Department ALPR system will not be sold,
accessed, or used for any purpose other than legitimate law enforcement or public safety
purposes.

1305.5 DATA ACCESS
(a) No member of this department shall operate ALPR equipment or access ALPR data
without first completing department-approved training.
(b) No ALPR operator may access California Law Enforcement Telecommunications
System (CLETs) data unless otherwise authorized to do so.
(c) If practical, an operator should verify an ALPR response through the California Law
Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETs) before taking enforcement action
that is based solely on an ALPR alert.

1305.6 DATA PROTECTION
Surveillance Use Policy—Fixed ALPRs

All saved data will be safeguarded and protected by both procedural and technological means. The Berkeley Police Department will observe the following safeguards regarding access to and use of stored data (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53):

(a) Non-law enforcement requests for access to stored ALPR data shall be processed according to the Records Maintenance and Release Policy in accordance with applicable law.

(b) All ALPR data downloaded to any workstation or server shall be accessible only through a login/password-protected system capable of documenting all access of information by name, date and time (Civil Code § 1798.90.52).

(c) Berkeley Police Department members approved to access ALPR data under these guidelines are permitted to access the data for legitimate law enforcement purposes only, such as when the data relate to a specific criminal investigation or department-related civil or administrative action.

(d) Aggregated ALPR data not related to specific criminal investigations shall not be released to any local, state or federal agency or entity without the consent of the Chief of Police or City Manager (i.e. If transportation department requested volume of vehicular traffic associated with specific events, it could conceivably be provided with the count of vehicles, but not the specific license plates with appropriate permissions).

(e) Measures will be taken to ensure the accuracy of ALPR information. Errors discovered in ALPR data collected by ALPR units shall be marked, corrected or deleted in accordance with the type and severity of the error in question.

(f) ALPR system audits will be conducted by the Professional Standards Bureau’s Audit and Inspections Sergeant on a regular basis, at least biennial.

(g) Such ALPR data may be released to other authorized and verified law enforcement officials and agencies for legitimate law enforcement purposes.

(h) Every ALPR Detection Browsing Inquiry must be documented by either the associated Berkeley Police case number or incident number, and/or a reason for the inquiry.

For security or data breaches, see the Records Release and Maintenance Policy.

1305.7Civil Liberties and Rights Protection

The Berkeley Police Department is dedicated to the most efficient utilization of its resources and services in its public safety endeavors. The Berkeley Police Department recognizes the need to protect its ownership and control over shared information and to protect the privacy and civil liberties of the public, in accordance with federal and state law. The procedures described within this policy (Data Access, Data Protection, Data Retention, Public Access and Third-Party Data Sharing) protect against the unauthorized use of ALPR data. These policies ensure the data is not used in a way that would violate or infringe upon anyone’s civil rights and/or liberties, including but not limited to potentially disparate or adverse impacts on any communities or groups.
Surveillance Use Policy - Fixed ALPRs

1305.8 DATA RETENTION
All ALPR data belongs to the Department. All ALPR data downloaded to the ALPR server should be stored for no longer than 30 days, and in accordance with the established records retention schedule. Thereafter, ALPR data should be purged unless it has become, or it is reasonable to believe it will become, evidence in a criminal or civil action or is subject to a discovery request or other lawful action to produce records. In those circumstances the applicable data should be downloaded from the server and uploaded into BPD’s digital evidence repository.

ALPR vendor, will store the data (data hosting) and ensure proper maintenance and security of data stored in their data towers. The ALPR vendor will purge their data at the end of the 30 days of storage. However, this will not preclude Berkeley Police Department from maintaining any relevant vehicle data obtained from the system after that period pursuant to the established City of Berkeley retention schedule mentioned above or outlined elsewhere. Relevant vehicle data are scans corresponding to the vehicle of interest on a hot list. The ALPR vendor and Department shall ensure that the necessary data is captured and stored to accurately report the relevant data required in the Annual Surveillance Technology report. Once the City Council approves the Annual Surveillance Technology report all said data may be purged so long as it doesn’t violate the Retention guidelines.

1305.9 PUBLIC ACCESS
All data and images gathered by the ALPR are for the official use of this department. Because such data may contain confidential information, it is not open to public review.

The Department shall to the extent feasible aim to offer a transparency portal wherein the number of scans, hits, and queries is available to the public in real-time, or as near as real-time as feasible. All data shall be reported in the Annual Surveillance Technology Report.

1305.10 THIRD PARTY DATA-SHARING
The ALPR data may be shared only with other law enforcement or prosecutorial agencies for official law enforcement purposes or as otherwise permitted by law.

(a) A supervisor at the requesting agency will sign an acknowledgement letter stating that the shared data will only be used for the purposes that are aligned with the Berkeley Police Department’s policy. The Berkeley Police Department does not permit the sharing of ALPR data gathered by the City or its contractors/subcontractors for purpose of federal immigration enforcement, these federal immigration agencies include Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Patrol (CBP). See attached letter.

(b) The signed letter is retained on file. Requests for ALPR data by non-law enforcement or non-prosecutorial agencies will be processed as provided in the Records Maintenance and Release Policy (Civil Code § 1798.90.55).

(c) All signed letters shall be routed to the Audit and Inspection Sergeant for compliance and reporting. ALPR data is subject to the provisions of the Berkeley Police Department’s Immigration Law Policy, and hence may not be shared with federal immigration enforcement officials.

1305.11 TRAINING
Training for the operation of ALPR Technology shall be provided by BPD personnel. All BPD
Surveillance Use Policy-Fixed ALPRs

employees who utilize ALPR Technology shall be provided a copy of this Surveillance Use Policy.

1305.12 AUDITING AND OVERSIGHT
ALPR system audits will be conducted by the Professional Standards Bureau’s Audit and Inspections Sergeant on a regular basis, at least biannually. The data from the fixed ALPRs shall be reported annually in the Surveillance Technology Report.

1305.13 MAINTENANCE
Any installation and maintenance of ALPR equipment, as well as ALPR data retention and access, shall be managed by the Investigations Division Captain or his or her designee. The Investigations Division Captain will assign members under his/her command to administer the day-to-day operation of the ALPR equipment and data. Equipment maintenance shall be provided by the vendor.
Draft of BPD Policy 1305 Appendix A
“Berkeley Police Department
Surveillance Acquisition Report – Fixed
Automated License Plate Readers”
FIXED AUTOMATED LICENSE PLATE READERS (ALPR)

A. DESCRIPTION

Fixed Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs) are cameras systems with software designed for license plate recognition. The camera systems are typically mounted on street poles, street lights, and highway overpasses.

ALPRs are designed to capture license plate numbers which come into view, along with the location, date and time. The data, which includes an image of the front or the back of the car displaying the license plate, is then uploaded to a central server operated by the vendor. The license plate data is cross referenced with systems such as Stolen Vehicle Systems (SVS), and other lists like Amber alerts to notice police of vehicles with hits.

This technology does not have facial recognition, and is not tied to any personal identifying information or used for traffic enforcement.

B. PURPOSE

Berkeley Police Department will utilize a network of fixed automated license plate readers. The ALPRs will be affixed to street poles, street lights, or other similar objects that are either owned by the City of Berkeley or wherein a right-of-way agreement has been established.

The use of ALPRs to alert police of a wanted or vehicle of interest entering into their respective jurisdiction has become increasingly more commonplace. This technology is being utilized on our local freeways, bridges, and in some instances in private parking lots.

Berkeley Police Department investigators have identified the following instances wherein the use of an effective deployment of ALPRs could have aided the Berkeley Police Department in it’s efforts to focus on the wanted vehicle prior to a crime occurring in the City of Berkeley, and potentially avoided an instance of victimization from happening.

RECENT CASES OF INTEREST

1.) BPD had an armed robbery in which the victim was pistol-whipped. The suspects fled in a vehicle. BPD officers located the vehicle and a pursuit ensued. The license plate on the vehicle was reported as a wanted vehicle for an armed robbery in San Ramon. Had this vehicle entered the City of Berkeley, and the vehicle passed an ALPR- BPD Officers could have been focused on finding this offender in advance of this violent robbery.

2.) Victim was carjacked of his Toyota Rav-4. The suspect vehicle two days later was used in a murder that occurred in a nearby East Bay City. This same vehicle was used in a robbery in Oakland. The stolen property in the Oakland robbery was tracked back into Berkeley. Then this same vehicle was used to commit a robbery in Berkeley at Woolsey
and Telegraph. The vehicle was listed as a car-jacking vehicle from the initial crime, ALPRs could have alerted BPD prior to the property being discarded in Berkeley, as well as the final robbery listed in this synopsis.

3.) Home invasion robbery in Berkeley wherein the suspect came in a stolen vehicle, listed in SVS as a wanted vehicle. The suspect violently attacked the resident. The suspect was arrested shortly after in San Pablo due to an ALPR hit. Suspect was unknown but identified due to having the victims stolen property.

4.) An armed robbery occurred in Berkeley the suspects fled in a cold plated stolen vehicle, meaning the vehicle was listed as wanted in SVS. San Pablo PD stopped the suspect vehicle due to the want associated to the license plate. Suspect was arrested and was in possession of a firearm. Suspect was eventually also linked to a stranger sexual assault case.

5.) A robbery of Valero in Berkeley occurred. The suspect arrived in stolen vehicle. The suspect was subsequently arrested by San Mateo PD due to an ALPR hit.

6.) A Victim called BPD to report his carjacked/stolen vehicle (from Union City), was tracking in South Berkeley. The victim was originally carjacked via gun by a group of suspects in Union City a few days prior. Moreover, Officers responded to South Berkeley but were unable to locate the victim’s vehicle. The victim later tracked his carjacked/stolen vehicle to 1370 University Ave. Officers responded to this location and located the victim’s vehicle. Three juveniles and one adult fled from the vehicle but were captured by the Officers. A search of the vehicle yielded a concealed/loaded firearm.

CATALYTIC CONVERTER THEFTS WITH GUNFIRE

7.) A theft of a catalytic converter took place at 5th and Hearst. The suspect vehicle’s license plate was captured on video surveillance. BPD put a felony stop on the vehicle. San Pablo PD located the vehicle using their ALPR system and arrested the driver who was in possession of a loaded handgun.

8.) A catalytic converter theft occurred at 145 Hillcrest Road. The suspect vehicle’s license plate was captured on video surveillance. BPD put a felony stop on the vehicle. Pinole PD located the vehicle. During a search of the vehicle, BPD located an assault rifle (ghost gun) and arrested the suspect.

9.) A pickup truck, wanted in SVS due to it being reported as a stolen vehicle, entered Berkeley. The aforementioned was caught in the act of cutting a catalytic converter
from a vehicle on the 1800 block of 4th Street. Witnesses and a Security guard confronted the suspects. The suspects fled, and then immediately returned to shoot at the witness and security guard.

PROPERTY CRIME

10.) An auto burglary occurred at 1316 San Pablo Avenue and the victim obtained a license plate. A felony entry was made on the license plate. Pittsburg PD located the suspect vehicle due to an ALPR hit. The vehicle failed to yield and crashed. The driver was arrested for the failure to yield and Pittsburg PD located a loaded handgun in her purse.

11.) A suspect drove into Berkeley in a stolen vehicle, listed in SVS. The suspect drove to the driveway of 1626 Berkeley Way and proceeded to steal that resident’s vehicle.

12.) Two suspects drove a reported stolen auto to Berkeley Bowl West. The suspects then burglarized a victim’s vehicle. The suspect then proceeded to Emeryville where they used the Victim’s identity to commit identity theft.

13.) A series of auto burglaries were committed in the area of San Pablo and Gilman. The suspects were seen getting into a vehicle which was listed in SVS as a stolen vehicle. Two days later a nearby city reported the same vehicle was used in a murder in that city. ALPR system could have notified officers of that wanted vehicle and helped in the capture of the suspects, and potentially intervened before the subsequent murder.

HOMICIDE

14.) Another agency reported a vehicle used in a murder, with a known license plate was entered into SVS with a felony want (associated with a murder). On 08/02/22 the vehicle was located in Berkeley. The associated suspects were located after fleeing from officers.

15.) BPD officers responded to a report of a person casing a house. Upon their arrival the suspects fled in a white sedan. That sedan was determined to be a reported stolen auto. The sedan fled from officers after they activated their emergency lights and sirens. The same vehicle was reported to be involved in a road rage incident in an adjacent city wherein the suspects shot and killed the victim on the freeway.

SEX/DV CRIMES

16.) This is a DV case in which the suspect fought with his adult girlfriend causing visible injury and then chased his girlfriend’s 12 year old daughter down the street and shot at
her with a firearm. San Pablo PD had an ALPR hit from this Berkeley PD case. The suspect ran from San Pablo PD and a gun was recovered from him.

17.) This is a series of peeping and prowling incidents against female UC Berkeley students. The suspect was driving for a ride share service and was in and out of Berkeley for the several months. The suspect was homeless, and thereby conventional methods of locating the suspect weren’t fruitful.

C. LOCATION

BPD proposes to install 52 fixed ALPRs in the City of Berkeley. While the cameras are permanent installations, if found ineffective in the installed location, the Department can elect to move the camera to another location at nominal cost. It’s preferred to leave cameras installed in locations for periods of minimally a year. Locations will be determined using crime data, known locations of ingress or egress into the City of Berkeley, and commonly known direction of travel after criminal acts based on information provided from investigators. The Department will balance the need to deploy the camera systems equitably across the City of Berkeley with the need to deploy the cameras in an effective manner. BPD will solicit input from the vendor for an effective deployment.

D. IMPACT

The Berkeley Police Department is dedicated to the most efficient utilization of its resources and services in its public safety endeavors. The Berkeley Police Department recognizes the need to protect its ownership and control over shared information and to protect the privacy and civil liberties of the public, in accordance with federal and state law. The procedures utilized with ALPR Units will help to ensure unauthorized use of its data. The procedures will ensure the data is not used in a way that would violate or infringe upon anyone’s civil rights and/or liberties, including but not limited to potentially disparate or adverse impacts on any communities or groups.

E. MITIGATION

All saved data will be safeguarded and protected by both procedural and technological means which are implemented to safeguard the public from any impacts identified in subsection (D). See subsection (G) for further.

F. DATA TYPES AND SOURCES

Images of license plates and location metadata may be obtained through the use of ALPR cameras. The vendor’s system may have searching capabilities due to technology from machine learning
that allow officers to search by vehicle type, make, color, license plate state, bumper sticker (the presence of a bumper sticker, not the image or content), decals (again the presence of a decal, not the image or content) and roof racks. All data stored in the vendor’s servers shall be securely protected with end-to-end encryption.

G. DATA SECURITY
BPD takes data security seriously. All saved data will be safeguarded and protected by both procedural and technological means. The Berkeley Police Department will observe the following safeguards regarding access to and use of stored data (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53):

(a) Non-law enforcement requests for access to stored ALPR data shall be processed according to the Records Maintenance and Release Policy in accordance with applicable law.

(b) All ALPR data downloaded to any workstation or server shall be accessible only through a login/password-protected system capable of documenting all access of information by name, date and time (Civil Code § 1798.90.52).

(c) Berkeley Police Department members approved to access ALPR data under these guidelines are permitted to access the data for legitimate law enforcement purposes only, such as when the data relate to a specific criminal investigation or department-related civil or administrative action.

(d) Aggregated ALPR data not related to specific criminal investigations shall not be released to any local, state or federal agency or entity without the consent of the Chief of Police or City Manager.

(e) Measures will be taken to ensure the accuracy of ALPR information. Errors discovered in ALPR data collected by ALPR units shall be marked, corrected or deleted in accordance with the type and severity of the error in question.

(f) ALPR system audits will be conducted by the Professional Standards Bureau’s Audit and Inspections Sergeant on a regular basis, at least biennial.

(g) Such ALPR data may be released to other authorized and verified law enforcement officials and agencies for legitimate law enforcement purposes.

(h) Every ALPR Detection Browsing Inquiry must be documented by either the associated Berkeley Police case number or incident number, and/or a reason for the inquiry.

For security or data breaches, see the Records Release and Maintenance Policy.
H. FISCAL COST
Since the City of Berkeley has not acquired the specific cameras, the costs can only be estimated. BPD expects the individual camera costs to range from $2500-$5000 each, with the installation to vary. BPD believes that for the proposed 52 camera deployment the cost to purchase and install to not exceed an initial cost of $250,000. The yearly subscription cost may fluctuate but is expected to range from $125,000 to $175,000 a year.

I. THIRD-PARTY DEPENDENCE AND ACCESS
ALPR vendor would store the data (data hosting) and ensure proper maintenance and security of data stored in their data towers. The vendor will purge their data at the end of 30 days of storage. However, this will not preclude Berkeley Police Department from maintaining any relevant vehicle data obtained from the system after that period pursuant to the established City of Berkeley retention schedule (i.e. if detectives establish a hit results in evidentiary value it should be incorporated into the digital evidence of that specific case, and thereby would be kept longer than the aforementioned 30 days).

Restrictions on use of fixed ALPR Data: Information gathered or collected, and records retained by the Vendor will not be sold, accessed, or used for any purpose other than legitimate law enforcement or public safety purpose unless allowed by policy (i.e. metadata will be permissible use for annual surveillance reporting).

An ALPR shall only be used for official law enforcement business.
Use of an ALPR is restricted to the purposes outlined below. Department members shall not use, or allow others to use the equipment or database records for any unauthorized purpose (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53).

(a) An ALPR shall only be used for official law enforcement business.

(b) An ALPR may be used in conjunction with any routine patrol operation or to support criminal investigations. Reasonable suspicion or probable cause is not required before using an ALPR.

(c) Partial license plates and unique vehicle descriptions reported during major crimes should be entered into the ALPR system in an attempt to identify suspect vehicles.

The ALPR system, and all data collected, is the property of the Berkeley Police Department. Department personnel may only access and use the ALPR system for official and legitimate law enforcement purposes consistent with this Policy. The following uses of the ALPR system are specifically prohibited:
(1) Invasion of Privacy: Except when done pursuant to a court order such as a search warrant, is a violation of this Policy to utilize the ALPR to record license plates except those of vehicles that are exposed to public view (e.g., vehicles on a public road or street, or that are on private property but whose license plate(s) are visible from a public road, street, or a place to which members of the public have access, such as the parking lot of a shop or other business establishment).

(2) Harassment or Intimidation: It is a violation of this Policy to use the ALPR system to harass and/or intimidate any individual or group.

(3) Use Based on a Protected Characteristic. It is a violation of this policy to use the ALPR system or associated scan files or hot lists solely because of a person's, or group's race, gender, religion, political affiliation, nationality, ethnicity, sexual orientation, disability, or other classification protected by law.

(4) Personal Use: It is a violation of this Policy to use the ALPR system or associated scan files or hot lists for any personal purpose.

(5) First Amendment Rights. It is a violation of this policy to use the LPR system or associated scan files or hot lists for the purpose or known effect of infringing upon First Amendment rights.

Anyone who engages in an impermissible use of the ALPR system or associated scan files or hot lists may be subject to administrative sanctions, up to and including termination, pursuant to and consistent with the relevant collective bargaining agreements and departmental policies.

The ALPR data may be shared only with other law enforcement or prosecutorial agencies for official law enforcement purposes or as otherwise permitted by law.

(a) A supervisor at the requesting agency will sign an acknowledgement letter stating that the shared data will only be used for the purposes that are aligned with the Berkeley Police Department’s policy. The Berkeley Police Department does not permit the sharing of ALPR data gathered by the City or its contractors/subcontractors for purpose of federal immigration enforcement, these federal immigration agencies include Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Patrol (CBP).

(b) The signed letter is retained on file. Requests for ALPR data by non-law enforcement or non-prosecutorial agencies will be processed as provided in the Records Maintenance and Release Policy (Civil Code § 1798.90.55).
J. ALTERNATIVES
An alternative is the deployment of additional police resources. The inherent problems with this alternative is that it is difficult to hire and train additional police officers and the cost would be significantly higher than adding technology. Furthermore, this technology furthers the Department’s goal in protecting and safeguarding our community through precision based policing strategies.

K. EXPERIENCE OF OTHER ENTITIES
Currently, in Alameda County, the following cities have ALPR programs, The Alameda County Sheriff’s Office, Alameda PD, Emeryville PD, Fremont PD, Hayward PD, Livermore PD, Newark PD, Oakland PD, Piedmont PD, Pleasanton PD, San Leandro PD, Union City PD, and the California Highway Patrol. The only agency in Alameda County to not utilize ALPRs is Albany PD.

Representatives from Newark indicated success with their program. No notable issues have arisen as a result of this program. Additionally, no unexpected expenditures have come from this program that were unforeseen.

Representatives from indicated similar to the above, success with their program. No notable issues have arisen as a result of this program. Additionally, no unexpected expenditures have come from this program that were unforeseen.
POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY BOARD
SUPPLEMENTAL SPECIAL MEETING PACKET
Friday, June 16, 2023
10:00 A.M.

Board Members:

JOHN MOORE III. (CHAIR)  REGINA HARRIS (VICE-CHAIR)
KITTY CALAVITA  JULIE LEFTWICH
LEAH WILSON

MEETING LOCATION
Multipurpose Room
1947 Center Street,
Berkeley, CA 94704

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<td>Automatic License Plate Readers (ALPR) in the City of Berkeley: A Preliminary Review of proposed BPD Policies by the Office of the Director of Police Accountability (ODPA) submitted to the Police Accountability Board (PAB) Special Meeting: June 16, 2023.</td>
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Calavita Responses to 1305 Appendix A

A. **Description.** Does not capture facial recognition, but what *does* it capture besides license plate and make of car? Photos online suggest ALPRs can capture at least silhouettes of those in car.

B. **Purpose.** The cases mentioned here (for example, the armed robbery mentioned first) might have been prevented *if the cameras allow for real-time alerts* based on the license plates being immediately transferred into a machine-readable format. That requires Optical Character recognition (OCR) which is a feature of the expensive version of cameras (not the $2000-2500 garden-variety referred to in the cost estimate).

C. **Location.** Why 52? Based on what? Who is the vendor and why will they play the critical role of where the cameras would go? How will effectiveness be determined? (Needs a detailed explanation of performance review, given the fiscal costs involved).

D. **Impact.** If efficient utilization of resources is the goal, it is important to provide more detail on cost/benefits (as above). Also, there is a sentence here that says ALPRs “will help to ensure unauthorized use of its data” (sic). What procedures “will ensure the data is not used in a way that would violate or infringe on anyone’s civil rights and/or liberties…”? More is needed here. Explain exactly what procedures other than the “data security” mentioned in G below.

**F. Data types and sources.** In addition to providing images of plates and cars, is it possible that some images of people will be retrieved? Further, bumper stickers, decals and roof racks are mentioned. How does this impact civil liberties? The text says only the *fact* of a bumper sticker would be in the image—it is unclear why the content is not also revealed. Also, the roof rack suggests that the entire car is in the image, and thus may include number of passengers and perhaps even their characteristics.

**G. Data Security.** (a). It notes there will be non-law enforcement requests for access. This is somewhat alarming. This report needs to clarify what is
meant by this and exactly how it will be dealt with (not just referencing a
different policy/law).
(b) “All ALPR data downloadable to any workstation or server”
(clarify)
(c,d, and G). All mention “legitimate law enforcement purposes” or
“law enforcement officials and agencies”, but nowhere does this
confine the sharing to California. Will these data be shared with, for
example, Texas law enforcement officials, or federal officials? I am
cconcerned about other state agencies acquiring CA ALPR data for the
“legitimate law enforcement purpose” of violating reproductive rights
in their states. (see below)

H. Fiscal cost. This is probably an underestimate of costs, given what I have
researched. Low-end cameras with limited abilities go for $2000 each but
others (which allow real-time alerts) cost in the $25,000 range. Also, Council
Member Taplin’s proposal provides the CM estimate for the ALPRs used for
parking enforcement at $78,363 each. What is the low-ball estimate here
based on? What type or model of camera is being proposed?

I. Third-party dependence and access. Again, does “legitimate law
enforcement or public safety purpose” include across state lines?
What about a “legitimate” Texas law enforcement purpose?

(b). no reasonable suspicion or probable cause required? In other
words, there is no need for a “hit”? What factors will determine if it is
“used” if not suspicion? And, what does “used” mean in this context?

After #5 (p. 7), a #6 is necessary, making it clear that ALPRs can not
be used in the violation of reproductive rights (see University of
Washington Center for Human Rights [Dec 2022], “Who’s Watching
Washington: Dangers of Automated License Plate Readers to
Immigration and Reproductive Rights in Washington State”).
(b). (p. 7). Explain how those requests will be processed.

J. Alternatives. The only alternative mentioned is additional police resources. CM Taplin’s proposal mentions other violence prevention measures and Reimagining. There is some evidence across the country for the effectiveness of alternatives other than additional police. These need to be acknowledged.

K. Experience of other entities. What is the evidence for the effectiveness of ALPRs in these other jurisdictions? Is their crime rate lower than that of Berkeley, or their criminal investigations improved by these cameras? Given the potential civil liberty threats of this technology, we need for them to at least be evidence-based.

Finally, the last paragraph in the Report is a duplicate.
1305.1. Purpose. First, there is no mention of what the actual purpose is. Second, the 4th paragraph mentions “contractors/subcontractors”. Who are they and exactly what role do they play? This is nowhere spelled out. Also, the only restriction on sharing mentioned in this section relates to the California Values Act and immigration enforcement. We need a statement that includes no sharing with states that violate a woman’s right to access reproductive care.

1305.2. Definitions. (a) What does “known information of interest” mean? (b) ALPR Operator. This section and section c conflate/confuse “operator” with “administrator”, which appear to be quite different things. Section e contains wording/grammar problems. Section (f on “detection”) does not fit in “definitions”. Neither does Section g belong in “definitions”.

1305.3 Authorized and prohibited uses. The first sentence is repetitious with Section a here. (b) says no “reasonable suspicion” or “probable cause” is necessary for use. What does “use” mean in this context? And, elsewhere it talks about a “vehicle of interest”. How is this different from “reasonable suspicion”? What factors will determine a “vehicle of interest”? This is all vague and confusing. Section d is not about a “purpose”. Sections e through g do not belong in a section on “authorized and prohibited uses”. They belong in a section possibly called “OPERATION”. Further, Section e begins “If practicable...”. This seems unduly vague, especially when joined with the later word “should” (not “shall”). Additionally, why is “LPR” sometimes used instead of “ALPR”? It’s a minor detail but if there is no difference, it’s better to be consistent.

#6 (p. 3). I have lost track of this enumeration system but this #6 appears to be subsequent to the entry on “Hot lists”. The first sentence in #6 makes no sense: “Administrator (or his/her designee) before initial entry within the ALPR system”.

In Section g, there is the phrase “which has the ability to be fully audited”. What does this mean? Later in section g, there is a section entitled
“Permitted/Impermissible Uses”, but this is the title of all of Section 1305.3. What is this doing here?

Similar problems exist throughout this policy draft, and I will stop keeping track here.

Section g on p. 4 needs a #6 after First Amendment Rights, citing Reproductive Rights for example: “It is a violation of this policy to provide the ALPR data to officials of any state that does not protect a woman’s reproductive rights.

Also, since the cameras capture images of whole cars, not just license plates, I assume they also periodically capture images of individual pedestrians and cyclists. Is it permissible to use these images in law enforcement? If so, how are these 52 APLRs in any essential way different from the 10 fixed surveillance cameras recently provided for?

1305.4. Data Collection. The first paragraph does not explain what “systems and processes are in place for the proper collection and retention of ALPR data,” only that they will be developed by the Division Captain. And, again, “if feasible” is vague and provides substantial discretion. Is this adequate? In the second critical paragraph about data retention, the word “should” is used throughout. Why not “shall”?

1305.6 Data Protection. For Sections a through c, see my notes about the acquisition report—for example, what “non-law enforcement requests”?

1305.7. Civil liberties. As always, Berkeley may want to have policies that are more restrictive than state and federal law requires.

1305.8. Data Retention. This section is largely verbatim with the second and third paragraphs of 1305.4 (Data Collection).
1305.10. Third Party data sharing. This section is largely redundant with previous sections, but if it is kept, add reproductive rights.

1305.12. Auditing and Oversight. This section needs to include a rigorous performance review. Has the camera reduced crime or helped solve crimes in the area? Does the evidence suggest that the cameras have had a positive impact on public safety around the city? What has the effect been on civil liberties? Have the cameras captured images of individual people in the roadway? Have these images been used by law enforcement?
Number Plate: ABC 123
Date: July 07, 2020
Time: 9:11:29 am
Location: Ashland, California
GPS: 33.4183, -117.6046
Vehicle Make Model: Toyota
Toyota Type: Sedan
Color: Silver
Surveillance Use Policy-Fixed ALPRs

1305.1 PURPOSE

The purpose of this policy is to provide guidance for the capture, storage and use of digital data obtained through the use of Automated License Plate Reader (ALPR) technology. Department Personnel shall adhere to the requirements of the Surveillance Use-Fixed ALPRs in this policy as well as the corresponding Use Policy -422.

The policy of the Berkeley Police Department is to utilize ALPR technology to capture and store digital license plate data and images while recognizing the established privacy rights of the public.

All data and images gathered by the ALPR are for the official use of this department. Because such data may contain confidential information, it is not open to public review.

The Berkeley Police Department does not permit the sharing of ALPR data gathered by the City or its contractors/subcontractors for federal immigration enforcement, pursuant to the California Values Act (Government Code § 7282.5; Government Code § 7284.2 et seq) – these federal immigration agencies include Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Patrol (CBP).

1305.2 DEFINITIONS

(a) Automated License Plate Reader (ALPR): A device that uses cameras and computer technology to compare digital images to lists of known information of interest.

(b) ALPR Operator: Trained Department members who may utilize ALPR system/equipment. ALPR operators may be assigned to any position within the Department, and the ALPR Administrator may order the deployment of the ALPR systems for use in various efforts.

(c) ALPR Administrator: The Investigations Bureau Captain or the Chief’s designee, serves as the ALPR Administrator for the Department.

(d) Hot List: A list of license plates associated with vehicles of interest compiled from one or more databases including, but not limited to, NCIC, CA DMV, Local BOLO's, etc.

(e) Vehicles of Interest: Including, but not limited to vehicles which are reported as stolen, display stolen license plates or tags; vehicles linked to missing and/or wanted persons and vehicles flagged by the Department of Motor Vehicle Administration or law enforcement agencies.

(f) Detection: Data obtained by an ALPR of an image (such as a license plate) within public view that was read by the device, including potential images (such as the plate and description of vehicle on which it was displayed), and information regarding the location of the ALPR system at the time of the ALPR's read.
(g) Hit Alert from the ALPR system that a scanned license plate number may be in the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) or other law enforcement database for a specific reason including, but not limited to, being related to a stolen car, wanted person, missing person, domestic violation protective order or terrorist-related activity.

1305.3 AUTHORIZED AND PROHIBITED USES

An ALPR shall only be used for official law enforcement business. Use of an ALPR is restricted to the purposes outlined below. Department members shall not use, or allow others to use the equipment or database records for any unauthorized purpose (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53).

(a) An ALPR shall only be used for official law enforcement business.

(b) An ALPR may be used in conjunction with any routine patrol operation or to support criminal investigations. Reasonable suspicion or probable cause is not required before using an ALPR.

(c) Partial license plates and unique vehicle descriptions reported during crimes may be entered into the ALPR system in an attempt to identify suspect vehicles.

(d) No member of this department shall operate ALPR equipment or access ALPR data without first completing department-approved training.

(e) If practicable, the officer should verify an ALPR response through the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS) before taking enforcement action that is based solely on an ALPR alert. Once an alert is received, the operator should confirm that the observed license plate from the system matches the license plate of the observed vehicle. Before any law enforcement action is taken because of an ALPR alert, the alert will be verified through a CLETS inquiry via MDT or through Dispatch. Members will not take any police action that restricts the freedom of any individual based solely on an ALPR alert unless it has been validated. Because the ALPR alert may relate to a vehicle and may not relate to the person operating the vehicle, officers are reminded that they need to have reasonable suspicion and/or probable cause to make an enforcement stop of any vehicle. (For example, if a vehicle is entered into the system because of its association with a wanted individual, Officers should attempt to visually match the driver to the description of the wanted subject prior to making the stop or should have another legal basis for making the stop.)

(f) Hot Lists. Designation of hot lists to be utilized by the ALPR system shall be made by the ALPR Administrator or his/her designee. Hot lists shall be obtained or compiled from sources as may be consistent with the purposes of the ALPR system set forth in this Policy. Hot lists utilized by the Department's LPR system may be updated by agency sources more frequently than the Department may be uploading them and thus the Department's LPR system will not have access to real time data. Occasionally, there may be errors in the LPR system's read of a license plate. Therefore, an alert alone shall not be a basis for police action (other than following the vehicle of interest). Prior to initiation of a stop of a vehicle or other intervention based on an alert, Department members shall undertake the following:

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Commented [WL1]: This section is problematic and needs more work. Specific comments noted below.

Commented [WL2]: What does this mean? Not an easily defined or enforceable standard.

Commented [WL3]: This sentence contradicts the first one – this doesn’t have an “if practicable” modifier.

Commented [WL4]: Is police action the same as law enforcement action?

Commented [WL5]: So no reasonable suspicion or pc to use ALPR per (b) above, but you need one to make an enforcement stop. So do you need BOTH to verify in CLETS and have reasonable suspicion? This whole section needs to be cleaned up.

Commented [WL6]: This kind of explanatory information is not needed in a policy.
(1) Verification of status on a Hot List. An officer must receive confirmation, from a Berkeley Police Department Communications Dispatcher or other department computer device, that the license plate is still stolen, wanted, or otherwise of interest before proceeding (absent exigent circumstances).

(2) Visual verification of license plate number. Officers shall visually verify that the license plate of interest matches identically with the image of the license plate number captured (read) by the LPR, including both the alphanumeric characters of the license plate, state of issue, and vehicle descriptors before proceeding. Department members alerted to the fact that an observed motor vehicle’s license plate is entered as a Hot Plate (hit) in a specific BOLO (be on the lookout) list are required to make a reasonable effort to confirm that a wanted person is actually in the vehicle and/or that a reasonable basis exists before a Department member would have a lawful basis to stop the vehicle.

(3) Department members will clear all stops from hot list alerts by indicating the positive ALPR Hit, i.e., with an arrest or other enforcement action. If it is not obvious in the text of the call as to the correlation of the ALPR Hit and the arrest, then the Department member shall update with the Communications Dispatcher and original person and/or a crime analyst inputting the vehicle in the hot list (hit).

(4) General Hot Lists (SVS, SFR, and SLR) will be automatically downloaded into the ALPR system a minimum of once a day with the most current data overwriting the old data.

(5) All entries and updates of specific Hot Lists within the ALPR system will be documented by the requesting Department member within the appropriate general offense report. As such, specific Hot Lists shall be approved by the ALPR Administrator.

(6) Administrator (or his/her designee) before initial entry within the ALPR system. The updating of such a list within the ALPR system shall thereafter be accomplished pursuant to the approval of the Department member's immediate supervisor. The hits from these data sources should be viewed as informational; created solely to bring the officers attention to specific vehicles that have been associated with criminal activity.

All Hot Plates and suspect information entered into the ALPR system will contain the following information as a minimum:
- Entering Department member's name
- Related case number
- Short synopsis describing the nature of the originating call

(g) Login/Log-Out Procedure. To ensure proper operation and facilitate oversight of the ALPR system, all users will be required to have individual credentials for access and use of the systems and/or data, which has the ability to be fully audited.

Commented [WL7]: #3 doesn’t go with the intro...Prior to initiation of a stop...neither does number 4, 5, or 6
from a public road, street, or a place to which members of the public have access, such as the parking lot of a shop or other business establishment).

2. Harassment or Intimidation: It is a violation of this Policy to use the ALPR system to harass and/or intimidate any individual or group.

3. Use Based on a Protected Characteristic. It is a violation of this policy to use the LPR system or associated scan files or hot lists solely because of a person's, or group's race, gender, religion, political affiliation, nationality, ethnicity, sexual orientation, disability, or other classification protected by law.

4. Personal Use: It is a violation of this Policy to use the ALPR system or associated scan files or hot lists for any personal purpose.

5. First Amendment Rights. It is a violation of this policy to use the LPR system or associated scan files or hot lists for the purpose or known effect of infringing upon First Amendment rights.

(h) Anyone who engages in an impermissible use of the ALPR system or associated scan files or hot lists may be subject to administrative sanctions, up to and including termination, pursuant to and consistent with the relevant collective bargaining agreements and departmental policies. Partial license plates reported during crimes may be entered into the ALPR system in an attempt to identify suspect vehicles.

No ALPR operator may access California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS) data unless otherwise authorized to do so. If practicable, the officer should verify an ALPR response through the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS) before taking enforcement action that is based solely on an ALPR alert.

1305.4 DATA COLLECTION

The Investigations Division Captain is responsible for ensuring systems and processes are in place for the proper collection and retention of ALPR data. Data will be transferred from vehicles to the designated storage in accordance with department procedures. The Department should if feasible find a solution to transfer evidentiary hit data into it's digital evidence repository through secure integration.

All ALPR data downloaded to the ALPR server should be stored for no longer than 30 days, and in accordance with the established records retention schedule. Thereafter, ALPR data should be purged unless it has become, or it is reasonable to believe it will become, evidence in a criminal or civil action or is subject to a discovery request or other lawful action to produce records. In those circumstances the applicable data should be downloaded from the server and uploaded into BPD’s digital evidence repository.

ALPR vendor, will store the data (data hosting) and ensure proper maintenance and security of data stored in their data towers. The ALPR vendor will purge their data at the end of the 30 days of storage. However, this will not preclude Berkeley Police Department from maintaining any relevant vehicle data obtained from the system after that period pursuant to the established City of Berkeley retention schedule mentioned above or outlined elsewhere. Relevant vehicle data are scans corresponding to the vehicle of interest on a hot list. The ALPR vendor and Department shall ensure that the necessary data is captured and stored to accurately report the relevant data required in the Annual Surveillance Technology report. Once the City Council approves the Annual Surveillance Technology report all said data may be purged so long as it doesn't violate the Retention guidelines.

Commented [WL8]: There should be a formal process to document exceptions to retention scheduled.

Commented [WL9]: This makes no sense. The retention schedule above is 30 days so what is the variance referenced?

Commented [WL10]: Why is this capitalized? Is there a separate document called Retention Guidelines?
Restrictions on use of vendor Data: Information gathered or collected, and records retained by the vendor’s cameras or any other Berkeley Police Department ALPR system will not be sold, accessed, or used for any purpose other than legitimate law enforcement or public safety purposes.

1305.5 DATA ACCESS
(a) No member of this department shall operate ALPR equipment or access ALPR data without first completing department-approved training.
(b) No ALPR operator may access California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS) data unless otherwise authorized to do so.
(c) If practical, an operator should verify an ALPR response through the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS) before taking enforcement action that is based solely on an ALPR alert.

1305.6 DATA PROTECTION

Commented [WL11]: This doesn’t fit under Data Access section.
Surveillance Use Policy - Fixed ALPRs

All saved data will be safeguarded and protected by both procedural and technological means. The Berkeley Police Department will observe the following safeguards regarding access to and use of stored data (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53):

(a) Non-law enforcement requests for access to stored ALPR data shall be processed according to the Records Maintenance and Release Policy in accordance with applicable law.

(b) All ALPR data downloaded to any workstation or server shall be accessible only through a login/password-protected system capable of documenting all access of information by name, date and time (Civil Code § 1798.90.52).

(c) Berkeley Police Department members approved to access ALPR data under these guidelines are permitted to access the data for legitimate law enforcement purposes only, such as when the data relate to a specific criminal investigation or department-related civil or administrative action.

(d) Aggregated ALPR data not related to specific criminal investigations shall not be released to any local, state or federal agency or entity without the consent of the Chief of Police or City Manager (i.e. If transportation department requested volume of vehicular traffic associated with specific events, it could conceivably be provided with the count of vehicles, but not the specific license plates with appropriate permissions).

(e) Measures will be taken to ensure the accuracy of ALPR information. Errors discovered in ALPR data collected by ALPR units shall be marked, corrected or deleted in accordance with the type and severity of the error in question.

(f) ALPR system audits will be conducted by the Professional Standards Bureau’s Audit and Inspections Sergeant on a regular basis, at least biennial.

(g) Such ALPR data may be released to other authorized and verified law enforcement officials and agencies for legitimate law enforcement purposes.

(h) Every ALPR Detection Browsing Inquiry must be documented by either the associated Berkeley Police case number or incident number, and/or a reason for the inquiry.

For security or data breaches, see the Records Release and Maintenance Policy.

1305.7 CIVIL LIBERTIES AND RIGHTS PROTECTION

The Berkeley Police Department is dedicated to the most efficient utilization of its resources and services in its public safety endeavors. The Berkeley Police Department recognizes the need to protect its ownership and control over shared information and to protect the privacy and civil liberties of the public, in accordance with federal and state law. The procedures described within this policy (Data Access, Data Protection, Data Retention, Public Access and Third-Party Data Sharing) protect against the unauthorized use of ALPR data. These policies ensure the data is not used in a way that would violate or infringe upon anyone’s civil rights and/or liberties, including but not limited to potentially disparate or adverse impacts on any communities or groups.
1305.8 DATA RETENTION

All ALPR data belongs to the Department. All ALPR data downloaded to the ALPR server should be stored for no longer than 30 days, and in accordance with the established records retention schedule. Thereafter, ALPR data should be purged unless it has become, or it is reasonable to believe it will become, evidence in a criminal or civil action or is subject to a discovery request or other lawful action to produce records. In those circumstances the applicable data should be downloaded from the server and uploaded into BPD’s digital evidence repository.

ALPR vendor will store the data (data hosting) and ensure proper maintenance and security of data stored in their data towers. The ALPR vendor will purge their data at the end of the 30 days of storage. However, this will not preclude Berkeley Police Department from maintaining any relevant vehicle data obtained from the system after that period pursuant to the established City of Berkeley retention schedule mentioned above or outlined elsewhere. Relevant vehicle data are scans corresponding to the vehicle of interest on a hot list. The ALPR vendor and Department shall ensure that the necessary data is captured and stored to accurately report the relevant data required in the Annual Surveillance Technology report. Once the City Council approves the Annual Surveillance Technology report all said data may be purged so long as it doesn’t violate the Retention guidelines.

1305.9 PUBLIC ACCESS

All data and images gathered by the ALPR are for the official use of this department. Because such data may contain confidential information, it is not open to public review.

The Department shall to the extent feasible aim to offer a transparency portal wherein the number of scans, hits, and queries is available to the public in real-time, or as near as real-time as feasible. All data shall be reported in the Annual Surveillance Technology Report.

1305.10 THIRD PARTY DATA-SHARING

The ALPR data may be shared only with other law enforcement or prosecutorial agencies for official law enforcement purposes or as otherwise permitted by law.

(a) A supervisor at the requesting agency will sign an acknowledgement letter stating that the shared data will only be used for the purposes that are aligned with the Berkeley Police Department’s policy. The Berkeley Police Department does not permit the sharing of ALPR data gathered by the City or its contractors/subcontractors for purpose of federal immigration enforcement, these federal immigration agencies include Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Patrol (CBP). See attached letter.

(b) The signed letter is retained on file. Requests for ALPR data by non-law enforcement or non-prosecutorial agencies will be processed as provided in the Records Maintenance and Release Policy (Civil Code § 1798.90.55).

(c) All signed letters shall be routed to the Audit and Inspection Sergeant for compliance and reporting.

ALPR data is subject to the provisions of the Berkeley Police Department’s Immigration Law Policy, and hence may not be shared with federal immigration enforcement officials.

1305.11 TRAINING

Training for the operation of ALPR Technology shall be provided by BPD personnel. All BPD
Surveillance Use Policy-Fixed ALPRs

employees who utilize ALPR Technology shall be provided a copy of this Surveillance Use Policy.

1305.12 AUDITING AND OVERSIGHT
ALPR system audits will be conducted by the Professional Standards Bureau’s Audit and Inspections Sergeant on a regular basis, at least biannually. The data from the fixed ALPRs shall be reported annually in the Surveillance Technology Report.

1305.13 MAINTENANCE
Any installation and maintenance of ALPR equipment, as well as ALPR data retention and access, shall be managed by the Investigations Division Captain or his or her designee. The Investigations Division Captain will assign members under his/her command to administer the day-to-day operation of the ALPR equipment and data. Equipment maintenance shall be provided by the vendor.
Policy

Fixed Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs)-

422.1 PURPOSE AND SCOPE
The purpose of this policy is to provide guidance for the capture, storage and use of digital data obtained through the use of Automated License Plate Reader (ALPR) technology. Department Personnel shall adhere to the requirements of Fixed ALPRs in this policy as well as the corresponding Surveillance Use-Fixed ALPRs policy-1305.

422.2 POLICY
The policy of the Berkeley Police Department is to utilize ALPR technology to capture and store digital license plate data and images while recognizing the established privacy rights of the public.

All data and images gathered by the ALPR are for the official use of this department. Because such data may contain confidential information, it is not open to public review.

The Berkeley Police Department does not permit the sharing of ALPR data gathered by the City or its contractors/subcontractors for federal immigration enforcement, pursuant to the California Values Act (Government Code § 7282.5; Government Code § 7284.2 et seq) – these federal immigration agencies include Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Patrol (CBP).

422.3 DEFINITIONS
(a) Automated License Plate Reader (ALPR): A device that uses cameras and computer technology to compare digital images to lists of known information of interest.

(b) ALPR Operator: Trained Department members who may utilize ALPR system/equipment. ALPR operators may be assigned to any position within the Department, and the ALPR Administrator may order the deployment of the ALPR systems for use in various efforts.

(c) ALPR Administrator: The Investigations Bureau Captain or the Chief’s designee, serves as the ALPR Administrator for the Department.

(d) Hot List: A list of license plates associated with vehicles of interest compiled from one or more databases including, but not limited to, NCIC, CA DMV, Local BOLO’s, etc.

(e) Vehicles of Interest: Including, but not limited to vehicles which are reported as stolen, display stolen license plates or tags; vehicles linked to missing and/or wanted persons and vehicles flagged by the Department of Motor Vehicle Administration or law enforcement agencies.
Detection: Data obtained by an ALPR of an image (such as a license plate) within public view that was read by the device, including potential images (such as the plate and description of vehicle on which it was displayed), and information regarding the location of the ALPR system at the time of the ALPR’s read.

Hit Alert from the ALPR system that a scanned license plate number may be in the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) or other law enforcement database for a specific reason including, but not limited to, being related to a stolen car, wanted person, missing person, domestic violation protective order or terrorist-related activity.

422.4 ADMINISTRATION
The ALPR technology, also known as License Plate Recognition (LPR), allows for the automated detection of license plates. It is used by the Berkeley Police Department to convert data associated with vehicle license plates for official law enforcement purposes, including identifying stolen or wanted vehicles, stolen license plates and missing persons. It may also be used to gather information related to active warrants, suspect apprehension and stolen property recovery. Any installation and maintenance of ALPR equipment, as well as ALPR data retention and access, shall be managed by the Investigations Division Captain. The Investigations Division Captain will assign members under his/her command to administer the day-to-day operation of the ALPR equipment and data.

422.4.1 ALPR ADMINISTRATOR
The Investigations Division Captain, or his/her designee, shall be responsible for compliance with the requirements of Civil Code § 1798.90.5 et seq. This includes, but is not limited to (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53):

(a) Only properly trained sworn officers, crime analysts, communication operators, records clerks, parking enforcement officers, and police assistants are allowed access to the ALPR system or to collect ALPR information.

(b) Ensuring that training requirements are completed for authorized users.

(c) ALPR system monitoring to ensure the security of the information and compliance with applicable privacy laws.

(d) Ensuring procedures are followed for system operators to maintain records of access in compliance with Civil Code § 1798.90.52.

(e) The title and name of the current designee in overseeing the ALPR operation.

(f) Working with the Custodian of Records, or vendor on the retention and destruction of ALPR data, ensuring this policy and related procedures are conspicuously posted on the City’s website.

422.5 OPERATIONS
An ALPR shall only be used for official law enforcement business.

Use of an ALPR is restricted to the purposes outlined below. Department members shall not use, or allow others to use the equipment or database records for any unauthorized purpose (Civil
An ALPR shall only be used for official law enforcement business.

(b) An ALPR may be used in conjunction with any routine patrol operation or to support criminal investigations. Reasonable suspicion or probable cause is not required before using an ALPR.

(c) Partial license plates and unique vehicle descriptions reported during crimes may be entered into the ALPR system in an attempt to identify suspect vehicles.

(d) No member of this department shall operate ALPR equipment or access ALPR data without first completing department-approved training.

(e) If practicable, the officer should verify an ALPR response through the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS) before taking enforcement action that is based solely on an ALPR alert. Once an alert is received, the operator should confirm that the observed license plate from the system matches the license plate of the observed vehicle. Before any law enforcement action is taken because of an ALPR alert, the alert will be verified through a CLETS inquiry via MDT or through Dispatch. Members will not take any police action that restricts the freedom of any individual based solely on an ALPR alert unless it has been validated. Because the ALPR alert may relate to a vehicle and may not relate to the person operating the vehicle, officers are reminded that they need to have reasonable suspicion and/or probable cause to make an enforcement stop of any vehicle. (For example, if a vehicle is entered into the system because of its association with a wanted individual, Officers should attempt to visually match the driver to the description of the wanted subject prior to making the stop or should have another legal basis for making the stop.)

(f) Hot Lists. Designation of hot lists to be utilized by the ALPR system shall be made by the ALPR Administrator or his/her designee. Hot lists shall be obtained or compiled from sources as may be consistent with the purposes of the ALPR system set forth in this Policy. Hot lists utilized by the Department's LPR system may be updated by agency sources more frequently than the Department may be uploading them and thus the Department's LPR system will not have access to real time data. Occasionally, there may be errors in the LPR system's read of a license plate. Therefore, an alert alone shall not be a basis for police action (other than following the vehicle of interest). Prior to initiation of a stop of a vehicle or other intervention based on an alert, Department members shall undertake the following:

1. Verification of status on a Hot List. An officer must receive confirmation, from a Berkeley Police Department Communications Dispatcher or other department computer device, that the license plate is still stolen, wanted, or otherwise of interest before proceeding (absent exigent circumstances).

2. Visual verification of license plate number. Officers shall visually verify that the license plate of interest matches identically with the image of the license plate number captured (read) by the LPR, including both the alphanumeric characters of the license
plate, state of issue, and vehicle descriptors before proceeding. Department members alerted to the fact that an observed motor vehicle's license plate is entered as a Hot Plate (hit) in a specific BOLO (be on the lookout) list are required to make a reasonable effort to confirm that a wanted person is actually in the vehicle and/or that a reasonable basis exists before a Department member would have a lawful basis to stop the vehicle.

(3) Department members will clear all stops from hot list alerts by indicating the positive ALPR Hit, i.e., with an arrest or other enforcement action. If it is not obvious in the text of the call as to the correlation of the ALPR Hit and the arrest, then the Department member shall update with the Communications Dispatcher and original person and/or a crime analyst inputting the vehicle in the hot list (hit).

(4) General Hot Lists (SVS, SFR, and SLR) will be automatically downloaded into the ALPR system a minimum of once a day with the most current data overwriting the old data.

(5) All entries and updates of specific Hot Lists within the ALPR system will be documented by the requesting Department member within the appropriate general offense report. As such, specific Hot Lists shall be approved by the ALPR Administrator.

(6) Administrator (or his/her designee) before initial entry within the ALPR system. The updating of such a list within the ALPR system shall thereafter be accomplished pursuant to the approval of the Department member's immediate supervisor. The hits from these data sources should be viewed as informational; created solely to bring the officers attention to specific vehicles that have been associated with criminal activity. All Hot Plates and suspect information entered into the ALPR system will contain the following information as a minimum:

- Entering Department member's name
- Related case number.
- Short synopsis describing the nature of the originating call

(g) Login/Log-Out Procedure. To ensure proper operation and facilitate oversight of the ALPR system, all users will be required to have individual credentials for access and use of the systems and/or data, which has the ability to be fully audited.

Permitted/Impermissible Uses. The ALPR system, and all data collected, is the property of the Berkeley Police Department. Department personnel may only access and use the ALPR system for official and legitimate law enforcement purposes consistent with this Policy. The following uses of the ALPR system are specifically prohibited:

1. Invasion of Privacy: Except when done pursuant to a court order such as a search warrant, is a violation of this Policy to utilize the ALPR to record license plates except those of vehicles that are exposed to public view (e.g., vehicles on a public road or street, or that are on private property but whose license plate(s) are visible from a public road, street, or a place to which members of the public have access, such as the parking lot of a shop or other business establishment).

2. Harassment or Intimidation: It is a violation of this Policy to use the ALPR system to harass and/or intimidate any individual or group.
3. Use Based on a Protected Characteristic. It is a violation of this policy to use the LPR system or associated scan files or hot lists solely because of a person's, or group's race, gender, religion, political affiliation, nationality, ethnicity, sexual orientation, disability, or other classification protected by law.

4. Personal Use: It is a violation of this Policy to use the ALPR system or associated scan files or hot lists for any personal purpose.

5. First Amendment Rights. It is a violation of this policy to use the LPR system or associated scan files or hot lists for the purpose or known effect of infringing upon First Amendment rights.

(h) Anyone who engages in an impermissible use of the ALPR system or associated scan files or hot lists may be subject to administrative sanctions, up to and including termination, pursuant to and consistent with the relevant collective bargaining agreements and departmental policies. Partial license plates reported during crimes may be entered into the ALPR system in an attempt to identify suspect vehicles.

No ALPR operator may access California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS) data unless otherwise authorized to do so. If practicable, the officer should verify an ALPR response through the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS) before taking enforcement action that is based solely on an ALPR alert.

422.6 DATA COLLECTION AND RETENTION
The Investigations Division Captain is responsible for ensuring systems and processes are in place for the proper collection and retention of ALPR data. Data will be transferred from vehicles to the designated storage in accordance with department procedures. The Department should find a solution to transfer evidentiary hit data into its digital evidence repository through secure integration.

All ALPR data downloaded to the ALPR server should be stored for no longer than 30 days, and in accordance with the established records retention schedule. Thereafter, ALPR data should be purged unless it has become, or it is reasonable to believe it will become, evidence in a criminal or civil action or is subject to a discovery request or other lawful action to produce records. In those circumstances the applicable data should be downloaded from the server and uploaded into BPD’s digital evidence repository.

ALPR vendor, will store the data (data hosting) and ensure proper maintenance and security of data stored in their data towers. The ALPR vendor will purge their data at the end of the 30 days of storage. However, this will not preclude Berkeley Police Department from maintaining any relevant vehicle data obtained from the system after that period pursuant to the established Berkeley retention schedule mentioned above or outlined elsewhere. Relevant vehicle data are scans corresponding to the vehicle of interest on a hot list. The ALPR vendor and Department shall ensure that the necessary data is captured and stored to accurately report the relevant data required in the Annual Surveillance Technology report. Once the City Council approves the Annual Surveillance Technology report all said data may be purged so long as it doesn't violate the Retention guidelines.
Restrictions on use of vendor Data: Information gathered or collected, and records retained by the vendor’s cameras or any other Berkeley Police Department ALPR system will not be sold, accessed, or used for any purpose other than legitimate law enforcement or public safety purposes.

422.7 ACCOUNTABILITY
All saved data will be safeguarded and protected by both procedural and technological means. The Berkeley Police Department will observe the following safeguards regarding access to and use of stored data (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53):

(a) Non-law enforcement requests for access to stored ALPR data shall be processed according to the Records Maintenance and Release Policy in accordance with applicable law.

(b) All ALPR data downloaded to any workstation or server shall be accessible only through a login/password-protected system capable of documenting all access of information by name, date and time (Civil Code § 1798.90.52).

(c) Berkeley Police Department members approved to access ALPR data under these guidelines are permitted to access the data for legitimate law enforcement purposes only, such as when the data relate to a specific criminal investigation or department-related civil or administrative action.

(d) Aggregated ALPR data not related to specific criminal investigations shall not be released to any local, state or federal agency or entity without the consent of the Chief of Police or City Manager (i.e. If transportation department requested volume of vehicular traffic associated with specific events, it could conceivably be provided with the count of vehicles, but not the specific license plates with appropriate permissions).

(e) Measures will be taken to ensure the accuracy of ALPR information. Errors discovered in ALPR data collected by ALPR units shall be marked, corrected or deleted in accordance with the type and severity of the error in question.

(f) ALPR system audits will be conducted by the Professional Standards Bureau’s Audit and Inspections Sergeant on a regular basis, at least biennial.

(g) Such ALPR data may be released to other authorized and verified law enforcement officials and agencies for legitimate law enforcement purposes.

(h) Every ALPR Detection Browsing Inquiry must be documented by either the associated Berkeley Police case number or incident number, and/or a reason for the inquiry.

For security or data breaches, see the Records Release and Maintenance Policy.

422.8 ALPR DATA DETECTION BROWSING AUDITS
It is the responsibility of the Sergeant of Audit and Inspections or the Chief’s designee to ensure that an audit is conducted of ALPR detection browsing inquiries at least biennial. The Department

Commented [WL2]: An independent auditor would be more appropriate; sample size should be determined based on the number of inquiries. 10 may be too low dependent on the total number.
will audit a sampling of the ALPR system utilization from the prior 24-month period to verify
proper use in accordance with the above-authorized uses. The audit shall randomly select at
least 10 detection browsing inquiries conducted by department employees during the preceding
24-month period and determine if each inquiry meets the requirements established in policy
section 462.6(e).

The audit shall be documented in the form of an internal department memorandum to the Chief of
Police. The memorandum shall include any data errors found so that such errors can be
corrected. After review by the Chief of Police, the memorandum and any associated
documentation shall be filed and retained by the Professional Standards Bureau Captain. This
audit should be shared in the Surveillance Ordinance reporting.

422.9 RELEASING ALPR DATA
The ALPR data may be shared only with other law enforcement or prosecutorial agencies for
official law enforcement purposes or as otherwise permitted by law.

(a) A supervisor at the requesting agency will sign an acknowledgement letter stating that
the shared data will only be used for the purposes that are aligned with the Berkeley Police
Department’s policy. The Berkeley Police Department does not permit the sharing of ALPR
data gathered by the City or its contractors/subcontractors for purpose of federal
immigration enforcement, these federal immigration agencies include Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Patrol (CBP). See attached letter.

(b) The signed letter is retained on file. Requests for ALPR data by non-law enforcement or
non-prosecutorial agencies will be processed as provided in the Records Maintenance and
Release Policy (Civil Code § 1798.90.55).

(c) All signed letters shall be routed to the Audit and Inspection Sergeant for compliance
and reporting.

ALPR data is subject to the provisions of the Berkeley Police Department’s Immigration Law
Policy, and hence may not be shared with federal immigration enforcement officials.

422.10 TRAINING
The Personnel and Training Sergeant shall ensure that members receive department-approved
training in order to be authorized to use or access the ALPR system (Civil Code § 1798.90.51;
Civil Code § 1798.90.53)
AUTOMATIC LICENSE PLATE READERS (ALPR) IN THE CITY OF BERKELEY

A Preliminary Review of proposed BPD Policies by the Office of the Director of Police Accountability (ODPA) submitted to the Police Accountability Board (PAB) Special Meeting: June 16, 2023
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Background

On November 1, 2021 the Public Safety Policy Committee of the City Council, made a budget referral proposing the acquisition of fixed automatic license plate readers (ALPRs) to the Council. They emphasized the need to evaluate the costs and benefits of the proposed expenditure in comparison to other public safety investments in the two-year FY 2022-23 & 2023-24 budget. Furthermore, they called for the development of a policy that addresses data retention and other pertinent issues in accordance with the City of Berkeley Surveillance Ordinance and Sanctuary City Contracting Ordinance.

On November 30, 2021, Councilmember Taplin presented the budget referral proposing the acquisition of fixed automatic license plate readers (ALPRs) and received co-sponsorship from Councilmember Droste and Councilmember Wengraf. The item was a part of the City Council’s Action Calendar (Item 28)\(^1\) and presented the following recommendations:

- Authorize the City Manager to install ALPRs at strategic locations, including public facilities, city entrances, and areas affected by violent crime, traffic violations, illegal dumping, Schedule II drug offenses, and other criminal activities.
- Allocate funds for ALPRs in the FY 23-24 budget.
- Refer the development of a policy enabling the use of ALPRs by the Berkeley Police Department to the City Manager, ensuring compliance with the City of Berkeley Surveillance Ordinance and Sanctuary City Contracting Ordinance.
- Consider a data retention period of no longer than one year, with a minimum of sixty days to account for reporting delays.
- Study the feasibility of shorter data retention periods for non-hit scans, granting the City Manager the final decision-making authority.

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Consider ALPR policies from neighboring local governments, including the City of Alameda, the City of Emeryville, the City of Hayward, the City of Oakland, the City of Piedmont, the City of Richmond, the City of San Leandro, and the City of Vallejo.

Include provisions in the policy to safeguard against plate counterfeiting, plate switching, and other methods of detection evasions.

The Public Safety Policy Committee's recommendation received approval from the City Council, garnering a majority in favor\(^2\). Councilmembers Kesarwani, Taplin, Bartlett, Wengraf, Robinson, Droste, and Mayor Arreguin all voted in support of the recommendation. However, Councilmember Harrison voted against it, while Councilmember Hahn chose to abstain from voting. This Council approval signifies the majority's endorsement of the proposed actions outlined in the recommendation. These actions include the installation of ALPRs at strategic locations, allocation of funds in the FY 23-24 budget for ALPRs, and the development of a policy governing the use of ALPRs by the Berkeley Police Department in compliance with relevant city ordinances, specifically Berkeley Municipal Code (BMC) 2.99\(^3\).

On May 11, 2023, Police Chief Jen Louis presented the Board\(^4\) with draft policies outlining the usage of Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs) in accordance with the Berkeley City Council's budget referral item focused on Community Safety. In response to this directive, the department diligently prepared the necessary Surveillance Ordinance policies and presented the following documents to the Police Accountability Board (PAB) and the Office of the Director of Police Accountability (ODPA):

- Policy 422: This policy establishes guidelines for the department's use of Fixed Automated License Plate Readers.
- Policy 1305: The Surveillance Use Policy specifically addresses the implementation of Fixed Automated License Plate Readers.

\(^3\) [https://berkeley.municipal.codes/BMC/2.99](https://berkeley.municipal.codes/BMC/2.99)
\(^4\) Through a secretarial oversight by the Director of Police Accountability (DPA) Hansel Alejandro Aguilar, the report was not provided to the Board until June 8, 2023. A request for additional time to review the policy (beyond the 30 days provided by the ordinance) was made to City Manager Williams-Ridley by DPA Aguilar. Per Council Member Taplin’s (current Chair of the Public Safety Policy Committee) instructions, the request to postpone was denied.
- Surveillance Acquisition Report: This report provides details regarding the acquisition of Fixed Automated License Plate Readers.
- Council Budget Referral Item: This document serves as background information.

According to the provisions of the Surveillance Ordinance (BMC Section 2.99.030.2), the Police Accountability Board (PAB) must review a Surveillance Use Policy within 30 days of receiving it. During this timeframe, the PAB is required to vote on recommending approval of the policy, objecting to the proposal, suggesting modifications, or taking no action. It is important to note that if there is opposition to the policy's approval or if the PAB does not take any action, the City Manager retains the authority to conduct an independent review and potentially proceed with adopting the policy.

Key Questions

The following questions will be addressed through the preliminary review on the use of ALPR technology by law enforcement agencies:

1. What evidence exists regarding the effectiveness of ALPR systems in reducing crime rates?
2. To what extent does the implementation of ALPR technology contribute to reducing disparities in law enforcement stops?
3. What are the specific privacy concerns associated with the use of ALPR technology, and what potential safeguards can be implemented to protect individual privacy rights? How do existing legal and regulatory frameworks address the privacy concerns related to this technology?

Literature Review Findings: ALPR Technology and its Implications

The literature review involved a thorough analysis of relevant sources, encompassing scholarly articles, research papers, reports, news articles and other pertinent publications from credible sources. The gathered information sheds light on the key questions posed in this review.
ALPR systems and crime

In 2022, a survey conducted by the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) gathered responses from 1,237 law enforcement agencies regarding the use of Automated License Plate Readers (ALPR) systems. The survey revealed that approximately 40% of the participating agencies utilized ALPR systems, while 52% reported never having used such a system. The remaining 8% had used ALPR systems in the past but had discontinued their use.

Among the agencies employing ALPR systems, the majority (86%) had fewer than 10 units available for deployment. According to the survey, the IACP found that vehicle-mounted and stationary/fixed units were the most commonly utilized, whereas portable units mounted on non-vehicular objects were less prevalent. A significant portion (74%) of the agencies using ALPR had implemented the technology for a duration ranging from one to 10 years.

For the agencies that were not currently employing ALPR systems, the primary reason cited for their non-use was the cost of acquisition. This concern was particularly pronounced among smaller agencies. The survey did not specifically request examples of how ALPR systems were used. However, a focus group identified three main purposes: investigations, crime prevention, and traffic/parking enforcement. The United States Department of Transportation's report titled "State of Knowledge and Practice for Using Automatic License Plate Readers for Traffic Safety Purposes" highlights the predominant use of ALPR systems in reactive scenarios. These include responding to incidents involving stolen vehicles, hit-and-run accidents, specific criminal activities, Amber Alerts, Megan's Law, Silver Alerts, be-on-the-look-out (BOLO) notifications, and wanted felons.

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6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id.
The Vallejo Police Department conducted a case study to assess the effectiveness of Automated License Plate Readers (ALPR) technology. Patrol cars were randomly selected and equipped with ALPR systems, with some cars having the ALPR alerts activated and others having them deactivated. The study found that the cars with ALPR technology had a 140 percent higher ability to detect stolen vehicles. However, the analysis also revealed that the technology identified a significantly larger number of lost or stolen license plates, including duplicates, which may have caused officers to overlook legitimate hits.

Fixed ALPR systems, which were stationary units, were found to be more efficient than mobile ALPR systems in making arrests. Officers using fixed systems tended to wait downstream of fixed locations for hits, resulting in more arrests. The control data indicated that 35 percent of hits from mobile readers and 37 percent of hits from fixed readers were misreads. After accounting for the number of cars in each condition, the department found significantly more hits in the ALPR intervention condition.

The study also found that stolen vehicles identified by officers with more seniority were more likely to result in arrests, although this finding was only marginally significant. The use of fixed ALPR systems significantly increased the odds of identifying a stolen vehicle and increased the likelihood of arrests. This is consistent with the IACP (2022) findings as they note, “Although research is sparse, there is some evidence that suggests LPR use is effective at preventing crime.” While acknowledging the potential benefits of ALPR technology, it is crucial to recognize the limited research conducted on its effectiveness in these specific scenarios. The available information predominantly originates from police technology vendors, underscoring the need for a cautious and critical approach when evaluating and interpreting it.

15 Id.
16 Id.
ALPR systems and its effects on racial disparities in law enforcement stops

Extensive research has shown clear disparities in police traffic stops based on race. A report published in October 2022 by the Public Policy Institute of California revealed that Latino drivers constitute approximately 40 percent of traffic stops, while white drivers make up around 33 percent, and Black drivers account for approximately 14 percent\(^\text{18}\). This data highlights a notable overrepresentation of Black Californians in traffic stops, considering they comprise only 6 percent of the state’s population\(^\text{19}\). Conversely, the proportion of traffic stops involving Latino drivers closely mirrors their population representation, with 40 percent of stops compared to 39 percent of the population\(^\text{20}\). However, white drivers are somewhat underrepresented in traffic stops, comprising 33 percent of stops compared to 35 percent of the population. It is worth noting that despite the Asian population in California growing to 15 percent, they are notably underrepresented in traffic stops, accounting for only 6 percent of them\(^\text{21}\).

A supporting point for the use of ALPR technology is its potential to mitigate racial and ethnic disparities in traffic stops. The rationale behind this argument is that by relying on the license plate and vehicle description, law enforcement officers can avoid making subjective judgments based on the driver’s appearance matching potentially matching a subject description\(^\text{22}\). However, through this preliminary review of the literature, the ODPA is unable to identify readily available research findings to substantiate this claim.

ALPR systems and privacy

The Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) has examined constitutional concerns regarding the use of Automatic License Plate Readers (ALPRs) by law enforcement. Currently, SCOTUS has not required a warrant for photographing license plates for comparison with law enforcement databases, nor have they established a specific standard of evidence to justify the use of ALPR technology. This lack of


\(^{20}\) Id.

\(^{21}\) Id.

requirement is based on two factors. First, the regulations governing vehicles on public roads have created a situation where there is no expectation of privacy regarding license plates. Second, longstanding legal precedent establishes that individuals driving on public roads have limited expectation of privacy in their movements with regard to law enforcement.

As new surveillance tools have emerged, they have raised concerns about potential infringements on individuals’ Fourth Amendment rights to privacy. In the case of *United States v. Jones*\(^{23}\), which involved GPS tracking, the Court determined that installing and monitoring a GPS device without a warrant constituted a search that violated the Fourth Amendment. However, the Court did not address whether achieving the same tracking result through electronic means, without a physical trespass, would be an unconstitutional invasion of privacy.

In her concurring opinion in *Jones*, Justice Sotomayor discussed the reasonable expectation of privacy in one’s public movements. She emphasized the need to consider the aggregation of data from novel modes of surveillance and its potential impact on constitutional rights\(^{24}\). Justice Sotomayor expressed criticism towards the trespass standard and proposed adopting the *Katz* test established in *Katz v. United States*. The *Katz* test centers around determining whether there is a violation of a societal expectation of privacy, rather than solely relying on physical trespass\(^{25}\). In *Katz*, the SCOTUS underscored that the Fourth Amendment safeguards individuals, not just physical locations. Of course, applying the *Katz* test presents its own sets of challenges.

The *Katz* test necessitates judges and lawmakers to evaluate the hypothetical expectation of privacy held by a reasonable person. This methodology has resulted in inconsistent judgments due to varying comprehension of advanced technology among judges and the inability of law and policy to keep up with the rapid pace of technological progress. However, despite these difficulties, the Court's agreement in *Jones* indicated that limited monitoring of an individual's movements on public roads might be acceptable in certain circumstances, while prolonged tracking could potentially exceed permissible


boundaries\textsuperscript{26}. The parameters of that boundary were established in the case of \textit{Carpenter v. United States}.

In the landmark case of \textit{Carpenter v. United States}, the Supreme Court undertook an examination of the utilization of historical cell phone data by law enforcement agencies. The Court reached a significant conclusion, asserting that the collection of such data, particularly when viewed in its entirety or aggregate form, raised legitimate constitutional concerns\textsuperscript{27}. The primary factors that contributed to these concerns were the depth, breadth, and automatic nature of the data collection process.

The concerns raised by citizen organizations, such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF)\textsuperscript{28} and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)\textsuperscript{29}, regarding the utilization of Automatic License Plate Readers (ALPR) technology were echoed in this case. Like the collection of historical cell phone data, ALPR technology involves the automatic gathering of information, often on a massive scale. The automatic nature of data collection, whether it pertains to cell phone records or license plate information, raises questions about the scope of privacy intrusion and the potential for misuse or abuse of such data.

Furthermore, the \textit{Carpenter} case also highlighted the significance of driving as an integral part of active participation in civil society. The Court recognized that individuals rely on their cell phones and vehicles for various daily activities, and the collection and analysis of location data can reveal detailed information about a person's movements, associations, and private activities\textsuperscript{30}. Similarly, ALPR technology captures and stores information about an individual's whereabouts, raising concerns about the extent to which one's movements should be subject to constant surveillance by law enforcement.

Therefore, \textit{Carpenter v. United States} underscored the need for judicial scrutiny and safeguards when it comes to the collection and use of personal data, whether it

\textsuperscript{27} Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 741 (2018)
\textsuperscript{30} Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 741 (2018)
involves cell phone records or ALPR technology. According to Yash Dattani’s research titled "Big Brother is Scanning: The widespread implementation of ALPR Technology in America’s Police Forces," a potential safeguard against privacy intrusions caused by ALPR technology would involve implementing stringent regulations on the retention periods of data not identified by the ALPR system.\(^{31}\)

Preliminary Analysis of the Proposed Policies

BERKELEY POLICE DEPARTMENT SURVEILLANCE ACQUISITION REPORT – FIXED AUTOMATED LICENSE PLATE READERS

Per BMC 2.99.020, the City Manager is required to present a "Surveillance Acquisition Report" to the Police Accountability Board prior to adoption by the City Council (2.99.030(2)). Under the ordinance, "Surveillance Acquisition Report" means a publicly-released written report produced prior to acquisition or to proposed permanent use after use in Exigent Circumstances pursuant to Section 2.99.040 (2), of a type of Surveillance Technology that includes the following:

- **Description**: Information describing the Surveillance Technology and how it works, including product descriptions from manufacturers;
- **Purpose**: Information on the proposed purpose(s) for the Surveillance Technology;
- **Location**: The general location(s) it may be deployed and reasons for deployment;
- **Impact**: An assessment identifying potential impacts on civil liberties and civil rights including but not limited to potential disparate or adverse impacts on any communities or groups;
- **Mitigation**: Information regarding technical and procedural measures that can be implemented to appropriately safeguard the public from any impacts identified in subsection (d);
- **Data Types and Sources**: A list of the sources of data proposed to be collected, analyzed, or processed by the Surveillance Technology, including "open source" data;

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g. **Data Security**: Information about the steps that can be taken to ensure adequate security measures to safeguard the data collected or generated from unauthorized access or disclosure;

h. **Fiscal Cost**: The fiscal costs for the Surveillance Technology, including initial purchase, personnel and other ongoing costs, including to the extent practicable costs associated with compliance with this and other reporting and oversight requirements, as well as any current or potential sources of funding;

i. **Third Party Dependence and Access**: Whether use or maintenance of the technology will require data gathered by the technology to be handled or stored by a third-party vendor on an ongoing basis, and whether a third party may have access to such data or may have the right to sell or otherwise share the data in aggregated, disaggregated, raw or any other formats;

j. **Alternatives**: A summary and general assessment of potentially viable alternative methods (whether involving the use of a new technology or not), if any, considered before deciding to propose acquiring the Surveillance Technology; and

k. **Experience of Other Entities**: To the extent such information is available, a summary of the experience of comparable government entities with the proposed technology, including any unanticipated financial or community costs and benefits, experienced by such other entities.

The general purpose of the acquisition report is to provide the Council with sufficient information to make a reasoned determination about the need and impact of the proposed surveillance technology acquisition or use. The following provides ODPA’s observations regarding the Acquisition Report for ALPR drafted by the BPD as the designee of the City Manager:

**Description:**

Considering the proposed expanded uses of the ALPR program already in place in the City, this section should provide further clarification about the technology. In our review and comparison to other descriptions and or definitions of the system, the BPD’s description section in the proposed Acquisition Report provides overall sufficient information about the technology by defining it in plain language; specifying where it can be mounted; identifying the data points it collects (i.e. license plates, location, date and time) Table _ provides information about the descriptive language used by other entities
Table 1 ALPR Technology Description Comparison

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BPD</th>
<th>IACP(^{32})</th>
<th>EFF(^{33})</th>
<th>ACLU(^{34})</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fixed Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs) are cameras systems with software designed for license plate recognition. The camera systems are typically mounted on street poles, street lights, and highway overpasses. ALPRRs are designed to capture license plate numbers which come into view, along with the location, date and time. The data, which includes an image of the front or the back of the car displaying the license plate, is then uploaded to a central server operated by the vendor. The license plate data is cross-referenced with systems such as Stolen Vehicle Systems (SVS), and other lists like Amber alerts to notice police of vehicles with hits. This technology does not have facial recognition, and is not tied to any personal identifying information or used for traffic enforcement.</td>
<td>ALPR systems function to automatically capture an image of the vehicle’s license plate, transform that image into alphanumeric characters using optical character recognition or similar software, compare the plate number acquired to one or more databases of vehicles of interest to law enforcement and other agencies, and to alert the officer when a vehicle of interest has been observed.</td>
<td>ALPR are high-speed camera systems that photograph license plates, convert the numbers and letters into machine-readable text, tag them with the time and location, and upload that data into a database for retrieval.</td>
<td>Automatic license plate readers—mounted on police cars or on objects like road signs and bridges—use small high-speed cameras to photograph thousands of plates per minute. The information captured by the readers—including the license plate number and the date, time, and location of every scan—is being collected and sometimes pooled into regional sharing systems.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{32}\) https://www.theiacp.org/projects/automated-license-plate-recognition
\(^{33}\) https://www.eff.org/pages/california-automated-license-plate-reader-policies
\(^{34}\) https://www.aclu.org/issues/privacy-technology/location-tracking/automatic-license-plate-readers
Purpose:
This section of the Acquisition Report describes the purpose for the installation and use of a network of fixed automated license plate readers by the Berkeley Police Department (BPD). Specifically, the Department clarifies that the automated license plate readers will "be affixed to street poles, street lights, or other similar objects that are either owned by the City of Berkeley or wherein a right-of-way agreement has been established." This is an important clarification considering that ALPRs can be mounted on police vehicles and it appears that the BPD does not have the intention in this acquisition to deploy the technology on patrol vehicles. If this is a misinterpretation on the ODPA’s behalf or an omission by the BPD in this section, this should be further clarified.

This section also presents several cases where the technology could have been beneficial in preventing crimes or apprehending suspects. From the perspective of the ODPA, it is important to evaluate whether the BPD has provided a data-based justification for the use of ALPRs and to identify areas where the section could be improved.

Data-Based Justification:
As was reported earlier this year by the Berkeleyside\(^\text{35}\) (through their review of BPD data), we know that violent crime and property crimes are on the rise, “The overall total number of violent and property crimes in 2022 was “the highest in the past 10 years,” Interim Police Chief Jen Louis told the City Council in a special meeting this week. “Berkeley continues to have one of the highest property crime rates in our region.” (Gecan, 2023). Specifically, the Berkeleyside reports that according to the recent annual report presented by the Berkeley Police Department, crime rates in Berkeley witnessed an increase in almost all categories from 2021 to 2022. However, it is worth noting that in several areas, these rates still remain below\(^\text{36}\) the levels observed before the pandemic.

\(^{35}\) [https://www.berkeleyside.org/2023/03/17/crime-reports-berkeley-police](https://www.berkeleyside.org/2023/03/17/crime-reports-berkeley-police)

\(^{36}\) Id.
Figure 1 Historical crime rates overview

Noteworthy are the following observations regarding Berkeley specific crime trends:

- Violent crimes (i.e. homicides, rapes, robberies and aggravated assaults) increased by 25.2%.
- Total property crimes (i.e. burglaries, larcenies, auto thefts and arson collectively) increased by 14.5% (although the specific categories of auto theft and arson saw a decrease from 2021 to 2022).

At face value, these trends, compounded with the current staffing crises being experienced in the City and in the Department, provide empirical support for the implementation of innovative crime prevention and reduction strategies. The use of technological tools like ALPR, when used transparently and judiciously, can be an effective force multiplier that improves public safety while balancing the respect and protection of civil liberties. As noted in the literature review, “Although research is sparse, there is some evidence that suggests LPR use is effective at preventing crime,” (pg. 1, IACP, 2022) As currently written, however, the BPD’s Purpose section does not explicitly mention a data-based justification for the use of ALPRs (beyond the highlighted cases of interest). To strengthen the justification, the BPD could provide statistical analyses and employ predictive policing methods (or other empirical data analyses) demonstrating the effectiveness of ALPRs in reducing crime rates, apprehending suspects, or improving overall public safety. This could include information on the number of cases where ALPRs
have aided investigations, the success rate of identifying wanted vehicles, or any studies or reports that support the use of ALPR technology.

**Location:**

As written, it is unclear what specific locations the proposed 52 units will be placed in around the City. Without that information, it is difficult to assess any disparate impact that may result from the use of this technology. It would be helpful to specify if the proposed 52 units translate to 13 separate locations at key intersections around the City (i.e. capturing the North, South, East, and West vantage points) or if the BPD intends to fix an ALPR unit at 52 separate locations. As referenced earlier, according to the 2022 survey\(^{37}\) conducted by IACP of jurisdictions utilizing the technology, “Most (86%) agencies using LPR systems reported fewer than 10 deployable units” (pg. 4). Without a clear articulable need or justification for 52 units, the BPD should consider deploying the proposed 52 units on a segmented deployment schedule that allows for data analysis and feedback on the effectiveness of the technology in Berkeley. For example, the BPD could consider a deployment schedule as outlined in Table 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deployment Year</th>
<th>Deployed Units</th>
<th>Predictive policing forecasting, benchmarking and assessments(^{38})</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2023</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>• Prior to the deployment year, through predictive policing program, utilize a forecasting methodology that addresses the specific crime problem BPD is attempting to solve (i.e. property, violent crime, etc.).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2024</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>• Assign (monthly/quarterly/yearly) benchmarks or goals for assessing the efficacy of ALPR in the crime reduction and prevention forecasted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2025</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>• Continue deployment plan if data supports the effectiveness of the program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2026</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This strategy will also allow the BPD to determine ongoing community receptiveness, social impact, fiscal implications beyond the initial assessment, and data to assess the soundness of the data security protocols of this proposed policy.

\(^{37}\) [https://www.theiacp.org/sites/default/files/IACP_LPR_Survey_Results_5.16.22.pdf](https://www.theiacp.org/sites/default/files/IACP_LPR_Survey_Results_5.16.22.pdf)

\(^{38}\) For more information on predictive analytics in policing consider:


**Impact:**
Similar to the comments on the previous sections, this section could benefit from further articulation of the impact. In the October 2022 Staff Report\(^39\) to the City Council, the Palo Alto Police Department, provides a helpful framework in its *Benefits of Usage* section which includes a discussion on:

- Real-Time Alerts
- Deterrence
- Crime solving
- Regional coordination
- Police-Community Co-production through an expanded searchable data set

**Mitigation and Data Security:**
While the Department indicates that it will safeguard and protect data through procedural and technological means, Policy 1305 should be strengthened to reflect this commitment. Specifically, the BPD should consider revising 1305.4 Data Collection in the following manner:

Table 3 Data security suggestions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Current Language</th>
<th>Suggested Language</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Department should if feasible find a solution to transfer evidentiary hit data into it's digital evidence repository through secure integration.</td>
<td><em>Evidentiary hit data shall be transferred into the Department’s digital evidence repository through secure integration.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All ALPR data downloaded to the ALPR server should be stored for no longer than 30 days, and in accordance with the established records retention schedule.</td>
<td><em>All ALPR data downloaded to the ALPR server shall be stored for no longer than 30 days, and in accordance with the established records retention schedule.</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Data Types and Sources:**
No comments at this time.

**Fiscal Cost:**
The BPD should consider revisiting its justifications to ensure the fiscal cost is accurate and a defendable use of City resources.

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Third Party Dependence and Access:
In this section, BPD outlines allowable uses which also appear in the corresponding policies (422 and 1305). The ODPA notes the potential for disparate impact and or civil liberties issues if safeguards are not put in place regarding the ability to use ALPR. Specifically, one of the authorized uses should be further analyzed:

(b) An ALPR may be used in conjunction with any routine patrol operation or to support criminal investigations. Reasonable suspicion or probable cause is not required before using an ALPR.

While (as noted earlier) there are no specific legal protections for a license plate in a public roadway, the BPD should further articulate the permission to utilize ALPR technology without reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Currently, the BPD’s language is consistent with every Lexipol drafted ALPR policy that the ODPA has reviewed, however, there does not appear to be clear justification or explanation on why ALPR would be used without meeting a reasonable suspicion or probable cause threshold. The BPD should assess and or explain if it has considered whether this provision has the potential for a racially disparate impact. Potential misuse or improper training can result in additional racial disparities that the Department is currently still grappling with. While the Department explicitly prohibits this technology from being used in a discriminatory matter, absent of reasonable suspicion or probable cause, if this technology is affixed in a neighborhood or location where racial minorities are overrepresented, its mere use may yield racial disparities.

Alternatives:
While the ODPA acknowledged the City and BPD are experiencing a hiring and retention shortage, a more defensible alternative is not deploying “additional police officers”, but rather assessing if reaching the authorized number of officers will enable the Department to address the current crime issues before assessing if this technology should be deployed.

Experience of Other Entities:
As the literature review section indicated, there are considerable case studies that indicate how this technology has been utilized in other locations. The Department can
benefit from further expanding this section to demonstrate successes and challenges with
the implementation of this technology.

Recommendations

Without taking specific positions regarding the predicted or expected effectiveness
of the expansion of this technological adoption in the City of Berkeley, the ODPA believes
there are several opportunities to further improve this Acquisition Report and the
Corresponding Policies.

Suggestions for Improvement include:

- **Transparency and Oversight:** The report is silent on the Police Accountability
  Board’s or the Office of the Director of Police Accountability’s access to this system’s data
  for the performance of the duties and responsibilities set forth by the Charter or by
  Ordinance. The report and policies could benefit from including information about the
  policies and guidelines contemplated to ensure the responsible use of ALPRs by the BPD
  and the ability of the PAB and ODPA to complete their duties.

- **Privacy Safeguards:** Given the potential privacy concerns associated with ALPR
  technology, it would be valuable to highlight the steps taken by the BPD to protect the
  privacy of individuals whose license plate data is captured and stored. This could involve
  explaining measures such as data encryption, access restrictions, and training to
  members and users on compliance with relevant privacy laws or regulations.

- **Community Engagement:** The report and or policies should emphasize the
  importance of engaging with the community and seeking public input on the use of
  ALPRs. The BPD could consider soliciting feedback, conducting public forums or surveys,
  and addressing concerns raised by community members to foster trust and transparency.

- **Regular Training and Accountability:** The BPD should outline the minimum
  training provided to officers on the proper use of ALPRs and adherence to privacy and
  civil rights standards. Additionally, the section could mention the existence of
mechanisms for reporting and investigating any alleged misuse or misconduct related to ALPR technology.

By incorporating these suggestions, the report and policies would provide a more comprehensive and transparent overview of the BPD's use of ALPRs, addressing potential concerns and enhancing accountability and public trust in the process.

Conclusion

In conclusion, while the implementation of an Automatic License Plate Readers (ALPR) system holds potential benefits, it is crucial to acknowledge that the current body of research, the lack of clarity on the BPD’s deployment strategy and lack of articulation of the crime problems the BPD is attempting to solve is insufficient to make definitive conclusions about its effectiveness in the City of Berkeley. The limited scope of existing studies and varying contexts make it challenging to determine the true impact of ALPR systems on public safety and law enforcement outcomes. Therefore, further research and articulation of the proposed policies is necessary to comprehensively evaluate the efficacy of ALPR technology and its potential benefits in the City.

Moreover, it is essential to recognize and address the legitimate privacy concerns raised by all relevant stakeholders. ALPR systems have the potential to collect and store vast amounts of personal data, raising concerns about surveillance and potential misuse. To mitigate these risks, robust safeguards must be put in place to ensure the privacy and protection of non-hit license plates. Transparent policies, legal frameworks, and data governance protocols should be developed and implemented, guaranteeing that the information collected is used solely for its intended purpose and subject to strict access controls and retention limits.

Additionally, the proposed police department policies, as currently formulated, do not fully address all the concerns raised by this report. The lack of clarity and specific guidelines regarding data handling and access restrictions can contribute to mistrust and apprehension. To foster community trust, it is imperative that the policies be revisited and
improved to incorporate meaningful community input and address the identified shortcomings. A well-defined policy should outline the purpose, limitations, and safeguards of the ALPR system, assuring the public that their privacy rights will be respected.

In the event that the need for ALPR systems is deemed to outweigh the privacy concerns of the community in the interest of public safety, a clear and transparent plan for implementation must be established. The process should encompass thorough public consultation, open dialogue, and active involvement of stakeholders at all stages. This inclusive approach ensures that community concerns are adequately addressed, and the benefits, risks, and trade-offs associated with ALPR deployment are fully understood by all parties involved.

In summary, while the potential benefits of ALPR systems warrant consideration, more research is required to determine their true effectiveness in our City. Privacy concerns must be taken seriously, and appropriate safeguards put in place to protect the privacy of non-hit license plates. The proposed police department policies should be refined to address community concerns and clearly articulate the plan for implementation. If the decision is made to proceed with ALPR deployment, transparency and accountability should guide the development of policies and the implementation process, ensuring that public safety goals are achieved while respecting the rights and privacy of individuals and respecting the Charter authority of the Police Accountability Board and the Office of the Director of Police Accountability.

Appendices

A. Letter from The Director of Police Accountability to City Manager Williams-Ridley Requesting Additional Time for Review of Policies and The Respective Response.

B. Draft of BPD Policy 422 “Fixed Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs)”

C. Draft of BPD Policy 1305 “Surveillance Use Policy – Fixed ALPRs”

June 08, 2023

Via Electronic Mail [DWilliams-Ridley@berkeleyca.gov]
Dee Williams-Ridley
2180 Milvia Street, 5th Floor
Berkeley, CA 94704

Re: Request to Postpone Presentation of Automated License Plate Reader Policy

Dear City Manager Williams-Ridley,

I hope this letter finds you well. I am writing to you today in my capacity as the Director of Police Accountability (ODPA) and Secretary of the Police Accountability Board (PAB) to request a postponement of the presentation of the Automated License Plate Reader (ALPR) policy to the Public Safety Policy Committee until July and to the full Council until after the summer recess. This request is being made due to a secretarial oversight on my behalf, which unfortunately resulted in a delay in disseminating the proposed policy to the PAB.

While Chief Louis promptly provided the ALPR policy to me as required by the ordinance, I regrettfully failed to distribute it to the rest of the Board in a timely manner. I was alerted to this oversight in the Chief's presentation to the PAB at their regularly scheduled Board meeting on June 8, 2023. They have now received the policy, but as a result of this delay, the Board has been unable to thoroughly review the policy in the contemplated time frame and provide meaningful input to the Berkeley Police Department, Public Safety Committee, and the full Council. I take full responsibility for this oversight and deeply apologize for any inconvenience caused especially considering the ongoing public safety discussions in the City and the need for solutions to address the various issues being experienced.

Given the importance of the ALPR policy and the need for the Board's comprehensive review, I firmly believe that providing additional time in this instance will benefit both the Department and the community at large. The PAB's meticulous review process and commitment to evidence-based policing will ensure that the policy takes into account a wide range of public safety considerations.

By postponing the presentation, we can ensure that the ALPR policy is the strongest it can be, reflecting the values and concerns of the community we serve. This will ultimately contribute to the adoption of an effective and transparent policy that upholds civil liberties while promoting public safety.
I kindly request your understanding and support in granting this postponement. We will use the additional time to support the Police Accountability Board in their thorough review and thoughtful feedback.

With this postponement, the Board will have sufficient time to review the ALPR policy and we will be better equipped to present a comprehensive and well-informed recommendation to the Police Department, Public Safety Policy Committee, and full Council. This will further facilitate a productive dialogue and enable us to address any concerns or suggestions raised by the Board.

Thank you for your attention to this matter, and I sincerely appreciate your consideration of our request. I can also confirm that because of this incident, I have revised my secretarial processes to ensure that this does not occur in the future. Should you require any additional information or have any questions, please do not hesitate to reach out to me or our team. We are fully committed to ensuring that the ALPR policy reflects the highest standards of accountability and transparency.

I look forward to your favorable response and the opportunity to work collaboratively on this important policy issue.

Sincerely,

Hansel Alejandro Aguilar
Director of Police Accountability

Cc: Public Safety Committee
    Farimah Brown, City Attorney
    Anne Cardwell, Deputy City Manager
    Jennifer Louis, Chief of Police
    Police Accountability Board

Attachments:

Email from Chief Louis dated May 11, 2023 (and resent on June 7, 2023)_Per Surveillance Ordinance_Automated License Plate Reader (APLR) Policies for PAB review
Good afternoon Director Aguilar,

Under the direction of a Berkeley City Council Budget referral item regarding Automated License Plate Readers for Community Safety, the department drafted the required Surveillance Ordinance policies. Attached please find the following documents for PAB review:

1. Policy 422 – The policy that will establish guidelines for the Department on the use of Fixed Automated License Plate Readers
2. Policy 1305 - The Surveillance Use Policy related to Fixed Automated License Plate Readers
3. Surveillance Acquisition Report regarding Fixed Automated License Plate Readers
4. Council Budget Referral Item (for background)

Under the Surveillance Ordinance, BMC Section 2.99.030.2, the Police Accountability Board (PAB) has a 30-day deadline “to recommend approval of the policy, object to the proposal, recommend modifications, or take no action.”

These polices are also being sent to the City Attorney’s Office for review and we plan to present on these policies to the Public Safety Policy Committee at their June meeting. Can you please forward these documents to the PAB for review. I wanted to get them to your office as soon as the first draft was completed so that the PAB would have ample time for review and feedback. I look forward to hearing back from you and the Board and we are available to answer questions that you or the PAB may have related to Policies 422 or 1305.

Respectfully,

Jen
Jen Louis
Chief of Police
Berkeley Police Department

Follow us on:
June 13, 2023

Sent via email: haguilar@cityofberkeley.gov
Hansel Alejandro Aguilar
Director of Police Accountability
Office of the Director of Police Accountability
1947 Center St. – 5th floor
Berkeley, CA  94704

Dear Director Aguilar,

I am in receipt of your letter dated June 8, 2023 requesting to postpone the presentation of the Automated License Plate Reader Policy. I spoke with the Chair of the Public Safety Policy Committee, Council Member Taplin, and his desire is to move forward with this item as scheduled. This will be an opportunity for you to hear the department’s presentation in advance of your discussion with the Police Accountability Board.

It is suggested that you plan to attend the next Public Safety Policy Committee meeting on June 20th, as well as the last City Council meeting on July 25th, when you will have the opportunity to bring forward any ideas and concerns.

If you have any questions, please feel free to reach out to Anne Cardwell, Deputy City Manager.

Sincerely,

Dee Williams-Ridley

Dee Williams-Ridley, City Manager

cc:  Public Safety Policy Committee
    Farimah Brown, City Attorney
    Anne Cardwell, Deputy City Manager
    Jennifer Louis, Chief of Police
    Police Accountability Board
422.1 PURPOSE AND SCOPE
The purpose of this policy is to provide guidance for the capture, storage and use of digital data obtained through the use of Automated License Plate Reader (ALPR) technology. Department Personnel shall adhere to the requirements of Fixed ALPRs in this policy as well as the corresponding Surveillance Use-Fixed ALPRs policy-1305.

422.2 POLICY
The policy of the Berkeley Police Department is to utilize ALPR technology to capture and store digital license plate data and images while recognizing the established privacy rights of the public.

All data and images gathered by the ALPR are for the official use of this department. Because such data may contain confidential information, it is not open to public review.

The Berkeley Police Department does not permit the sharing of ALPR data gathered by the City or its contractors/subcontractors for federal immigration enforcement, pursuant to the California Values Act (Government Code § 7282.5; Government Code § 7284.2 et seq) – these federal immigration agencies include Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Patrol (CBP).

422.3 DEFINITIONS
(a) Automated License Plate Reader (ALPR): A device that uses cameras and computer technology to compare digital images to lists of known information of interest.

(b) ALPR Operator: Trained Department members who may utilize ALPR system/equipment. ALPR operators may be assigned to any position within the Department, and the ALPR Administrator may order the deployment of the ALPR systems for use in various efforts.

(c) ALPR Administrator: The Investigations Bureau Captain or the Chief's designee, serves as the ALPR Administrator for the Department.

(d) Hot List: A list of license plates associated with vehicles of interest compiled from one or more databases including, but not limited to, NCIC, CA DMV, Local BOLO's, etc.

(e) Vehicles of Interest: Including, but not limited to vehicles which are reported as stolen, display stolen license plates or tags; vehicles linked to missing and/or wanted persons and vehicles flagged by the Department of Motor Vehicle Administration or law enforcement agencies.
Detection: Data obtained by an ALPR of an image (such as a license plate) within public view that was read by the device, including potential images (such as the plate and description of vehicle on which it was displayed), and information regarding the location of the ALPR system at the time of the ALPR’s read.

Hit Alert from the ALPR system that a scanned license plate number may be in the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) or other law enforcement database for a specific reason including, but not limited to, being related to a stolen car, wanted person, missing person, domestic violation protective order or terrorist-related activity.

422.4 ADMINISTRATION
The ALPR technology, also known as License Plate Recognition (LPR), allows for the automated detection of license plates. It is used by the Berkeley Police Department to convert data associated with vehicle license plates for official law enforcement purposes, including identifying stolen or wanted vehicles, stolen license plates and missing persons. It may also be used to gather information related to active warrants, suspect apprehension and stolen property recovery. Any installation and maintenance of ALPR equipment, as well as ALPR data retention and access, shall be managed by the Investigations Division Captain. The Investigations Division Captain will assign members under his/her command to administer the day-to-day operation of the ALPR equipment and data.

422.4.1 ALPR ADMINISTRATOR
The Investigations Division Captain, or his/her designee, shall be responsible for compliance with the requirements of Civil Code § 1798.90.5 et seq. This includes, but is not limited to (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53):

(a) Only properly trained sworn officers, crime analysts, communication operators, records clerks, parking enforcement officers, and police assistants are allowed access to the ALPR system or to collect ALPR information.

(b) Ensuring that training requirements are completed for authorized users.

(c) ALPR system monitoring to ensure the security of the information and compliance with applicable privacy laws.

(d) Ensuring procedures are followed for system operators to maintain records of access in compliance with Civil Code § 1798.90.52.

(e) The title and name of the current designee in overseeing the ALPR operation.

(f) Working with the Custodian of Records, or vendor on the retention and destruction of ALPR data, ensuring this policy and related procedures are conspicuously posted on the City’s website.

422.5 OPERATIONS
An ALPR shall only be used for official law enforcement business. Use of an ALPR is restricted to the purposes outlined below. Department members shall not use, or allow others to use the equipment or database records for any unauthorized purpose (Civil
Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53).

(a) An ALPR shall only be used for official law enforcement business.

(b) An ALPR may be used in conjunction with any routine patrol operation or to support criminal investigations. Reasonable suspicion or probable cause is not required before using an ALPR.

(c) Partial license plates and unique vehicle descriptions reported during crimes may be entered into the ALPR system in an attempt to identify suspect vehicles.

(d) No member of this department shall operate ALPR equipment or access ALPR data without first completing department-approved training.

(e) If practicable, the officer should verify an ALPR response through the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS) before taking enforcement action that is based solely on an ALPR alert. Once an alert is received, the operator should confirm that the observed license plate from the system matches the license plate of the observed vehicle. Before any law enforcement action is taken because of an ALPR alert, the alert will be verified through a CLETS inquiry via MDT or through Dispatch. Members will not take any police action that restricts the freedom of any individual based solely on an ALPR alert unless it has been validated. Because the ALPR alert may relate to a vehicle and may not relate to the person operating the vehicle, officers are reminded that they need to have reasonable suspicion and/or probable cause to make an enforcement stop of any vehicle. (For example, if a vehicle is entered into the system because of its association with a wanted individual, Officers should attempt to visually match the driver to the description of the wanted subject prior to making the stop or should have another legal basis for making the stop.)

(f) Hot Lists. Designation of hot lists to be utilized by the ALPR system shall be made by the ALPR Administrator or his/her designee. Hot lists shall be obtained or compiled from sources as may be consistent with the purposes of the ALPR system set forth in this Policy. Hot lists utilized by the Department's LPR system may be updated by agency sources more frequently than the Department may be uploading them and thus the Department's LPR system will not have access to real time data. Occasionally, there may be errors in the LPR system’s read of a license plate. Therefore, an alert alone shall not be a basis for police action (other than following the vehicle of interest). Prior to initiation of a stop of a vehicle or other intervention based on an alert, Department members shall undertake the following:

1. Verification of status on a Hot List. An officer must receive confirmation, from a Berkeley Police Department Communications Dispatcher or other department computer device, that the license plate is still stolen, wanted, or otherwise of interest before proceeding (absent exigent circumstances).

2. Visual verification of license plate number. Officers shall visually verify that the license plate of interest matches identically with the image of the license plate number captured (read) by the LPR, including both the alphanumeric characters of the license
plate, state of issue, and vehicle descriptors before proceeding. Department members alerted to the fact that an observed motor vehicle's license plate is entered as a Hot Plate (hit) in a specific BOLO (be on the lookout) list are required to make a reasonable effort to confirm that a wanted person is actually in the vehicle and/or that a reasonable basis exists before a Department member would have a lawful basis to stop the vehicle.

(3) Department members will clear all stops from hot list alerts by indicating the positive ALPR Hit, i.e., with an arrest or other enforcement action. If it is not obvious in the text of the call as to the correlation of the ALPR Hit and the arrest, then the Department member shall update with the Communications Dispatcher and original person and/or a crime analyst inputting the vehicle in the hot list (hit).

(4) General Hot Lists (SVS, SFR, and SLR) will be automatically downloaded into the ALPR system a minimum of once a day with the most current data overwriting the old data.

(5) All entries and updates of specific Hot Lists within the ALPR system will be documented by the requesting Department member within the appropriate general offense report. As such, specific Hot Lists shall be approved by the ALPR Administrator.

(6) Administrator (or his/her designee) before initial entry within the ALPR system. The updating of such a list within the ALPR system shall thereafter be accomplished pursuant to the approval of the Department member's immediate supervisor. The hits from these data sources should be viewed as informational; created solely to bring the officers attention to specific vehicles that have been associated with criminal activity.

All Hot Plates and suspect information entered into the ALPR system will contain the following information as a minimum:
• Entering Department member's name
• Related case number.
• Short synopsis describing the nature of the originating call

(g) Login/Log-Out Procedure. To ensure proper operation and facilitate oversight of the ALPR system, all users will be required to have individual credentials for access and use of the systems and/or data, which has the ability to be fully audited.

Permitted/Impermissible Uses. The ALPR system, and all data collected, is the property of the Berkeley Police Department. Department personnel may only access and use the ALPR system for official and legitimate law enforcement purposes consistent with this Policy. The following uses of the ALPR system are specifically prohibited:

1. Invasion of Privacy: Except when done pursuant to a court order such as a search warrant, is a violation of this Policy to utilize the ALPR to record license plates except those of vehicles that are exposed to public view (e.g., vehicles on a public road or street, or that are on private property but whose license plate(s) are visible from a public road, street, or a place to which members of the public have access, such as the parking lot of a shop or other business establishment).

2. Harassment or Intimidation: It is a violation of this Policy to use the ALPR system to harass and/or intimidate any individual or group.
3. Use Based on a Protected Characteristic. It is a violation of this policy to use the LPR system or associated scan files or hot lists solely because of a person's, or group's race, gender, religion, political affiliation, nationality, ethnicity, sexual orientation, disability, or other classification protected by law.

4. Personal Use: It is a violation of this Policy to use the ALPR system or associated scan files or hot lists for any personal purpose.

5. First Amendment Rights. It is a violation of this policy to use the LPR system or associated scan files or hot lists for the purpose or known effect of infringing upon First Amendment rights.

(h) Anyone who engages in an impermissible use of the ALPR system or associated scan files or hot lists may be subject to administrative sanctions, up to and including termination, pursuant to and consistent with the relevant collective bargaining agreements and departmental policies. Partial license plates reported during crimes may be entered into the ALPR system in an attempt to identify suspect vehicles.

No ALPR operator may access California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS) data unless otherwise authorized to do so. If practicable, the officer should verify an ALPR response through the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS) before taking enforcement action that is based solely on an ALPR alert.

422.6 DATA COLLECTION AND RETENTION
The Investigations Division Captain is responsible for ensuring systems and processes are in place for the proper collection and retention of ALPR data. Data will be transferred from vehicles to the designated storage in accordance with department procedures. The Department should if feasible find a solution to transfer evidentiary hit data into it's digital evidence repository through secure integration.

All ALPR data downloaded to the ALPR server should be stored for no longer than 30 days, and in accordance with the established records retention schedule. Thereafter, ALPR data should be purged unless it has become, or it is reasonable to believe it will become, evidence in a criminal or civil action or is subject to a discovery request or other lawful action to produce records. In those circumstances the applicable data should be downloaded from the server and uploaded into BPD’s digital evidence repository.

ALPR vendor, will store the data (data hosting) and ensure proper maintenance and security of data stored in their data towers. The ALPR vendor will purge their data at the end of the 30 days of storage. However, this will not preclude Berkeley Police Department from maintaining any relevant vehicle data obtained from the system after that period pursuant to the established City of Berkeley retention schedule mentioned above or outlined elsewhere. Relevant vehicle data are scans corresponding to the vehicle of interest on a hot list. The ALPR vendor and Department shall ensure that the necessary data is captured and stored to accurately report the relevant data required in the Annual Surveillance Technology report. Once the City Council approves the Annual Surveillance Technology report all said data may be purged so long as it doesn’t violate the Retention guidelines.
Restrictions on use of vendor Data: Information gathered or collected, and records retained by the vendor’s cameras or any other Berkeley Police Department ALPR system will not be sold, accessed, or used for any purpose other than legitimate law enforcement or public safety purposes.

422.7 ACCOUNTABILITY
All saved data will be safeguarded and protected by both procedural and technological means. The Berkeley Police Department will observe the following safeguards regarding access to and use of stored data (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53):

(a) Non-law enforcement requests for access to stored ALPR data shall be processed according to the Records Maintenance and Release Policy in accordance with applicable law.

(b) All ALPR data downloaded to any workstation or server shall be accessible only through a login/password-protected system capable of documenting all access of information by name, date and time (Civil Code § 1798.90.52).

(c) Berkeley Police Department members approved to access ALPR data under these guidelines are permitted to access the data for legitimate law enforcement purposes only, such as when the data relate to a specific criminal investigation or department-related civil or administrative action.

(d) Aggregated ALPR data not related to specific criminal investigations shall not be released to any local, state or federal agency or entity without the consent of the Chief of Police or City Manager (i.e. if transportation department requested volume of vehicular traffic associated with specific events, it could conceivably be provided with the count of vehicles, but not the specific license plates with appropriate permissions).

(e) Measures will be taken to ensure the accuracy of ALPR information. Errors discovered in ALPR data collected by ALPR units shall be marked, corrected or deleted in accordance with the type and severity of the error in question.

(f) ALPR system audits will be conducted by the Professional Standards Bureau’s Audit and Inspections Sergeant on a regular basis, at least biennial.

(g) Such ALPR data may be released to other authorized and verified law enforcement officials and agencies for legitimate law enforcement purposes.

(h) Every ALPR Detection Browsing Inquiry must be documented by either the associated Berkeley Police case number or incident number, and/or a reason for the inquiry

For security or data breaches, see the Records Release and Maintenance Policy.

422.8 ALPR DATA DETECTION BROWSING AUDITS
It is the responsibility of the Sergeant of Audit and Inspections or the Chief’s designee to ensure that an audit is conducted of ALPR detection browsing inquiries at least biennial. The Department
will audit a sampling of the ALPR system utilization from the prior 24-month period to verify proper use in accordance with the above-authorized uses. The audit shall randomly select at least 10 detection browsing inquiries conducted by department employees during the preceding 24-month period and determine if each inquiry meets the requirements established in policy section 462.6(e).

The audit shall be documented in the form of an internal department memorandum to the Chief of Police. The memorandum shall include any data errors found so that such errors can be corrected. After review by the Chief of Police, the memorandum and any associated documentation shall be filed and retained by the Professional Standards Bureau Captain. This audit should be shared in the Surveillance Ordinance reporting.

422.9 RELEASE ALPR DATA
The ALPR data may be shared only with other law enforcement or prosecutorial agencies for official law enforcement purposes or as otherwise permitted by law.

(a) A supervisor at the requesting agency will sign an acknowledgement letter stating that the shared data will only be used for the purposes that are aligned with the Berkeley Police Department’s policy. The Berkeley Police Department does not permit the sharing of ALPR data gathered by the City or its contractors/subcontractors for purpose of federal immigration enforcement, these federal immigration agencies include Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Patrol (CBP). See attached letter.

(b) The signed letter is retained on file. Requests for ALPR data by non-law enforcement or non-prosecutorial agencies will be processed as provided in the Records Maintenance and Release Policy (Civil Code § 1798.90.55).

(c) All signed letters shall be routed to the Audit and Inspection Sergeant for compliance and reporting.

ALPR data is subject to the provisions of the Berkeley Police Department’s Immigration Law Policy, and hence may not be shared with federal immigration enforcement officials.

422.10 TRAINING
The Personnel and Training Sergeant shall ensure that members receive department-approved training in order to be authorized to use or access the ALPR system (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53)
Surveillance Use Policy-Fixed ALPRs

1305.1 PURPOSE

The purpose of this policy is to provide guidance for the capture, storage and use of digital data obtained through the use of Automated License Plate Reader (ALPR) technology. Department Personnel shall adhere to the requirements of the Surveillance Use-Fixed ALPRs in this policy as well as the corresponding Use Policy -422.

The policy of the Berkeley Police Department is to utilize ALPR technology to capture and store digital license plate data and images while recognizing the established privacy rights of the public.

All data and images gathered by the ALPR are for the official use of this department. Because such data may contain confidential information, it is not open to public review.

The Berkeley Police Department does not permit the sharing of ALPR data gathered by the City or its contractors/subcontractors for federal immigration enforcement, pursuant to the California Values Act (Government Code § 7282.5; Government Code § 7284.2 et seq) – these federal immigration agencies include Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Patrol (CBP).

1305.2 DEFINITIONS

(a) Automated License Plate Reader (ALPR): A device that uses cameras and computer technology to compare digital images to lists of known information of interest.

(b) ALPR Operator: Trained Department members who may utilize ALPR system/equipment. ALPR operators may be assigned to any position within the Department, and the ALPR Administrator may order the deployment of the ALPR systems for use in various efforts.

(c) ALPR Administrator: The Investigations Bureau Captain or the Chief’s designee, serves as the ALPR Administrator for the Department.

(d) Hot List: A list of license plates associated with vehicles of interest compiled from one or more databases including, but not limited to, NCIC, CA DMV, Local BOLO’s, etc.

(e) Vehicles of Interest: Including, but not limited to vehicles which are reported as stolen, display stolen license plates or tags; vehicles linked to missing and/or wanted persons and vehicles flagged by the Department of Motor Vehicle Administration or law enforcement agencies.

(f) Detection: Data obtained by an ALPR of an image (such as a license plate) within public view that was read by the device, including potential images (such as the plate and description of vehicle on which it was displayed), and information regarding the location of the ALPR system at the time of the ALPR's read.
(g) Hit Alert from the ALPR system that a scanned license plate number may be in the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) or other law enforcement database for a specific reason including, but not limited to, being related to a stolen car, wanted person, missing person, domestic violation protective order or terrorist-related activity.

1305.3 AUTHORIZED AND PROHIBITED USES

An ALPR shall only be used for official law enforcement business.

Use of an ALPR is restricted to the purposes outlined below. Department members shall not use, or allow others to use the equipment or database records for any unauthorized purpose (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53).

(a) An ALPR shall only be used for official law enforcement business.

(b) An ALPR may be used in conjunction with any routine patrol operation or to support criminal investigations. Reasonable suspicion or probable cause is not required before using an ALPR.

(c) Partial license plates and unique vehicle descriptions reported during crimes may be entered into the ALPR system in an attempt to identify suspect vehicles.

(d) No member of this department shall operate ALPR equipment or access ALPR data without first completing department-approved training.

(e) If practicable, the officer should verify an ALPR response through the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS) before taking enforcement action that is based solely on an ALPR alert. Once an alert is received, the operator should confirm that the observed license plate from the system matches the license plate of the observed vehicle. Before any law enforcement action is taken because of an ALPR alert, the alert will be verified through a CLETS inquiry via MDT or through Dispatch. Members will not take any police action that restricts the freedom of any individual based solely on an ALPR alert unless it has been validated. Because the ALPR alert may relate to a vehicle and may not relate to the person operating the vehicle, officers are reminded that they need to have reasonable suspicion and/or probable cause to make an enforcement stop of any vehicle. (For example, if a vehicle is entered into the system because of its association with a wanted individual, Officers should attempt to visually match the driver to the description of the wanted subject prior to making the stop or should have another legal basis for making the stop.)

(f) Hot Lists. Designation of hot lists to be utilized by the ALPR system shall be made by the ALPR Administrator or his/her designee. Hot lists shall be obtained or compiled from sources as may be consistent with the purposes of the ALPR system set forth in this Policy. Hot lists utilized by the Department's LPR system may be updated by agency sources more frequently than the Department may be uploading them and thus the Department's LPR system will not have access to real time data. Occasionally, there may be errors in the LPR system’s read of a license plate. Therefore, an alert alone shall not be a basis for police action (other than following the vehicle of interest). Prior to initiation of a stop of a vehicle or other intervention based on an alert, Department members shall undertake the following:
(1) Verification of status on a Hot List. An officer must receive confirmation, from a Berkeley Police Department Communications Dispatcher or other department computer device, that the license plate is still stolen, wanted, or otherwise of interest before proceeding (absent exigent circumstances).

(2) Visual verification of license plate number. Officers shall visually verify that the license plate of interest matches identically with the image of the license plate number captured (read) by the LPR, including both the alphanumeric characters of the license plate, state of issue, and vehicle descriptors before proceeding. Department members alerted to the fact that an observed motor vehicle's license plate is entered as a Hot Plate (hit) in a specific BOLO (be on the lookout) list are required to make a reasonable effort to confirm that a wanted person is actually in the vehicle and/or that a reasonable basis exists before a Department member would have a lawful basis to stop the vehicle.

(3) Department members will clear all stops from hot list alerts by indicating the positive ALPR Hit, i.e., with an arrest or other enforcement action. If it is not obvious in the text of the call as to the correlation of the ALPR Hit and the arrest, then the Department member shall update with the Communications Dispatcher and original person and/or a crime analyst inputting the vehicle in the hot list (hit).

(4) General Hot Lists (SVS, SFR, and SLR) will be automatically downloaded into the ALPR system a minimum of once a day with the most current data overwriting the old data.

(5) All entries and updates of specific Hot Lists within the ALPR system will be documented by the requesting Department member within the appropriate general offense report. As such, specific Hot Lists shall be approved by the ALPR Administrator.

(6) Administrator (or his/her designee) before initial entry within the ALPR system. The updating of such a list within the ALPR system shall thereafter be accomplished pursuant to the approval of the Department member's immediate supervisor. The hits from these data sources should be viewed as informational; created solely to bring the officers attention to specific vehicles that have been associated with criminal activity. All Hot Plates and suspect information entered into the ALPR system will contain the following information as a minimum:

• Entering Department member's name
• Related case number.
• Short synopsis describing the nature of the originating call

(g) Login/Log-Out Procedure. To ensure proper operation and facilitate oversight of the ALPR system, all users will be required to have individual credentials for access and use of the systems and/or data, which has the ability to be fully audited.

Permitted/Impermissible Uses. The ALPR system, and all data collected, is the property of the Berkeley Police Department. Department personnel may only access and use the ALPR system for official and legitimate law enforcement purposes consistent with this Policy. The following uses of the ALPR system are specifically prohibited:

1. Invasion of Privacy: Except when done pursuant to a court order such as a search warrant, is a violation of this Policy to utilize the ALPR to record license plates except those of vehicles that are exposed to public view (e.g., vehicles on a public road or street, or that are on private property but whose license plate(s) are visible
from a public road, street, or a place to which members of the public have access, such as the parking lot of a shop or other business establishment).

2. Harassment or Intimidation: It is a violation of this Policy to use the ALPR system to harass and/or intimidate any individual or group.

3. Use Based on a Protected Characteristic. It is a violation of this policy to use the LPR system or associated scan files or hot lists solely because of a person’s, or group’s race, gender, religion, political affiliation, nationality, ethnicity, sexual orientation, disability, or other classification protected by law.

4. Personal Use: It is a violation of this Policy to use the ALPR system or associated scan files or hot lists for any personal purpose.

5. First Amendment Rights. It is a violation of this policy to use the LPR system or associated scan files or hot lists for the purpose or known effect of infringing upon First Amendment rights.

(h) Anyone who engages in an impermissible use of the ALPR system or associated scan files or hot lists may be subject to administrative sanctions, up to and including termination, pursuant to and consistent with the relevant collective bargaining agreements and departmental policies. Partial license plates reported during crimes may be entered into the ALPR system in an attempt to identify suspect vehicles.

No ALPR operator may access California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS) data unless otherwise authorized to do so. If practicable, the officer should verify an ALPR response through the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS) before taking enforcement action that is based solely on an ALPR alert.

1305.4 DATA COLLECTION

The Investigations Division Captain is responsible for ensuring systems and processes are in place for the proper collection and retention of ALPR data. Data will be transferred from vehicles to the designated storage in accordance with department procedures. The Department should if feasible find a solution to transfer evidentiary hit data into it’s digital evidence repository through secure integration.

All ALPR data downloaded to the ALPR server should be stored for no longer than 30 days, and in accordance with the established records retention schedule. Thereafter, ALPR data should be purged unless it has become, or it is reasonable to believe it will become, evidence in a criminal or civil action or is subject to a discovery request or other lawful action to produce records. In those circumstances the applicable data should be downloaded from the server and uploaded into BPD’s digital evidence repository.

ALPR vendor, will store the data (data hosting) and ensure proper maintenance and security of data stored in their data towers. The ALPR vendor will purge their data at the end of the 30 days of storage. However, this will not preclude Berkeley Police Department from maintaining any relevant vehicle data obtained from the system after that period pursuant to the established City of Berkeley retention schedule mentioned above or outlined elsewhere. Relevant vehicle data are scans corresponding to the vehicle of interest on a hot list. The ALPR vendor and Department shall ensure that the necessary data is captured and stored to accurately report the relevant data required in the Annual Surveillance Technology report. Once the City Council approves the Annual Surveillance Technology report all said data may be purged so long as it doesn't violate the Retention guidelines.
Restrictions on use of vendor Data: Information gathered or collected, and records retained by the vendor’s cameras or any other Berkeley Police Department ALPR system will not be sold, accessed, or used for any purpose other than legitimate law enforcement or public safety purposes.

1305.5 DATA ACCESS
(a) No member of this department shall operate ALPR equipment or access ALPR data without first completing department-approved training.
(b) No ALPR operator may access California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETs) data unless otherwise authorized to do so.
(c) If practical, an operator should verify an ALPR response through the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETs) before taking enforcement action that is based solely on an ALPR alert.

1305.6 DATA PROTECTION
Surveillance Use Policy - Fixed ALPRs

All saved data will be safeguarded and protected by both procedural and technological means. The Berkeley Police Department will observe the following safeguards regarding access to and use of stored data (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53):

(a) Non-law enforcement requests for access to stored ALPR data shall be processed according to the Records Maintenance and Release Policy in accordance with applicable law.

(b) All ALPR data downloaded to any workstation or server shall be accessible only through a login/password-protected system capable of documenting all access of information by name, date and time (Civil Code § 1798.90.52).

(c) Berkeley Police Department members approved to access ALPR data under these guidelines are permitted to access the data for legitimate law enforcement purposes only, such as when the data relate to a specific criminal investigation or department-related civil or administrative action.

(d) Aggregated ALPR data not related to specific criminal investigations shall not be released to any local, state or federal agency or entity without the consent of the Chief of Police or City Manager (i.e. If transportation department requested volume of vehicular traffic associated with specific events, it could conceivably be provided with the count of vehicles, but not the specific license plates with appropriate permissions).

(e) Measures will be taken to ensure the accuracy of ALPR information. Errors discovered in ALPR data collected by ALPR units shall be marked, corrected or deleted in accordance with the type and severity of the error in question.

(f) ALPR system audits will be conducted by the Professional Standards Bureau’s Audit and Inspections Sergeant on a regular basis, at least biennial.

(g) Such ALPR data may be released to other authorized and verified law enforcement officials and agencies for legitimate law enforcement purposes.

(h) Every ALPR Detection Browsing Inquiry must be documented by either the associated Berkeley Police case number or incident number, and/or a reason for the inquiry.

For security or data breaches, see the Records Release and Maintenance Policy.

1305.7 CIVIL LIBERTIES AND RIGHTS PROTECTION

The Berkeley Police Department is dedicated to the most efficient utilization of its resources and services in its public safety endeavors. The Berkeley Police Department recognizes the need to protect its ownership and control over shared information and to protect the privacy and civil liberties of the public, in accordance with federal and state law. The procedures described within this policy (Data Access, Data Protection, Data Retention, Public Access and Third-Party Data Sharing) protect against the unauthorized use of ALPR data. These policies ensure the data is not used in a way that would violate or infringe upon anyone’s civil rights and/or liberties, including but not limited to potentially disparate or adverse impacts on any communities or groups.
Surveillance Use Policy-Fixed ALPRs

1305.8 DATA RETENTION
All ALPR data belongs to the Department. All ALPR data downloaded to the ALPR server should be stored for no longer than 30 days, and in accordance with the established records retention schedule. Thereafter, ALPR data should be purged unless it has become, or it is reasonable to believe it will become, evidence in a criminal or civil action or is subject to a discovery request or other lawful action to produce records. In those circumstances the applicable data should be downloaded from the server and uploaded into BPD’s digital evidence repository.

ALPR vendor, will store the data (data hosting) and ensure proper maintenance and security of data stored in their data towers. The ALPR vendor will purge their data at the end of the 30 days of storage. However, this will not preclude Berkeley Police Department from maintaining any relevant vehicle data obtained from the system after that period pursuant to the established City of Berkeley retention schedule mentioned above or outlined elsewhere. Relevant vehicle data are scans corresponding to the vehicle of interest on a hot list. The ALPR vendor and Department shall ensure that the necessary data is captured and stored to accurately report the relevant data required in the Annual Surveillance Technology report. Once the City Council approves the Annual Surveillance Technology report all said data may be purged so long as it doesn’t violate the Retention guidelines.

1305.9 PUBLIC ACCESS
All data and images gathered by the ALPR are for the official use of this department. Because such data may contain confidential information, it is not open to public review.

The Department shall to the extent feasible aim to offer a transparency portal wherein the number of scans, hits, and queries is available to the public in real-time, or as near as real-time as feasible. All data shall be reported in the Annual Surveillance Technology Report.

1305.10 THIRD PARTY DATA-SHARING
The ALPR data may be shared only with other law enforcement or prosecutorial agencies for official law enforcement purposes or as otherwise permitted by law.

(a) A supervisor at the requesting agency will sign an acknowledgement letter stating that the shared data will only be used for the purposes that are aligned with the Berkeley Police Department’s policy. The Berkeley Police Department does not permit the sharing of ALPR data gathered by the City or its contractors/subcontractors for purpose of federal immigration enforcement, these federal immigration agencies include Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Patrol (CBP). See attached letter.

(b) The signed letter is retained on file. Requests for ALPR data by non-law enforcement or non-prosecutorial agencies will be processed as provided in the Records Maintenance and Release Policy (Civil Code § 1798.90.55).

(c) All signed letters shall be routed to the Audit and Inspection Sergeant for compliance and reporting. ALPR data is subject to the provisions of the Berkeley Police Department’s Immigration Law Policy, and hence may not be shared with federal immigration enforcement officials.

1305.11 TRAINING
Training for the operation of ALPR Technology shall be provided by BPD personnel. All BPD
Surveillance Use Policy-Fixed ALPRs

employees who utilize ALPR Technology shall be provided a copy of this Surveillance Use Policy.

1305.12 AUDITING AND OVERSIGHT
ALPR system audits will be conducted by the Professional Standards Bureau’s Audit and Inspections Sergeant on a regular basis, at least biannually. The data from the fixed ALPRs shall be reported annually in the Surveillance Technology Report.

1305.13 MAINTENANCE
Any installation and maintenance of ALPR equipment, as well as ALPR data retention and access, shall be managed by the Investigations Division Captain or his or her designee. The Investigations Division Captain will assign members under his/her command to administer the day-to-day operation of the ALPR equipment and data. Equipment maintenance shall be provided by the vendor.
**FIXED AUTOMATED LICENSE PLATE READERS (ALPR)**

**A. DESCRIPTION**

Fixed Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs) are cameras systems with software designed for license plate recognition. The camera systems are typically mounted on street poles, street lights, and highway overpasses.

ALPRs are designed to capture license plate numbers which come into view, along with the location, date and time. The data, which includes an image of the front or the back of the car displaying the license plate, is then uploaded to a central server operated by the vendor. The license plate data is cross referenced with systems such as Stolen Vehicle Systems (SVS), and other lists like Amber alerts to notice police of vehicles with hits.

This technology does not have facial recognition, and is not tied to any personal identifying information or used for traffic enforcement.

**B. PURPOSE**

Berkeley Police Department will utilize a network of fixed automated license plate readers. The ALPRs will be affixed to street poles, street lights, or other similar objects that are either owned by the City of Berkeley or wherein a right-of-way agreement has been established.

The use of ALPRs to alert police of a wanted or vehicle of interest entering into their respective jurisdiction has become increasingly more commonplace. This technology is being utilized on our local freeways, bridges, and in some instances in private parking lots.

Berkeley Police Department investigators have identified the following instances wherein the use of an effective deployment of ALPRs could have aided the Berkeley Police Department in it’s efforts to focus on the wanted vehicle prior to a crime occurring in the City of Berkeley, and potentially avoided an instance of victimization from happening.

**RECENT CASES OF INTEREST**

1.) BPD had an armed robbery in which the victim was pistol-whipped. The suspects fled in a vehicle. BPD officers located the vehicle and a pursuit ensued. The license plate on the vehicle was reported as a wanted vehicle for an armed robbery in San Ramon. Had this vehicle entered the City of Berkeley, and the vehicle passed an ALPR- BPD Officers could have been focused on finding this offender in an advance of this violent robbery.

2.) Victim was carjacked of his Toyota Rav-4. The suspect vehicle two days later was used in a murder that occurred in a nearby East Bay City. This same vehicle was used in a robbery in Oakland. The stolen property in the Oakland robbery was tracked back into Berkeley. Then this same vehicle was used to commit a robbery in Berkeley at Woolsey...
and Telegraph. The vehicle was listed as a car-jacking vehicle from the initial crime, ALPRs could have alerted BPD prior to the property being discarded in Berkeley, as well as the final robbery listed in this synopsis.

3.) Home invasion robbery in Berkeley wherein the suspect came in a stolen vehicle, listed in SVS as a wanted vehicle. The suspect violently attacked the resident. The suspect was arrested shortly after in San Pablo due to an ALPR hit. Suspect was unknown but identified due to having the victims stolen property.

4.) An armed robbery occurred in Berkeley the suspects fled in a cold plated stolen vehicle, meaning the vehicle was listed as wanted in SVS. San Pablo PD stopped the suspect vehicle due to the want associated to the license plate. Suspect was arrested and was in possession of a firearm. Suspect was eventually also linked to a stranger sexual assault case.

5.) A robbery of Valero in Berkeley occurred. The suspect arrived in stolen vehicle. The suspect was subsequently arrested by San Mateo PD due to an ALPR hit.

6.) A Victim called BPD to report his carjacked/stolen vehicle (from Union City), was tracking in South Berkeley. The victim was originally carjacked via gun by a group of suspects in Union City a few days prior. Moreover, Officers responded to South Berkeley but were unable to locate the victim’s vehicle. The victim later tracked his carjacked/stolen vehicle to 1370 University Ave. Officers responded to this location and located the victim’s vehicle. Three juveniles and one adult fled from the vehicle but were captured by the Officers. A search of the vehicle yielded a concealed/loaded firearm.

**CATALYTIC CONVERTER THEFTS WITH GUNFIRE**

7.) A theft of a catalytic converter took place at 5th and Hearst. The suspect vehicle’s license plate was captured on video surveillance. BPD put a felony stop on the vehicle. San Pablo PD located the vehicle using their ALPR system and arrested the driver who was in possession of a loaded handgun.

8.) A catalytic converter theft occurred at 145 Hillcrest Road. The suspect vehicle’s license plate was captured on video surveillance. BPD put a felony stop on the vehicle. Pinole PD located the vehicle. During a search of the vehicle, BPD located an assault rifle (ghost gun) and arrested the suspect.

9.) A pickup truck, wanted in SVS due to it being reported as a stolen vehicle, entered Berkeley. The aforementioned was caught in the act of cutting a catalytic converter
from a vehicle on the 1800 block of 4th Street. Witnesses and a Security guard confronted the suspects. The suspects fled, and then immediately returned to shoot at the witness and security guard.

**PROPERTY CRIME**

10.) An auto burglary occurred at 1316 San Pablo Avenue and the victim obtained a license plate. A felony entry was made on the license plate. Pittsburg PD located the suspect vehicle due to an ALPR hit. The vehicle failed to yield and crashed. The driver was arrested for the failure to yield and Pittsburg PD located a loaded handgun in her purse.

11.) A suspect drove into Berkeley in a stolen vehicle, listed in SVS. The suspect drove to the driveway of 1626 Berkeley Way and proceeded to steal that resident’s vehicle.

12.) Two suspects drove a reported stolen auto to Berkeley Bowl West. The suspects then burglarized a victim’s vehicle. The suspect then proceeded to Emeryville where they used the Victim’s identity to commit identity theft.

13.) A series of auto burglaries were committed in the area of San Pablo and Gilman. The suspects were seen getting into a vehicle which was listed in SVS as a stolen vehicle. Two days later a nearby city reported the same vehicle was used in a murder in that city. ALPR system could have notified officers of that wanted vehicle and helped in the capture of the suspects, and potentially intervened before the subsequent murder.

**HOMICIDE**

14.) Another agency reported a vehicle used in a murder, with a known license plate was entered into SVS with a felony want (associated with a murder). On 08/02/22 the vehicle was located in Berkeley. The associated suspects were located after fleeing from officers.

15.) BPD officers responded to a report of a person casing a house. Upon their arrival the suspects fled in a white sedan. That sedan was determined to be a reported stolen auto. The sedan fled from officers after they activated their emergency lights and sirens. The same vehicle was reported to be involved in a road rage incident in an adjacent city wherein the suspects shot and killed the victim on the freeway.

**SEX/DV CRIMES**

16.) This is a DV case in which the suspect fought with his adult girlfriend causing visible injury and then chased his girlfriend’s 12 year old daughter down the street and shot at
her with a firearm. San Pablo PD had an ALPR hit from this Berkeley PD case. The suspect ran from San Pablo PD and a gun was recovered from him.

17.) This is a series of peeping and prowling incidents against female UC Berkeley students. The suspect was driving for a ride share service and was in and out of Berkeley for the several months. The suspect was homeless, and thereby conventional methods of locating the suspect weren’t fruitful.

C. LOCATION
BPD proposes to install 52 fixed ALPRs in the City of Berkeley. While the cameras are permanent installations, if found ineffective in the installed location, the Department can elect to move the camera to another location at nominal cost. It’s preferred to leave cameras installed in locations for periods of minimally a year. Locations will be determined using crime data, known locations of ingress or egress into the City of Berkeley, and commonly known direction of travel after criminal acts based on information provided from investigators. The Department will balance the need to deploy the camera systems equitably across the City of Berkeley with the need to deploy the cameras in an effective manner. BPD will solicit input from the vendor for an effective deployment.

D. IMPACT
The Berkeley Police Department is dedicated to the most efficient utilization of its resources and services in its public safety endeavors. The Berkeley Police Department recognizes the need to protect its ownership and control over shared information and to protect the privacy and civil liberties of the public, in accordance with federal and state law. The procedures utilized with ALPR Units will help to ensure unauthorized use of its data. The procedures will ensure the data is not used in a way that would violate or infringe upon anyone’s civil rights and/or liberties, including but not limited to potentially disparate or adverse impacts on any communities or groups.

E. MITIGATION
All saved data will be safeguarded and protected by both procedural and technological means which are implemented to safeguard the public from any impacts identified in subsection (D). See subsection (G) for further.

F. DATA TYPES AND SOURCES
Images of license plates and location metadata may be obtained through the use of ALPR cameras. The vendor’s system may have searching capabilities due to technology from machine learning.
that allow officers to search by vehicle type, make, color, license plate state, bumper sticker (the presence of a bumper sticker, not the image or content), decals (again the presence of a decal, not the image or content) and roof racks. All data stored in the vendor’s servers shall be securely protected with end-to-end encryption.

G. DATA SECURITY

BPD takes data security seriously. All saved data will be safeguarded and protected by both procedural and technological means. The Berkeley Police Department will observe the following safeguards regarding access to and use of stored data (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53):

(a) Non-law enforcement requests for access to stored ALPR data shall be processed according to the Records Maintenance and Release Policy in accordance with applicable law.

(b) All ALPR data downloaded to any workstation or server shall be accessible only through a login/password-protected system capable of documenting all access of information by name, date and time (Civil Code § 1798.90.52).

(c) Berkeley Police Department members approved to access ALPR data under these guidelines are permitted to access the data for legitimate law enforcement purposes only, such as when the data relate to a specific criminal investigation or department-related civil or administrative action.

(d) Aggregated ALPR data not related to specific criminal investigations shall not be released to any local, state or federal agency or entity without the consent of the Chief of Police or City Manager.

(e) Measures will be taken to ensure the accuracy of ALPR information. Errors discovered in ALPR data collected by ALPR units shall be marked, corrected or deleted in accordance with the type and severity of the error in question.

(f) ALPR system audits will be conducted by the Professional Standards Bureau’s Audit and Inspections Sergeant on a regular basis, at least biennial.

(g) Such ALPR data may be released to other authorized and verified law enforcement officials and agencies for legitimate law enforcement purposes.

(h) Every ALPR Detection Browsing Inquiry must be documented by either the associated Berkeley Police case number or incident number, and/or a reason for the inquiry

For security or data breaches, see the Records Release and Maintenance Policy.
H. FISCAL COST
Since the City of Berkeley has not acquired the specific cameras, the costs can only be estimated. BPD expects the individual camera costs to range from $2500-$5000 each, with the installation to vary. BPD believes that for the proposed 52 camera deployment the cost to purchase and install to not exceed an initial cost of $250,000. The yearly subscription cost may fluctuate but is expected to range from $125,000 to $175,000 a year.

I. THIRD-PARTY DEPENDENCE AND ACCESS
ALPR vendor would store the data (data hosting) and ensure proper maintenance and security of data stored in their data towers. The vendor will purge their data at the end of 30 days of storage. However, this will not preclude Berkeley Police Department from maintaining any relevant vehicle data obtained from the system after that period pursuant to the established City of Berkeley retention schedule (i.e. if detectives establish a hit results in evidentiary value it should be incorporated into the digital evidence of that specific case, and thereby would be kept longer than the aforementioned 30 days).

Restrictions on use of fixed ALPR Data: Information gathered or collected, and records retained by the Vendor will not be sold, accessed, or used for any purpose other than legitimate law enforcement or public safety purpose unless allowed by policy (i.e. metadata will be permissible use for annual surveillance reporting).

An ALPR shall only be used for official law enforcement business.
Use of an ALPR is restricted to the purposes outlined below. Department members shall not use, or allow others to use the equipment or database records for any unauthorized purpose (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53).

(a) An ALPR shall only be used for official law enforcement business.
(b) An ALPR may be used in conjunction with any routine patrol operation or to support criminal investigations. Reasonable suspicion or probable cause is not required before using an ALPR.
(c) Partial license plates and unique vehicle descriptions reported during major crimes should be entered into the ALPR system in an attempt to identify suspect vehicles.

The ALPR system, and all data collected, is the property of the Berkeley Police Department. Department personnel may only access and use the ALPR system for official and legitimate law enforcement purposes consistent with this Policy. The following uses of the ALPR system are specifically prohibited:
(1) Invasion of Privacy: Except when done pursuant to a court order such as a search warrant, is a violation of this Policy to utilize the ALPR to record license plates except those of vehicles that are exposed to public view (e.g., vehicles on a public road or street, or that are on private property but whose license plate(s) are visible from a public road, street, or a place to which members of the public have access, such as the parking lot of a shop or other business establishment).

(2) Harassment or Intimidation: It is a violation of this Policy to use the ALPR system to harass and/or intimidate any individual or group.

(3) Use Based on a Protected Characteristic. It is a violation of this policy to use the ALPR system or associated scan files or hot lists solely because of a person's, or group's race, gender, religion, political affiliation, nationality, ethnicity, sexual orientation, disability, or other classification protected by law.

(4) Personal Use: It is a violation of this Policy to use the ALPR system or associated scan files or hot lists for any personal purpose.

(5) First Amendment Rights. It is a violation of this policy to use the LPR system or associated scan files or hot lists for the purpose or known effect of infringing upon First Amendment rights.

Anyone who engages in an impermissible use of the ALPR system or associated scan files or hot lists may be subject to administrative sanctions, up to and including termination, pursuant to and consistent with the relevant collective bargaining agreements and departmental policies.

The ALPR data may be shared only with other law enforcement or prosecutorial agencies for official law enforcement purposes or as otherwise permitted by law.

(a) A supervisor at the requesting agency will sign an acknowledgement letter stating that the shared data will only be used for the purposes that are aligned with the Berkeley Police Department’s policy. The Berkeley Police Department does not permit the sharing of ALPR data gathered by the City or its contractors/subcontractors for purpose of federal immigration enforcement, these federal immigration agencies include Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Patrol (CBP).

(b) The signed letter is retained on file. Requests for ALPR data by non-law enforcement or non-prosecutorial agencies will be processed as provided in the Records Maintenance and Release Policy (Civil Code § 1798.90.55).
J. ALTERNATIVES
An alternative is the deployment of additional police resources. The inherent problems with this alternative is that it is difficult to hire and train additional police officers and the cost would be significantly higher than adding technology. Furthermore, this technology furthers the Department’s goal in protecting and safeguarding our community through precision based policing strategies.

K. EXPERIENCE OF OTHER ENTITIES
Currently, in Alameda County, the following cities have ALPR programs, The Alameda County Sheriff’s Office, Alameda PD, Emeryville PD, Fremont PD, Hayward PD, Livermore PD, Newark PD, Oakland PD, Piedmont PD, Pleasanton PD, San Leandro PD, Union City PD, and the California Highway Patrol. The only agency in Alameda County to not utilize ALPRs is Albany PD.

Representatives from Newark indicated success with their program. No notable issues have arisen as a result of this program. Additionally, no unexpected expenditures have come from this program that were unforeseen.

Representatives from indicated similar to the above, success with their program. No notable issues have arisen as a result of this program. Additionally, no unexpected expenditures have come from this program that were unforeseen.
422.1 PURPOSE AND SCOPE
The purpose of this policy is to provide guidance for the capture, storage and use of digital data obtained through the use of Automated License Plate Reader (ALPR) technology. Department Personnel shall adhere to the requirements of Fixed ALPRs in this policy as well as the corresponding Surveillance Use-Fixed ALPRs policy-1305.

422.2 POLICY
The policy of the Berkeley Police Department is to utilize ALPR technology to capture and store digital license plate data and images while recognizing the established privacy rights of the public.

All data and images gathered by the ALPR are for the official use of this department. Because such data may contain confidential information, it is not open to public review.

The Berkeley Police Department does not permit the sharing of ALPR data gathered by the City or its contractors/subcontractors for federal immigration enforcement, pursuant to the California Values Act (Government Code § 7282.5; Government Code § 7284.2 et seq) – these federal immigration agencies include Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Patrol (CBP).

422.3 DEFINITIONS
(a) Automated License Plate Reader (ALPR): A device that uses cameras and computer technology to compare digital images to lists of known information of interest.

(b) ALPR Operator: Trained Department members who may utilize ALPR system/equipment. ALPR operators may be assigned to any position within the Department, and the ALPR Administrator may order the deployment of the ALPR systems for use in various efforts.

(c) ALPR Administrator: The Investigations Bureau Captain or the Chief’s designee, serves as the ALPR Administrator for the Department.

(d) Hot List: A list of license plates associated with vehicles of interest compiled from one or more databases including, but not limited to, NCIC, CA DMV, Local BOLO's, etc.

(e) Vehicles of Interest: Including, but not limited to vehicles which are reported as stolen, display stolen license plates or tags; vehicles linked to missing and/or wanted persons and vehicles flagged by the Department of Motor Vehicle Administration or law enforcement agencies.
(f) Detection: Data obtained by an ALPR of an image (such as a license plate) within public view that was read by the device, including potential images (such as the plate and description of vehicle on which it was displayed), and information regarding the location of the ALPR system at the time of the ALPR’s read.

(g) Hit Alert from the ALPR system that a scanned license plate number may be in the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) or other law enforcement database for a specific reason including, but not limited to, being related to a stolen car, wanted person, missing person, domestic violation protective order or terrorist-related activity.

422.4 ADMINISTRATION

The ALPR technology, also known as License Plate Recognition (LPR), allows for the automated detection of license plates. It is used by the Berkeley Police Department to convert data associated with vehicle license plates for official law enforcement purposes, including identifying stolen or wanted vehicles, stolen license plates and missing persons. It may also be used to gather information related to active warrants, suspect apprehension and stolen property recovery. Any installation and maintenance of ALPR equipment, as well as ALPR data retention and access, shall be managed by the Investigations Division Captain. The Investigations Division Captain will assign members under his/her command to administer the day-to-day operation of the ALPR equipment and data.

422.4.1 ALPR ADMINISTRATOR

The Investigations Division Captain, or his/her designee, shall be responsible for compliance with the requirements of Civil Code § 1798.90.5 et seq. This includes, but is not limited to (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53):

(a) Only properly trained sworn officers, crime analysts, communication operators, records clerks, parking enforcement officers, and police assistants are allowed access to the ALPR system or to collect ALPR information.

(b) Ensuring that training requirements are completed for authorized users.

(c) ALPR system monitoring to ensure the security of the information and compliance with applicable privacy laws.

(d) Ensuring procedures are followed for system operators to maintain records of access in compliance with Civil Code § 1798.90.52.

(e) The title and name of the current designee in overseeing the ALPR operation.

(f) Working with the Custodian of Records, or vendor on the retention and destruction of ALPR data. Ensuring this policy and related procedures are conspicuously posted on the City’s website.

422.5 OPERATIONS

An ALPR shall only be used for official law enforcement business. Use of an ALPR is restricted to the purposes outlined below. Department members shall not use, or allow others to use the equipment or database records for any unauthorized purpose (Civil
(a) An ALPR shall only be used for official law enforcement business.

(b) An ALPR may be used in conjunction with any routine patrol operation or to support criminal investigations. Reasonable suspicion or probable cause is not required before using an ALPR database.

(c) Partial license plates and unique vehicle descriptions reported during crimes may be entered into the ALPR system in an attempt to identify suspect vehicles.

(d) No member of this department shall operate ALPR equipment or access ALPR data without first completing department-approved training.

(e) If practicablefeasible, the officer should verify an ALPR response through the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS) before taking enforcement action that is based solely on an ALPR alert. Once an alert is received, the operator should confirm that the observed license plate from the system matches the license plate of the observed vehicle. Before any law enforcement action is taken because of an ALPR alert, the alert will be verified through a CLETS inquiry via MDT or through Dispatch.

(e)(f) Members will not take any police action that restricts the freedom of any individual based solely on an ALPR alert unless it has been validated. Because the ALPR alert may relate to a vehicle and may not relate to the person operating the vehicle, officers are reminded that they need to have reasonable suspicion and/or probable cause to make an enforcement stop of any vehicle. (For example, if a vehicle is entered into the system because of its association with a wanted individual, Officers should attempt to visually match the driver to the description of the wanted subject prior to making the stop or should have another legal basis for making the stop.)

(f)(g) Hot Lists. Designation of hot lists to be utilized by the ALPR system shall be made by the ALPR Administrator or his/her designee. Hot lists shall be obtained or compiled from sources as may be consistent with the purposes of the ALPR system set forth in this Policy. Hot lists utilized by the Department’s LPR system may be updated by agency sources more frequently than the Department may be uploading them and thus the Department’s LPR system will not have access to real time data. Occasionally, there may be errors in the LPR system’s read of a license plate. Therefore, an alert alone shall not be a basis for police action (other than following the vehicle of interest). Prior to initiation of a stop of a vehicle or other intervention based on an alert, Department members shall undertake the following:

(1) Verification of status on a Hot List. An officer must receive confirmation, from a Berkeley Police Department Communications Dispatcher or other department computer device, that the license plate is still stolen, wanted, or otherwise of interest before proceeding (absent exigent circumstances).

(2) Visual verification of license plate number. Officers shall visually verify that the license plate of interest matches identically with the image of the license plate number
captured (read) by the LPR, including both the alphanumeric characters of the license plate, state of issue, and vehicle descriptors before proceeding. Department members alerted to the fact that an observed motor vehicle's license plate is entered as a Hot Plate (hit) in a specific BOLO (be on the lookout) list are required to make a reasonable effort to confirm that a wanted person is actually in the vehicle and/or that a reasonable basis exists before a Department member would have a lawful basis to stop the vehicle.

(3) Department members will clear all stops from hot list alerts by indicating the positive ALPR Hit, i.e., with an arrest or other enforcement action. If it is not obvious in the text of the call as to the correlation of the ALPR Hit and the arrest, then the Department member shall update with the Communications Dispatcher and original person and/or a crime analyst inputting the vehicle in the hot list (hit).

(4) General Hot Lists (SVS, SFR, and SLR) will be automatically downloaded into the ALPR system a minimum of once a day with the most current data overwriting the old data.

(5) All entries and updates of specific Hot Lists within the ALPR system will be documented by the requesting Department member within the appropriate general offense report. As such, specific Hot Lists shall be approved by the ALPR Administrator.

(6) Administrator (or his/her designee) before initial entry within the ALPR system. The updating of such a list within the ALPR system shall thereafter be accomplished pursuant to the approval of the Department member's immediate supervisor. The hits from these data sources should be viewed as informational; created solely to bring the officers attention to specific vehicles that have been associated with criminal activity. All Hot Plates and suspect information entered into the ALPR system will contain the following information as a minimum:
   • Entering Department member's name
   • Related case number.
   • Short synopsis describing the nature of the originating call

(6)(h) Login/Log-Out Procedure. To ensure proper operation and facilitate oversight of the ALPR system, all users will be required to have individual credentials for access and use of the systems and/or data, which has the ability to be fully audited.

Permitted/Impermissible Uses. The ALPR system, and all data collected, is the property of the Berkeley Police Department. Department personnel may only access and use the ALPR system for official and legitimate California law enforcement purposes consistent with this Policy. The following uses of the ALPR system are specifically prohibited:

1. Invasion of Privacy: Except when done pursuant to a court order such as a search warrant, is a violation of this Policy to utilize the ALPR to record license plates except those of vehicles that are exposed to public view (e.g., vehicles on a public road or street, or that are on private property but whose license plate(s) are visible from a public road, street, or a place to which members of the public have access, such as the parking lot of a shop or other business establishment).
2. Harassment or Intimidation: It is a violation of this Policy to use the ALPR system to harass and/or intimidate any individual or group.

3. Use Based on a Protected Characteristic. It is a violation of this policy to use the LPR system or associated scan files or hot lists solely because of a person's, or group's race, gender, religion, political affiliation, nationality, ethnicity, sexual orientation, disability, or other classification protected by law.

4. Personal Use: It is a violation of this Policy to use the ALPR system or associated scan files or hot lists for any personal purpose.

5. First Amendment Rights. It is a violation of this policy to use the LPR system or associated scan files or hot lists for the purpose or known effect of infringing upon First Amendment rights.

(i) Anyone who intentionally engages in an impermissible use of the ALPR system or associated scan files or hot lists may be subject to administrative sanctions, up to and including termination, pursuant to and consistent with the relevant collective bargaining agreements and departmental policies. Partial license plates reported during crimes may be entered into the ALPR system in an attempt to identify suspect vehicles.

(j) Anyone who negligently engages in an impermissible use of the ALPR system or associated scan files or hot lists may be subject to administrative sanctions, up to and including termination, pursuant to and consistent with the relevant collective bargaining agreements and departmental policies. Partial license plates reported during crimes may be entered into the ALPR system in an attempt to identify suspect vehicles.

No ALPR operator may access California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS) data unless otherwise authorized to do so. If practicable, the officer should verify an ALPR response through the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS) before taking enforcement action that is based solely on an ALPR alert.

422.6 DATA COLLECTION AND RETENTION

The Investigations Division Captain is responsible for ensuring systems and processes are in place for the proper collection and retention of ALPR data. Data will be transferred from vehicles to the designated storage in accordance with department procedures. The Department should if feasible find a solution to transfer evidentiary hit data into its digital evidence repository through secure integration. Evidentiary hit data shall be transferred into the Department’s digital evidence repository through secure integration.

All ALPR data downloaded to the ALPR server should be stored for no longer than 30 days, and in accordance with the established records retention schedule. Thereafter, ALPR data should be purged unless it has become, or it is reasonable to believe it will become, evidence in a criminal or civil action or is subject to a discovery request or other lawful action to produce records. In those circumstances the applicable data should be downloaded from the server and uploaded into BPD’s digital evidence repository.
ALPR vendor, will store the data (data hosting) and ensure proper maintenance and security of data stored in their data towers. The ALPR vendor will purge their data at the end of the 30 days of storage. However, this will not preclude Berkeley Police Department from maintaining any relevant vehicle data obtained from the system after that period pursuant to the established City of Berkeley retention schedule mentioned above or outlined elsewhere. Relevant vehicle data are scans corresponding to the vehicle of interest on a hot list. The ALPR vendor and Department shall ensure that the necessary data is captured and stored to accurately report the relevant data required in the Annual Surveillance Technology report. Once the City Council approves the Annual Surveillance Technology report all said data may be purged so long as it doesn’t violate the Retention guidelines.

Restrictions on use of vendor Data: Information gathered or collected, and records retained by the vendor’s cameras or any other Berkeley Police Department ALPR system will not be sold, accessed, or used for any purpose other than legitimate California law enforcement or public safety purposes.

422.7 ACCOUNTABILITY

All saved data will be safeguarded and protected by both procedural and technological means. The Berkeley Police Department will observe the following safeguards regarding access to and use of stored data (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53):

(a) Non-law enforcement requests for access to stored ALPR data shall be processed according to the Records Maintenance and Release Policy in accordance with applicable law.

(b) All ALPR data downloaded to any workstation or server shall be accessible only through a login/password-protected system capable of documenting all access of information by name, date and time (Civil Code § 1798.90.52).

(c) Berkeley Police Department members approved to access ALPR data under these guidelines are permitted to access the data for legitimate California law enforcement purposes only, such as when the data relate to a specific criminal investigation or department-related civil or administrative action.

(d) Aggregated ALPR data not related to specific criminal investigations shall not be released to any local, state or federal agency or entity without the consent of the Chief of Police or City Manager (i.e. If transportation department requested volume of vehicular traffic associated with specific events, it could conceivably be provided with the count of vehicles, but not the specific license plates with appropriate permissions).

(e) Measures will be taken to ensure the accuracy of ALPR information. Errors discovered in ALPR data collected by ALPR units shall be marked, corrected or deleted in accordance with the type and severity of the error in question.

(f) ALPR system audits will be conducted by the Professional Standards Bureau’s Audit and Inspections Sergeant on a regular basis, at least biennial.

(g) Such ALPR data may be released to other authorized and verified law enforcement officials and agencies for legitimate California law enforcement purposes.
(h) Every ALPR Detection Browsing Inquiry must be documented by either the associated Berkeley Police case number or incident number, and/or a reason for the inquiry.

For security or data breaches, see the Records Release and Maintenance Policy.

422.8 ALPR DATA DETECTION BROWSING AUDITS

It is the responsibility of the Sergeant of Audit and Inspections or the Chief’s designee to ensure that an audit is conducted of ALPR detection browsing inquiries at least biennial. The Department will audit a sampling of the ALPR system utilization from the prior 24-month period to verify proper use in accordance with the above-authorized uses. The audit shall randomly select at least 10 detection browsing inquiries conducted by department employees during the preceding 24-month period and determine if each inquiry meets the requirements established in policy section 462.6(e).

The audit shall be documented in the form of an internal department memorandum to the Chief of Police. The memorandum shall include any data errors found so that such errors can be corrected. After review by the Chief of Police, the memorandum and any associated documentation shall be filed and retained by the Professional Standards Bureau Captain. This audit should be shared in the Surveillance Ordinance reporting.

422.9 RELEASING ALPR DATA

The ALPR data may be shared only with other law enforcement or prosecutorial agencies for official law enforcement purposes or as otherwise permitted by law.

(a) A supervisor at the requesting agency will sign an acknowledgement letter stating that the shared data will only be used for the purposes that are aligned with the Berkeley Police Department’s policy. The Berkeley Police Department does not permit the sharing of ALPR data gathered by the City or its contractors/subcontractors for purpose of federal immigration enforcement, these federal immigration agencies include Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Patrol (CBP). See attached letter.

(b) The signed letter is retained on file. Requests for ALPR data by non-law enforcement or non-prosecutorial agencies will be processed as provided in the Records Maintenance and Release Policy (Civil Code § 1798.90.55).

(c) All signed letters shall be routed to the Audit and Inspection Sergeant for compliance and reporting.

422.10 OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY

ALPR data is subject to the provisions of the Berkeley Police Department’s Immigration Law Policy, and hence may not be shared with federal immigration enforcement officials.

422.10 OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY

Any ALPR data or images that are utilized for an investigation that becomes evidence in a case will be made available to the Office of the Director of Police Accountability (ODPA) as it relates to a specific complaint of misconduct. Additionally, the results of any audits will be shared with the ODPA upon their completion.
422.10422.11 **TRAINING**

The Personnel and Training Sergeant shall ensure that members receive department-approved training in order to be authorized to use or access the ALPR system (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53)
Surveillance Use Policy-Fixed ALPRs

1305.1  PURPOSE

The purpose of this policy is to provide guidance for the capture, storage and use of digital data obtained through the use of Automated License Plate Reader (ALPR) technology. Department Personnel shall adhere to the requirements of the Surveillance Use-Fixed ALPRs in this policy as well as the corresponding Use Policy -422.

The policy of the Berkeley Police Department is to utilize ALPR technology to capture and store digital license plate data and images while recognizing the established privacy rights of the public.

All data and images gathered by the ALPR are for the official use of this department. Because such data may contain confidential information, it is not open to public review.

The Berkeley Police Department does not permit the sharing of ALPR data gathered by the City or its contractors/subcontractors for federal immigration enforcement, pursuant to the California Values Act (Government Code § 7282.5; Government Code § 7284.2 et seq) – these federal immigration agencies include Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Patrol (CBP).

1305.2  DEFINITIONS

(a) Automated License Plate Reader (ALPR): A device that uses cameras and computer technology to compare digital images to lists of known information of interest.

(b) ALPR Operator: Trained Department members who may utilize ALPR system/equipment. ALPR operators may be assigned to any position within the Department, and the ALPR Administrator may order the deployment of the ALPR systems for use in various efforts.

(c) ALPR Administrator: The Investigations Bureau Captain or the Chief’s designee, serves as the ALPR Administrator for the Department.

(d) Hot List: A list of license plates associated with vehicles of interest compiled from one or more databases including, but not limited to, NCIC, CA DMV, Local BOLO's, etc.

(e) Vehicles of Interest: Including, but not limited to vehicles which are reported as stolen, display stolen license plates or tags; vehicles linked to missing and/or wanted persons and vehicles flagged by the Department of Motor Vehicle Administration or law enforcement agencies.

(f) Detection: Data obtained by an ALPR of an image (such as a license plate) within public view that was read by the device, including potential images (such as the plate and description of vehicle on which it was displayed), and information regarding the location of the ALPR system at the time of the ALPR's read.
Hit Alert from the ALPR system that a scanned license plate number may be in the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) or other law enforcement database for a specific reason including, but not limited to, being related to a stolen car, wanted person, missing person, domestic violation protective order or terrorist-related activity.

1305.3 AUTHORIZED AND PROHIBITED USES

An ALPR shall only be used for official law enforcement business. Use of an ALPR is restricted to the purposes outlined below. Department members shall not use, or allow others to use the equipment or database records for any unauthorized purpose (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53).

(a) An ALPR shall only be used for official law enforcement business.

(b) An ALPR may be used in conjunction with any routine patrol operation or to support criminal investigations. Reasonable suspicion or probable cause is not required before using an ALPR database.

(c) Partial license plates and unique vehicle descriptions reported during crimes may be entered into the ALPR system in an attempt to identify suspect vehicles.

(d) No member of this department shall operate ALPR equipment or access ALPR data without first completing department-approved training.

If practicable, the officer should verify an ALPR response through the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS) before taking enforcement action that is based solely on an ALPR alert. Once an alert is received, the operator should confirm that the observed license plate from the system matches the license plate of the observed vehicle. Before any law enforcement action is taken because of an ALPR alert, the alert will be verified through a CLETS inquiry via MDT or through Dispatch.

Members will not take any police action that restricts the freedom of any individual based solely on an ALPR alert unless it has been validated. Because the ALPR alert may relate to a vehicle and may not relate to the person operating the vehicle, officers are reminded that they need to have reasonable suspicion and/or probable cause to make an enforcement stop of any vehicle. (For example, if a vehicle is entered into the system because of its association with a wanted individual, Officers should attempt to visually match the driver to the description of the wanted subject prior to making the stop or should have another legal basis for making the stop.)

Hot Lists. Designation of hot lists to be utilized by the ALPR system shall be made by the ALPR Administrator or his/her designee. Hot lists shall be obtained or compiled from sources as may be consistent with the purposes of the ALPR system set forth in this Policy. Hot lists utilized by the Department's LPR system may be updated by agency sources more frequently than the Department may be uploading them and thus the Department's LPR system will not have access to real time data. Occasionally, there may be errors in the LPR system's read of a license plate. Therefore, an alert alone shall not be a basis for police action (other than following the vehicle of interest). Prior to initiation of a stop of a vehicle or other intervention based on an alert, Department members shall undertake the following:
(1) Verification of status on a Hot List. An officer must receive confirmation, from a Berkeley Police Department Communications Dispatcher or other department computer device, that the license plate is still stolen, wanted, or otherwise of interest before proceeding (absent exigent circumstances).

(2) Visual verification of license plate number. Officers shall visually verify that the license plate of interest matches identically with the image of the license plate number captured (read) by the LPR, including both the alphanumeric characters of the license plate, state of issue, and vehicle descriptors before proceeding. Department members alerted to the fact that an observed motor vehicle’s license plate is entered as a Hot Plate (hit) in a specific BOLO (be on the lookout) list are required to make a reasonable effort to confirm that a wanted person is actually in the vehicle and/or that a reasonable basis exists before a Department member would have a lawful basis to stop the vehicle.

(3) Department members will clear all stops from hot list alerts by indicating the positive ALPR Hit, i.e., with an arrest or other enforcement action. If it is not obvious in the text of the call as to the correlation of the ALPR Hit and the arrest, then the Department member shall update with the Communications Dispatcher and original person and/or a crime analyst inputting the vehicle in the hot list (hit).

(4) General Hot Lists (SVS, SFR, and SLR) will be automatically downloaded into the ALPR system a minimum of once a day with the most current data overwriting the old data.

(5) All entries and updates of specific Hot Lists within the ALPR system will be documented by the requesting Department member within the appropriate general offense report. As such, specific Hot Lists shall be approved by the ALPR Administrator.

(6) Administrator (or his/her designee) before initial entry within the ALPR system. The updating of such a list within the ALPR system shall thereafter be accomplished pursuant to the approval of the Department member’s immediate supervisor. The hits from these data sources should be viewed as informational; created solely to bring the officers attention to specific vehicles that have been associated with criminal activity.

All Hot Plates and suspect information entered into the ALPR system will contain the following information as a minimum:
- Entering Department member’s name
- Related case number.
- Short synopsis describing the nature of the originating call

Login/Log-Out Procedure. To ensure proper operation and facilitate oversight of the ALPR system, all users will be required to have individual credentials for access and use of the systems and/or data, which has the ability to be fully audited.

Permitted/Impermissible Uses. The ALPR system, and all data collected, is the property of the Berkeley Police Department. Department personnel may only access and use the ALPR system for official and legitimate California law enforcement purposes consistent with this Policy. The following uses of the ALPR system are specifically prohibited:

1. Invasion of Privacy: Except when done pursuant to a court order such as a search warrant, is a violation of this Policy to utilize the ALPR to record license plates except those of vehicles that are exposed to public view (e.g., vehicles on a public road or street, or that are on private property but whose license plate(s) are visible
2. Harassment or Intimidation: It is a violation of this Policy to use the ALPR system to harass and/or intimidate any individual or group.

3. Use Based on a Protected Characteristic. It is a violation of this policy to use the LPR system or associated scan files or hot lists solely because of a person's, or group's race, gender, religion, political affiliation, nationality, ethnicity, sexual orientation, disability, or other classification protected by law.

4. Personal Use: It is a violation of this Policy to use the ALPR system or associated scan files or hot lists for any personal purpose.

5. First Amendment Rights. It is a violation of this policy to use the LPR system or associated scan files or hot lists for the purpose or known effect of infringing upon First Amendment rights.

   (i) Anyone who intentionally engages in an impermissible use of the ALPR system or associated scan files or hot lists may shall be subject to administrative sanctions, up to and including termination, pursuant to and consistent with the relevant collective bargaining agreements and departmental policies. Partial license plates reported during crimes may be entered into the ALPR system in an attempt to identify suspect vehicles.

   (j) Anyone who negligently engages in an impermissible use of the ALPR system or associated scan files or hot lists may be subject to administrative sanctions, up to and including termination, pursuant to and consistent with the relevant collective bargaining agreements and departmental policies. Partial license plates reported during crimes may be entered into the ALPR system in an attempt to identify suspect vehicles.

No ALPR operator may access California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS) data unless otherwise authorized to do so. If practicable, the officer should verify an ALPR response through the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS) before taking enforcement action that is based solely on an ALPR alert.

1305.4 DATA COLLECTION

The Investigations Division Captain is responsible for ensuring systems and processes are in place for the proper collection and retention of ALPR data. Data will be transferred from vehicles to the designated storage in accordance with department procedures. The Department should if feasible find a solution to transfer evidentiary hit data into its digital evidence repository through secure integration. Evidentiary hit data shall be transferred into the Department’s digital evidence repository through secure integration.

All ALPR data downloaded to the ALPR server should be stored for no longer than 30 days, and in accordance with the established records retention schedule. Thereafter, ALPR data should be purged unless it has become, or it is reasonable to believe it will become, evidence in a criminal or civil action or is subject to a discovery request or other lawful action to produce records. In those circumstances the applicable data should be downloaded from the server and uploaded into BPD’s digital evidence repository.

ALPR vendor, will store the data (data hosting) and ensure proper maintenance and security of data stored in their data towers. The ALPR vendor will purge their data at the end of the 30 days of storage. However, this will not preclude Berkeley Police Department from maintaining
any relevant vehicle data obtained from the system after that period pursuant to the established City of Berkeley retention schedule mentioned above or outlined elsewhere. Relevant vehicle data are scans corresponding to the vehicle of interest on a hot list. The ALPR vendor and Department shall ensure that the necessary data is captured and stored to accurately report the relevant data required in the Annual Surveillance Technology report. Once the City Council approves the Annual Surveillance Technology report all said data may be purged so long as it doesn’t violate the Retention guidelines.

Restrictions on use of vendor Data: Information gathered or collected, and records retained by the vendor’s cameras or any other Berkeley Police Department ALPR system will not be sold, accessed, or used for any purpose other than legitimate California law enforcement or public safety purposes.

1305.5 DATA ACCESS

(a) No member of this department shall operate ALPR equipment or access ALPR data without first completing department-approved training.

(b) No ALPR operator may access California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETs) data unless otherwise authorized to do so.

(c) If practical, an operator should verify an ALPR response through the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETs) before taking enforcement action that is based solely on an ALPR alert.

1305.6 DATA PROTECTION
**Surveillance Use Policy-Fixed ALPRs**

All saved data will be safeguarded and protected by both procedural and technological means. The Berkeley Police Department will observe the following safeguards regarding access to and use of stored data (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53):

(a) Non-law enforcement requests for access to stored ALPR data shall be processed according to the Records Maintenance and Release Policy in accordance with applicable law.

(b) All ALPR data downloaded to any workstation or server shall be accessible only through a login/password-protected system capable of documenting all access of information by name, date and time (Civil Code § 1798.90.52).

(c) Berkeley Police Department members approved to access ALPR data under these guidelines are permitted to access the data for legitimate California law enforcement purposes only, such as when the data relate to a specific criminal investigation or department-related civil or administrative action.

(d) Aggregated ALPR data not related to specific criminal investigations shall not be released to any local, state or federal agency or entity without the consent of the Chief of Police or City Manager (i.e. If transportation department requested volume of vehicular traffic associated with specific events, it could conceivably be provided with the count of vehicles, but not the specific license plates with appropriate permissions).

(e) Measures will be taken to ensure the accuracy of ALPR information. Errors discovered in ALPR data collected by ALPR units shall be marked, corrected or deleted in accordance with the type and severity of the error in question.

(f) ALPR system audits will be conducted by the Professional Standards Bureau’s Audit and Inspections Sergeant on a regular basis, at least biennial.

(g) Such ALPR data may be released to other authorized and verified law enforcement officials and agencies for legitimate California law enforcement purposes.

(h) Every ALPR Detection Browsing Inquiry must be documented by either the associated Berkeley Police case number or incident number, and/or a reason for the inquiry.

For security or data breaches, see the Records Release and Maintenance Policy.

**1305.7 CIVIL LIBERTIES AND RIGHTS PROTECTION**

The Berkeley Police Department is dedicated to the most efficient utilization of its resources and services in its public safety endeavors. The Berkeley Police Department recognizes the need to protect its ownership and control over shared information and to protect the privacy and civil liberties of the public, in accordance with federal and state law. The procedures described within this policy (Data Access, Data Protection, Data Retention, Public Access and Third-Party Data Sharing) protect against the unauthorized use of ALPR data. These policies ensure the data is not used in a way that would violate or infringe upon anyone’s civil rights and/or liberties, including but not limited to potentially disparate or adverse impacts on any communities or groups.
1305.8 DATA RETENTION
All ALPR data belongs to the Department. All ALPR data downloaded to the ALPR server should be stored for no longer than 30 days, and in accordance with the established records retention schedule. Thereafter, ALPR data should be purged unless it has become, or it is reasonable to believe it will become, evidence in a criminal or civil action or is subject to a discovery request or other lawful action to produce records. In those circumstances the applicable data should be downloaded from the server and uploaded into BPD’s digital evidence repository.

ALPR vendor, will store the data (data hosting) and ensure proper maintenance and security of data stored in their data towers. The ALPR vendor will purge their data at the end of the 30 days of storage. However, this will not preclude Berkeley Police Department from maintaining any relevant vehicle data obtained from the system after that period pursuant to the established City of Berkeley retention schedule mentioned above or outlined elsewhere. Relevant vehicle data are scans corresponding to the vehicle of interest on a hot list. The ALPR vendor and Department shall ensure that the necessary data is captured and stored to accurately report the relevant data required in the Annual Surveillance Technology report. Once the City Council approves the Annual Surveillance Technology report all said data may be purged so long as it doesn’t violate the Retention guidelines.

1305.9 PUBLIC ACCESS
All data and images gathered by the ALPR are for the official use of this department. Because such data may contain confidential information, it is not open to public review.

The Department shall to the extent feasible aim to offer a transparency portal wherein the number of scans, hits, and queries is available to the public in real-time, or as near as real-time as feasible. All data shall be reported in the Annual Surveillance Technology Report.

1305.10 THIRD PARTY DATA-SHARING
The ALPR data may be shared only with other law enforcement or prosecutorial agencies for official law enforcement purposes or as otherwise permitted by law.

(a) A supervisor at the requesting agency will sign an acknowledgement letter stating that the shared data will only be used for the purposes that are aligned with the Berkeley Police Department’s policy. The Berkeley Police Department does not permit the sharing of ALPR data gathered by the City or its contractors/subcontractors for purpose of federal immigration enforcement, these federal immigration agencies include Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Patrol (CBP). See attached letter.

(b) The signed letter is retained on file. Requests for ALPR data by non-law enforcement or non-prosecutorial agencies will be processed as provided in the Records Maintenance and Release Policy (Civil Code § 1798.90.55).

(c) All signed letters shall be routed to the Audit and Inspection Sergeant for compliance and reporting.
ALPR data is subject to the provisions of the Berkeley Police Department’s Immigration Law Policy, and hence may not be shared with federal immigration enforcement officials.

1305.11 TRAINING
Training for the operation of ALPR Technology shall be provided by BPD personnel. All BPD
Surveillance Use Policy-Fixed ALPRs

employees who utilize ALPR Technology shall be provided a copy of this Surveillance Use Policy.

1305.12 AUDITING AND OVERSIGHT
ALPR system audits will be conducted by the Professional Standards Bureau’s Audit and Inspections Sergeant on a regular basis, at least biannually. The data from the fixed ALPRs shall be reported annually in the Surveillance Technology Report.

Any ALPR data or images that are utilized for an investigation that becomes evidence in a case will be made available to the Office of the Director of Police Accountability (ODPA) as it relates to a specific complaint of misconduct. Additionally, the results of any audits will be shared with the ODPA upon their completion.

1305.13 MAINTENANCE
Any installation and maintenance of ALPR equipment, as well as ALPR data retention and access, shall be managed by the Investigations Division Captain or his or her designee. The Investigations Division Captain will assign members under his/her command to administer the day-to-day operation of the ALPR equipment and data. Equipment maintenance shall be provided by the vendor.
FIXED AUTOMATED LICENSE PLATE READERS (ALPR)

A. DESCRIPTION

Fixed Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs) are cameras systems with software designed for license plate recognition. The camera systems are typically mounted on street poles, street lights, and highway overpasses.

ALPRs are designed to capture license plate numbers which come into view, along with the location, date and time. The data, which includes an image of the front or the back of the car displaying the license plate, is then uploaded to a central server operated by the vendor. The license plate data is cross referenced with systems such as Stolen Vehicle Systems (SVS), and other lists like Amber alerts to notice police of vehicles with hits.

This technology does not have facial recognition, and is not tied to any personal identifying information or used for traffic enforcement.

B. PURPOSE

Berkeley Police Department will utilize a network of fixed automated license plate readers. The ALPRs will be affixed to street poles, street lights, or other similar objects that are either owned by the City of Berkeley or wherein a right-of-way agreement has been established.

The use of ALPRs to alert police of a wanted or vehicle of interest entering into their respective jurisdiction has become increasingly more commonplace. This technology is being utilized on our local freeways, bridges, and in some instances in private parking lots.

Berkeley Police Department investigators have identified the following instances wherein the use of an effective deployment of ALPRs could have aided the Berkeley Police Department in it’s efforts to focus on the wanted vehicle prior to a crime occurring in the City of Berkeley, and potentially avoided an instance of victimization from happening.

RECENT CASES OF INTEREST

1.) BPD had an armed robbery in which the victim was pistol-whipped. The suspects fled in a vehicle. BPD officers located the vehicle and a pursuit ensued. The license plate on the vehicle was reported as a wanted vehicle for an armed robbery in San Ramon. Had this vehicle entered the City of Berkeley, and the vehicle passed an ALPR- BPD Officers could have been focused on finding this offender in an advance of this violent robbery.

2.) Victim was carjacked of his Toyota Rav-4. The suspect vehicle two days later was used in a murder that occurred in a nearby East Bay City. This same vehicle was used in a robbery in Oakland. The stolen property in the Oakland robbery was tracked back into Berkeley. Then this same vehicle was used to commit a robbery in Berkeley at Woolsey
and Telegraph. The vehicle was listed as a car-jacking vehicle from the initial crime, ALPRs could have alerted BPD prior to the property being discarded in Berkeley, as well as the final robbery listed in this synopsis.

3.) Home invasion robbery in Berkeley wherein the suspect came in a stolen vehicle, listed in SVS as a wanted vehicle. The suspect violently attacked the resident. The suspect was arrested shortly after in San Pablo due to an ALPR hit. Suspect was unknown but identified due to having the victims stolen property.

4.) An armed robbery occurred in Berkeley the suspects fled in a cold plated stolen vehicle, meaning the vehicle was listed as wanted in SVS. San Pablo PD stopped the suspect vehicle due to the want associated to the license plate. Suspect was arrested and was in possession of a firearm. Suspect was eventually also linked to a stranger sexual assault case.

5.) A robbery of Valero in Berkeley occurred. The suspect arrived in stolen vehicle. The suspect was subsequently arrested by San Mateo PD due to an ALPR hit.

6.) A Victim called BPD to report his carjacked/stolen vehicle (from Union City), was tracking in South Berkeley. The victim was originally carjacked via gun by a group of suspects in Union City a few days prior. Moreover, Officers responded to South Berkeley but were unable to locate the victim’s vehicle. The victim later tracked his carjacked/stolen vehicle to 1370 University Ave. Officers responded to this location and located the victim’s vehicle. Three juveniles and one adult fled from the vehicle but were captured by the Officers. A search of the vehicle yielded a concealed/loaded firearm.

CATALYTIC CONVERTER THEFTS WITH GUNFIRE

7.) A theft of a catalytic converter took place at 5th and Hearst. The suspect vehicle’s license plate was captured on video surveillance. BPD put a felony stop on the vehicle. San Pablo PD located the vehicle using their ALPR system and arrested the driver who was in possession of a loaded handgun.

8.) A catalytic converter theft occurred at 145 Hillcrest Road. The suspect vehicle’s license plate was captured on video surveillance. BPD put a felony stop on the vehicle. Pinole PD located the vehicle. During a search of the vehicle, BPD located an assault rifle (ghost gun) and arrested the suspect.

9.) A pickup truck, wanted in SVS due to it being reported as a stolen vehicle, entered Berkeley. The aforementioned was caught in the act of cutting a catalytic converter
from a vehicle on the 1800 block of 4th Street. Witnesses and a Security guard confronted the suspects. The suspects fled, and then immediately returned to shoot at the witness and security guard.

PROPERTY CRIME

10.) An auto burglary occurred at 1316 San Pablo Avenue and the victim obtained a license plate. A felony entry was made on the license plate. Pittsburg PD located the suspect vehicle due to an ALPR hit. The vehicle failed to yield and crashed. The driver was arrested for the failure to yield and Pittsburg PD located a loaded handgun in her purse.

11.) A suspect drove into Berkeley in a stolen vehicle, listed in SVS. The suspect drove to the driveway of 1626 Berkeley Way and proceeded to steal that resident’s vehicle.

12.) Two suspects drove a reported stolen auto to Berkeley Bowl West. The suspects then burglarized a victim’s vehicle. The suspect then proceeded to Emeryville where they used the Victim’s identity to commit identity theft.

13.) A series of auto burglaries were committed in the area of San Pablo and Gilman. The suspects were seen getting into a vehicle which was listed in SVS as a stolen vehicle. Two days later a nearby city reported the same vehicle was used in a murder in that city. ALPR system could have notified officers of that wanted vehicle and helped in the capture of the suspects, and potentially intervened before the subsequent murder.

HOMICIDE

14.) Another agency reported a vehicle used in a murder, with a known license plate was entered into SVS with a felony want (associated with a murder). On 08/02/22 the vehicle was located in Berkeley. The associated suspects were located after fleeing from officers.

15.) BPD officers responded to a report of a person casing a house. Upon their arrival the suspects fled in a white sedan. That sedan was determined to be a reported stolen auto. The sedan fled from officers after they activated their emergency lights and sirens. The same vehicle was reported to be involved in a road rage incident in an adjacent city wherein the suspects shot and killed the victim on the freeway.

SEX/DV CRIMES

16.) This is a DV case in which the suspect fought with his adult girlfriend causing visible injury and then chased his girlfriend’s 12 year old daughter down the street and shot at
her with a firearm. San Pablo PD had an ALPR hit from this Berkeley PD case. The suspect ran from San Pablo PD and a gun was recovered from him.

17.) This is a series of peeping and prowling incidents against female UC Berkeley students. The suspect was driving for a ride share service and was in and out of Berkeley for the several months. The suspect was homeless, and thereby conventional methods of locating the suspect weren’t fruitful.

C. LOCATION
BPD proposes to install 52 fixed ALPRs in the City of Berkeley. While the cameras are permanent installations, if found ineffective in the installed location, the Department can elect to move the camera to another location at nominal cost. It’s preferred to leave cameras installed in locations for periods of minimally a year. Locations will be determined using crime data, known locations of ingress or egress into the City of Berkeley, and commonly known direction of travel after criminal acts based on information provided from investigators. The Department will balance the need to deploy the camera systems equitably across the City of Berkeley with the need to deploy the cameras in an effective manner. BPD will solicit input from the vendor for an effective deployment.

D. IMPACT
The Berkeley Police Department is dedicated to the most efficient utilization of its resources and services in its public safety endeavors. The Berkeley Police Department recognizes the need to protect its ownership and control over shared information and to protect the privacy and civil liberties of the public, in accordance with federal and state law. The procedures utilized with ALPR Units will help to ensure unauthorized use of its data. The procedures will ensure the data is not used in a way that would violate or infringe upon anyone’s civil rights and/or liberties, including but not limited to potentially disparate or adverse impacts on any communities or groups.

E. MITIGATION
All saved data will be safeguarded and protected by both procedural and technological means which are implemented to safeguard the public from any impacts identified in subsection (D). See subsection (G) for further.

F. DATA TYPES AND SOURCES
Images of license plates and location metadata may be obtained through the use of ALPR cameras. The vendor’s system may have searching capabilities due to technology from machine learning
that allow officers to search by vehicle type, make, color, license plate state, bumper sticker (the presence of a bumper sticker, not the image or content), decals (again the presence of a decal, not the image or content) and roof racks. All data stored in the vendor’s servers shall be securely protected with end-to-end encryption.

G. DATA SECURITY

BPD takes data security seriously. All saved data will be safeguarded and protected by both procedural and technological means. The Berkeley Police Department will observe the following safeguards regarding access to and use of stored data (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53):

(a) Non-law enforcement requests for access to stored ALPR data shall be processed according to the Records Maintenance and Release Policy in accordance with applicable law.

(b) All ALPR data downloaded to any workstation or server shall be accessible only through a login/password-protected system capable of documenting all access of information by name, date and time (Civil Code § 1798.90.52).

(c) Berkeley Police Department members approved to access ALPR data under these guidelines are permitted to access the data for legitimate law enforcement purposes only, such as when the data relate to a specific criminal investigation or department-related civil or administrative action.

(d) Aggregated ALPR data not related to specific criminal investigations shall not be released to any local, state or federal agency or entity without the consent of the Chief of Police or City Manager.

(e) Measures will be taken to ensure the accuracy of ALPR information. Errors discovered in ALPR data collected by ALPR units shall be marked, corrected or deleted in accordance with the type and severity of the error in question.

(f) ALPR system audits will be conducted by the Professional Standards Bureau’s Audit and Inspections Sergeant on a regular basis, at least biennial.

(g) Such ALPR data may be released to other authorized and verified law enforcement officials and agencies for legitimate law enforcement purposes.

(h) Every ALPR Detection Browsing Inquiry must be documented by either the associated Berkeley Police case number or incident number, and/or a reason for the inquiry.

For security or data breaches, see the Records Release and Maintenance Policy.
H. FISCAL COST
Since the City of Berkeley has not acquired the specific cameras, the costs can only be estimated. BPD expects the individual camera costs to range from $2500-$5000 each, with the installation to vary. BPD believes that for the proposed 52 camera deployment the cost to purchase and install to not exceed an initial cost of $250,000. The yearly subscription cost may fluctuate but is expected to range from $125,000 to $175,000 a year.

I. THIRD-PARTY DEPENDENCE AND ACCESS
ALPR vendor would store the data (data hosting) and ensure proper maintenance and security of data stored in their data towers. The vendor will purge their data at the end of 30 days of storage. However, this will not preclude Berkeley Police Department from maintaining any relevant vehicle data obtained from the system after that period pursuant to the established City of Berkeley retention schedule (i.e. if detectives establish a hit results in evidentiary value it should be incorporated into the digital evidence of that specific case, and thereby would be kept longer than the aforementioned 30 days).

Restrictions on use of fixed ALPR Data: Information gathered or collected, and records retained by the Vendor will not be sold, accessed, or used for any purpose other than legitimate law enforcement or public safety purpose unless allowed by policy (i.e. metadata will be permissible use for annual surveillance reporting).

An ALPR shall only be used for official law enforcement business.

Use of an ALPR is restricted to the purposes outlined below. Department members shall not use, or allow others to use the equipment or database records for any unauthorized purpose (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53).

(a) An ALPR shall only be used for official law enforcement business.

(b) An ALPR may be used in conjunction with any routine patrol operation or to support criminal investigations. Reasonable suspicion or probable cause is not required before using an ALPR.

(c) Partial license plates and unique vehicle descriptions reported during major crimes should be entered into the ALPR system in an attempt to identify suspect vehicles.

The ALPR system, and all data collected, is the property of the Berkeley Police Department. Department personnel may only access and use the ALPR system for official and legitimate law enforcement purposes consistent with this Policy. The following uses of the ALPR system are specifically prohibited:

(1) Invasion of Privacy: Except when done pursuant to a court order such as a search warrant, is a violation of this Policy to utilize the ALPR to record license plates except
those of vehicles that are exposed to public view (e.g., vehicles on a public road or street, or that are on private property but whose license plate(s) are visible from a public road, street, or a place to which members of the public have access, such as the parking lot of a shop or other business establishment).

(2) Harassment or Intimidation: It is a violation of this Policy to use the ALPR system to harass and/or intimidate any individual or group.

(3) Use Based on a Protected Characteristic. It is a violation of this policy to use the ALPR system or associated scan files or hot lists solely because of a person's, or group's race, gender, religion, political affiliation, nationality, ethnicity, sexual orientation, disability, or other classification protected by law.

(4) Personal Use: It is a violation of this Policy to use the ALPR system or associated scan files or hot lists for any personal purpose.

(5) First Amendment Rights. It is a violation of this policy to use the LPR system or associated scan files or hot lists for the purpose or known effect of infringing upon First Amendment rights.

Anyone who engages in an impermissible use of the ALPR system or associated scan files or hot lists may be subject to administrative sanctions, up to and including termination, pursuant to and consistent with the relevant collective bargaining agreements and departmental policies.

The ALPR data may be shared only with other law enforcement or prosecutorial agencies for official law enforcement purposes or as otherwise permitted by law.

(a) A supervisor at the requesting agency will sign an acknowledgement letter stating that the shared data will only be used for the purposes that are aligned with the Berkeley Police Department’s policy. The Berkeley Police Department does not permit the sharing of ALPR data gathered by the City or its contractors/subcontractors for purpose of federal immigration enforcement, these federal immigration agencies include Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Patrol (CBP).

(b) The signed letter is retained on file. Requests for ALPR data by non-law enforcement or non-prosecutorial agencies will be processed as provided in the Records Maintenance and Release Policy (Civil Code § 1798.90.55).

J. ALTERNATIVES
An alternative is the deployment of additional police resources. The inherent problems with this alternative is that it is difficult to hire and train additional police officers and the cost would be
significantly higher than adding technology. Furthermore, this technology furthers the Department’s goal in protecting and safeguarding our community through precision based policing strategies.

K. EXPERIENCE OF OTHER ENTITIES

Currently, in Alameda County, the following cities have ALPR programs, The Alameda County Sheriff’s Office, Alameda PD, Emeryville PD, Fremont PD, Hayward PD, Livermore PD, Newark PD, Oakland PD, Piedmont PD, Pleasanton PD, San Leandro PD, Union City PD, and the California Highway Patrol. The only agency in Alameda County to not utilize ALPRs is Albany PD.

Representatives from Newark indicated success with their program. No notable issues have arisen as a result of this program. Additionally, no unexpected expenditures have come from this program that were unforeseen.

Representatives from indicated similar to the above, success with their program. No notable issues have arisen as a result of this program. Additionally, no unexpected expenditures have come from this program that were unforeseen.
To: Honorable Mayor and City Council Members  
From: Dee Williams-Ridley, City Manager  
Submitted by: Jennifer Louis, Chief of Police  
Subject: Response to the PAB Objections and PSPC on Surveillance Ordinance item related to Fixed Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs)

CURRENT SITUATION AND ITS EFFECTS
The Berkeley Police Department received feedback regarding the proposed policies from the Police Accountability Board at an ad hoc PAB meeting on 6/16/23 and the Public Safety Policy Committee meeting on 6/20/23. The purpose of this memorandum is to address those concerns.

On June 16, 2023, Chief Louis received via electronic mail an Objection to the Berkeley Police Department Surveillance Acquisition Report – Fixed Automated License Plate Readers (ALPR) and Proposed Policies 422 and 1305 from PAB Chair John “Chip” Moore. That document listed four primary concerns with eight subsections that are restated and addressed below.

1.) Civil Liberties Protections: The proposed acquisition report and policies need to provide stronger safeguards and assurances for protecting civil liberties and privacy rights. It is essential to ensure that the acquisition and use of ALPRs do not infringe upon the rights of individuals in our community. For example:

a. One PAB member expressed concerns that the acquisition report or the policies don’t provide safeguards for this surveillance technology or its data being used in a way that could run afoul of reproductive rights by recording movements or location patterns of individuals seeking medical attention or health services for reproductive rights.

BPD Response:
At the recommendation of a PAB Member on 6/20/23, the Department has modified the language to include “California” law enforcement purposes to address this concern. The policy was changed from “legitimate law enforcement purposes” to “legitimate California law enforcement purposes”

b. The PAB stated concern that the Department indicates “Reasonable suspicion or probable cause is not required before using an ALPR”, but provides no clear
examples of a scenario where the technology may be required to be used without reaching these important legal thresholds.

**BPD Response:**
ALPR is a tool that assists law enforcement in several manners. First, it is proactive by alerting patrol officers when a wanted vehicle passes through an intersection that is equipped with an ALPR. Additionally, as the Department shared in both the PAB subcommittee meeting on 6/16/23 and the PSPC meeting on 6/20/23, ALPR also has a second use as a potential to aid in developing probable cause. An example of this use would be if a shooting occurred at Sacramento and Ashby with a white vehicle fleeing. The use of an ALPR could further the detective’s ability to establish probable cause and further an investigation. Additionally, officers investigating missing person cases would be able to add a vehicle license plate to the missing person report, but not every missing person case would have probable cause or reasonable suspicion as it’s not necessarily a crime.

Furthermore, in a PAB meeting, it was clarified that in this language that the PAB cites (from Policy 422.5(b) and 1305.3(b)) the Department has added Reasonable suspicion or probable cause is not required before using an ALPR database. This further refines the point that this applies to the database. It was not intended to mislead that an enforcement stop could be conducted outside of the constitutionally guided authority.

c. There appears to be unclear language about retention periods. In one section the Department indicates, “The ALPR vendor will purge their data at the end of the 30 days of storage.” Then, the Department includes seemingly contradictory language in its policy: “However, this will not preclude Berkeley Police Department from maintaining any relevant vehicle data obtained from the system after that period pursuant to the established City of Berkeley retention schedule mentioned above or outlined elsewhere.” (see Section 1305.4 of the proposed policy).

**BPD Response:**
This language indicates that any ALPR hit that becomes part of a case would be downloaded into the digital evidence repository and subject to the pre-established retention guidelines for evidence pursuant to BPD Policy 804 Records Release Management.

2) **Lack of Empirical Support or Data justifying the need or its intended use:** We have noted a lack of empirical evidence or data demonstrating the effectiveness of the technology in achieving its intended goals here in the City of Berkeley. While the PAB is aware the BPD has reported an increase in crime in specific categories over the years, comparable jurisdictions with or without this technology have not been analyzed to
determine potential effectiveness for those crime categories. Before moving forward with the acquisition, it is crucial to have solid evidence that ALPRs will significantly contribute to solving criminal investigations and enhancing public safety beyond the highlighted cases the Department cites in the Acquisition Report.

a. The ODPA’s report cited the IACP (2022) survey which indicated, “Although research is sparse, there is some evidence that suggests LPR use is effective at preventing crime.” However, the Acquisition Report fails to adequately provide a data-based justification for why the City of Berkeley needs to adopt this technology.

BPD Response:
The Department has brought forth this item in response to a City Council Budget Referral Item. However, in 2020 Berkeley Police reported to the FBI a total of 805 vehicle thefts. As of 6/20/23, in the past 180 days, Berkeley Police had 704 reported vehicle thefts. This data indicates that for the first half of 2023, the City has reached 87% of vehicle thefts for the entire year of 2020. If that trend continues that could lead to a 74% increase in vehicle thefts. According to a record management query, BPD year to date has noted the loss in vehicle thefts for the City of Berkeley (only those reported to BPD, not including BART, or UCPD-Berkeley as of 6/26/23) is $1,949,386 in losses just from the vehicles; which does not include lost wages, or emotional losses.

b. As noted in the ODPA report, as currently written, the Purpose section of the BPD’s Acquisition Report does not explicitly mention a data-based justification for the use of ALPRs (beyond the highlighted cases of interest). To strengthen the justification for the acquisition, the BPD needs to provide statistical analyses (or other data analyses) demonstrating the effectiveness of ALPRs in reducing the specific crime problems the City would like to resolve.

BPD Response:
The item was drafted in response to a City Council Budget referral. However, as it relates to effectiveness, it’s difficult to empirically capture the expected effectiveness though the Department expects there to be both a deterrent effect as well as a direct measurable impact. While some cities like Alameda have few entrances and exits to the city via roadway, Berkeley has several dozens of roadways that enter and exit our neighboring cities. BPD is not recommending tracking all of those avenues but rather focuses on the main corridors with the limited number of cameras proposed. BPD is proposing in this item a two-year trial period wherein the data can be tracked in the Annual STO report. At the end of the trial period City Council will ultimately decide on the extent of continued use.

3) Concerns about True Financial Costs: The PAB has concerns about the true costs
associated with the technology, including potential hidden costs, maintenance expenses, and long-term financial commitments. It is essential to have a comprehensive understanding of the financial implications and ensure that the benefits outweigh the costs.

**BPD Response:**
BPD is confident in our ask for Council authority as outlined in section H of the Acquisition Report, where BPD indicates that the initial cost is not to exceed $250,000 and that the annual subscription cost is not to exceed $175,000 a year based on the current costs. This is an all-inclusive cost as the equipment is leased, and all maintenance is assumed by the vendor.

4) **Lack of Completeness of the Acquisition Report and Proposed Policies:** The proposed policies require further clarity, elaboration, and editing. Particularly, the Department should clearly outline the intended uses of the data, retention periods, access controls, and measures to protect against potential misuse or unauthorized access (to include more information about minimum training requirements for the users of the technology). For example:

a. The PAB stated that in the proposed policies, the Department uses language to emphasize the importance of data privacy, protection of civil liberties, and accountability but has a weak approach to misuse in Section 422.5 of the proposed policy, “Anyone who engages in an impermissible use of the ALPR system or associated scan files or hot lists may be subject to administrative sanctions, up to and including termination, pursuant to and consistent with the relevant collective bargaining agreements and departmental policies.” (emphasis added). Adherence to the policy needs to be nonnegotiable, therefore the Department needs to modify the language to indicate that impermissible uses **SHALL** be subject to administrative sanctions.

**BPD Response:**
BPD proposes the following edit as discussed at PSPC on 6/20/23:

Anyone who intentionally engages in an impermissible use of the ALPR system or associated scan files or hot lists shall be subject to administrative sanctions, up to and including termination, pursuant to and consistent with the relevant collective bargaining agreements and departmental policies.

Anyone who negligently engages in an impermissible use of the ALPR system or associated scan files or hot lists may be subject to administrative sanctions, up to and including termination, pursuant to and consistent with the relevant collective bargaining agreements and departmental policies.
b. Section 422.10 of the proposed policy mentions the requirement for training but does not specify what that will look like. As noted in the ODPA report, the BPD should outline the minimum training requirements provided to officers on the proper use of ALPRs and adherence to privacy and civil rights standards.

**BPD Response:**
Training is offered by FLOCK upon entering into a contract. The training will cover the use of the technology, equipment, and policy. BPD will help in the creation of robust training to ensure officers are able to properly and lawfully utilize the ALPRs upon Council approval.

c. Without clear articulation of the minimum training requirements, the Board has concerns regarding Sections 422.5 and 1305.3 of the proposed policies which encapsulate conditions for use, standards to be observed for various circumstances (stop of car vs. stop of person for example) and required verification before certain activities can be taken.

**BPD Response:**
The Department does not anticipate the use of ALPRs to lead to stops of persons, also referred to as pedestrian stops. However, as explained at the PAB meeting on 06/27/23, nothing changes the legal parameters that guide the permissibility of detentions.

As with any new or updated policy issued by the Department, an appropriate training plan will be developed to ensure personnel are aware of how to use technology and the policy that guides its use. For this technology, training will be provided by the vendor. It’s premature to develop a training plan in advance of Council approval, and without knowing the vendor for certain. If the vendor is Flock they offer a training program which will be made available on the Department’s Website. As for concern for adherence to the policy, all policy violations are enforced pursuant to Policy 1010. Regardless of training, no officer can use the system without acknowledging the policy and understanding the consequences of policy violations.

**OTHER CONCERNS ADDRESSED:**
**PAB reviewing ALPR data**
PAB/DPA sought language added to the policy to codify their ability to review materials related to the ALPR system.

**BPD Response:**
The Department has included the following language in the policy (422.10 & 1305.12):

**Office of the Director of Police Accountability**
Any ALPR data or images that are utilized for an investigation that becomes evidence in a case will be made available to the ODPA as it relates to a specific complaint of misconduct. Additionally, the results of any audits will be shared with the ODPA upon their completion.

A member asked about Berkeley’s Stolen Vehicle trends

BPD Response:

According to BPD Law Enforcement Records Management System (VC 10851 – vehicle theft)

According to BPD Law Enforcement Records Management System (PC 215 – Car-jacking)
A member asked about other nearby agencies utilizing ALPR’s and any data as to the effectiveness.

BPD Response:

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**ODPA Mitigation and Data Security**

While the Department indicates that it will safeguard and protect data through procedural and technological means, Policy 1305 should be strengthened to reflect this commitment. Specifically, the BPD should consider revising 1305.4 Data Collection in the following manner:

**BPD Response:**

**Current Language:** The Department should if feasible find a solution to transfer evidentiary hit data into its digital evidence repository through secure integration.

**Suggested Language:** Evidentiary hit data shall be transferred into the Department’s digital evidence repository through secure integration.

The Department accepted this suggested language as proposed.

**ODPA - Third Party Dependencies.**

The ODPA asserts concern that the use of ALPRs may lead to racial disparities.

**BPD Response:**

The Department does not anticipate the placement of ALPR may yield racial disparities. The cameras capture objective evidence and provide objective results or notifications.
This technology further supports the Department’s goal of providing precision-based policing. The Department believes this technology furthers the goal of reducing racial disparities by leveraging objective evidence.

The Department would also like to advise the Council that California legislatures currently have AB 1463 which would restrict retention periods, require annual audits, and prohibit out-of-state sharing without a valid subpoena, court order, or warrant. This legislation is pending further approval.

On 6/20/23 at the direction of the Public Safety Policy Committee, the Department agreed to submit an off-agenda item with the placement of the ALPRs pending the Council’s approval of the item.

ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY AND CLIMATE IMPACTS
None identified.

CONTACT PERSON
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